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ABSTRACT
This article explores two related questions: First, does mood shape how well
lawyers succeed at negotiation? Second, can lawyers succeed better at negotiation
by understanding and managing the role of mood?
On the first question, many studies of psychology and business school students'
show those in even mildly better moods - after smelling a pleasant scent, or
watching a funny five minute video - do better at negotiation. The studies tell us
much less clearly how mood leads to success. Nor do the studies carefully consider
how much they apply to law students, lawyers, and legal negotiations. Although it
is likely that such studies apply to at least some degree to at least some lawyers and
legal negotiations, the article suggests several reasons why mood may apply
differently.
There is far less clear scientific research that addresses the second question, key
to negotiators: How does one do better in negotiation by studying mood? Based on
scientific research on mood management, the article shows the limitations of both
pop psychology mood management and the limitations of basic research on mood
and negotiation. Instead, the article offers some preliminary suggestions on potential
short-term and longer-term strategies based on: (1) correcting for the dysfunctional
effects of certain moods, and/or (2) attempting to change moods that may have
dysfunctional effects.
In short, the article presents a critical analysis of existing scientific research on
how mood affects negotiation, analyzes how that research might apply differently
to lawyers, and offers practical advice - rooted in empirical research - on how
lawyers might manage their moods to improve both their results in negotiation and
their own health.
The article differs in four ways from two recent books by the Harvard Project
on Negotiation, Beyond Winning (2000) and Difficult Conversations (1999). First,
while both those books emphasize that emotion may be a barrier to negotiation, this
article also addresses how moods and emotion may help negotiation. Second, while
both books concentrate on negative mood, this article presents research that positive
mood - not merely the absence of negative mood - may lead to better results at
negotiation. Third, while both books depend on an uncritical incorporation of
psychological theories and research on non-lawyers, the article questions some of the
ideology and method of psychological research including how much it applies to
lawyers. Fourth, while Difficult Conversations focuses on deep-seeded and intense
emotion, the article instead shows how even very mild changes in mood (such as
from watching a five minute funny video or smelling a mild scent) have significant
effects on success in negotiation.
[Vol. 2002, No. I
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The Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist: What We
Know and Don't Know About How Mood Relates To
Successful Negotiation,
PROLOGUE:
Five minutes before the big deal, and all the players are getting psyched. One
man starts punching a pillow to vent his anger' and psych himself up for the big
fight. One person is watching his favorite funny movie.' Another suggests playing
some pleasant music before discussions begin.4 One person is taking Botox to keep
from letting his face show any emotion. One person is meditating with his breath to
make himself more aware of reality. One person is visualizing himself as the
successful winner.' One person is popping Xanax to keep from getting too worked
up.
6
Are these people nuts - or can science reveal how certain moods may promote
successful negotiation?
I. We acknowledge the inspiration of Galanter's criticism of common misunderstandings about data
on other topics about which we think we know much, but where our common understandings lack
support. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don t Know (And
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4 (1983).
2. On the dysfunctional aspects of mere venting, see infra text accompanying n. 321.
3. See Roderick Kramer et al., Self-enhancement Biases and Negotiator Judgment: Effects of Self-
esteem and Mood, 56 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. Proc. 110, 116-19 (1993).
4. At informal meetings of the United Nations Security Council, diplomats began playing music at
the beginning of each session. Barbara Crosette, Stop The Music, Envoy Says, N.Y. Times (New York,
NY) AI0 (June 12, 2001). At least one diplomat was not amused, asking the Council to "'stop such
jokes."' Id. Scientific study of music and mood suggests the diplomat misunderstood how music could
help negotiations. See generally, Lawrence J. Sanna, Defensive Pessimism and Optimism: the Bitter-
sweet Influence ofMoodon Performance and Prefactual and Counterfactual Thinking, 12 Cog. & Emot.
635,648-49 (1998) (showing how use of certain music predictably induced negative orpositive moods);
Benjamin M. Dykman, A Test of Whether Negative Emotional Priming Facilitates Access to Latent
Dysfunctional Attitudes, II Cog. & Emot. 208, 210 (1997) (same).
5. Visualizing success is a familiar pop psychology mantra, but experimental research shows that
merely picturing success does not help. Shelley E. Taylor, Lien B. Pham, Inna D. Rivkin & David A.
Armor, Harnessing the Imagination: Mental Simulation. Self-Regulation, and Coping, 53 Am. Psychol.
429,438 (1998) ("Mental simulations in which people focus exclusively on the outcomes they want to
achieve may succeed in making them feel good, but these emotional regulation benefits may be achieved
at the expense of effective planning and problem solving.").
6. Interview with Dan Smith, (May 24, 2001) (describing how some prominent lawyers act before
settlement conferences).
2002]
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INTRODUCTION
This article explores two related questions: First, does mood7 shape how well
lawyers succeed at negotiation?" Second, can lawyers succeed better at negotiation
by understanding and managing the role of mood? We begin by exploring what
scientific evidence we currently have about how mild changes in mood are
associated with significant differences in success at negotiation. Ultimately, we
argue that existing scientific evidence shows mood plays a far more complicated role
than negotiators and negotiation scholars usually imagine, but that further research
needs to address more carefully exactly how mood works and how it affects lawyers
7. We use "mood" as the most generally familiar word that captures the relatively mild emotional
changes that may affect the way people negotiate. For our purposes, because we are concerned with
helping negotiators improve their own behavior, we examine a continuum that begins with quite
transient moods, which may be readily changed by such simple things as music, scents, small gifts,
funny videos, and so on. See infra text accompanying nn. 190-93 (distinguishing between transient
mood, moderately stable mood disorders, and more stable personality). We follow an entire cottage
industry of researchers who use "mood" to refer to the mild changes such simple manipulations induce
in most people. W. Gerrod Parrott & Paula Hertel, Research Methods, in Handbook of Cognition and
Emotion 665 (Tim Dalgleish & Mick Power eds., Wiley 1999). At the other extreme are quite stable
personality predispositions, which might change, if at all, only due to lengthy therapy. In between, we
consider a range of mood disorders which are more difficult to change, but which typically change on
their own or respond to relatively brief psychological counseling.
Other researchers use the terms "mood," "affect," and "emotion" in various different ways that are of
less concern to our project We note that other researchers often use the less familiar term "affect" as
an umbrella term. See Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition 415 (2d ed., McGraw-Hill
1991) ("[a]ffect subsumes preferences, evaluations, moods, and emotions"); Leigh L. Thompson, Janice
Nadler & Peter H. Kim, Some Like It Hot: The Case For The Emotional Negotiator, in Shared Cognition
in Organizations: The Management Of Knowledge 140 n. I (Leigh Thompson et al., eds., Lawrence
Erlbaum 1999) (acknowledging various distinctions sometimes made by other psychologists but using
"affect in a very broad sense to refer to the entire constellation of emotion and feeling states that are
experienced by negotiators and characterize the negotiation process"). As one leading text summarized,
"[M]any of these distinctions are not uniformly applied by those working in the field. In fact, some of
the best empirical work... bears little relation to the best taxonomic work....". Fiske & Taylor, supra
at 415.
8. We note there is no single agreed upon definition of negotiation - other than the consensus among
scholars of negotiation that it describes much of what all of us, particularly lawyers, do much of the time.
Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. of Dis. Res. 1, 66 (1996); Joseph D.
Harbaugh & Barbara Britzke, The Negotiation Process, 347 Practicing Law Institute 17, 34 (1988)
("More than 90 percent of all matters handled by lawyers, whether they be planning problems or
litigation cases, are resolved through the process of negotiation."); Leonard L. Riskin, A Response to
Professor Pipkin, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 757, 759 (1998) ("[A]II lawyers negotiate ...."); Charles Thensted,
Litigation and Less: The Negotiation Alternative, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 76,92 (1984) ("[N]egotiation is what
litigators now do .... ); John Barkai, Teaching Negotiation and ADR: The Savvy Samurai Meets the
Devil, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 704,704 (1996) ("Negotiation pervades the life of a lawyer."); Walter W. Steele,
Jr., Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1387, 1387 (1986) ("[M]any
lawyers negotiate more than they litigate.").
Some emphasize the potential to help individuals do more together than they might as individuals;
others emphasize the potential of individuals to obtain more at the expense of another. See infra text
accompanying n. 15. We prefer a functional approach to negotiation, using the term "negotiation" when
analyses and skills associated with. "negotiation" may help individuals and groups of individuals
understand and/or improve their situation.
[Vol. 2002, No. I
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and legal negotiation. We also preview our ongoing empirical research attempts to
meet such needs.
Our shift to scientific study of mood and legal negotiation represents a kind of
third generation in negotiation scholarship. The first generation of negotiation
advice brought attention to negotiation as a phenomenon, but relied largely on
anecdote and theory rather than systematic empirical testing.9 A second generation
of legal negotiation scholarship brought quantitative rigor to the rational aspects of
negotiation, such as importing decision analysis to offer quantitative models of
settlement.'0 The rigor of this second generation, however, extended relatively little
to the questions of mood and emotions." Instead, this second generation largely
recreated the folk wisdom that lawyers and other super-negotiators could manage
emotion better largely by ignoring it -- lawyers could cool out the emotional client.
As one recent study by two business school teachers suggested, "human emotions
often interfere with rational judgment."'" The legal mediator could use reason to
"test" the overly emotion-laden reality of parties. There remains little careful study
of whether this folk wisdom about lawyers and emotion is correct.
The lack of careful study of how mood affects legal negotiations is curious when
so many see the importance of legal negotiation and the potential complications of
emotion. As a purely financial matter, lawyers have a huge financial stake in the
success of negotiations. Indeed, most of what lawyers do is negotiate in one way
or another. 3 From the perspective of individual lawyers, the ability to negotiate may
mean the ability to get better results for clients and, therefore, attract clients - rather
than lose clients to other professionals who might negotiate better.'4  The
significance extends beyond clients as well. Many academic lawyers claim that
lawyers not only help their clients but also help identify more efficient deals and
efficient ways to resolve conflict, thereby creating value that benefits society as a
9. See Arvind Rangasway & G. Richard Shell, Using Computers to Realize Joint Gains in
Negotiation: Towardan "Electronic Bargaining Table",43 Mgmt. Sci. 1147,1148 (1997) (contrasting
"purely anecdotal approaches to bargaining" with "analytical approaches that are based on models used
in economics, decision analysis, and game theory").
10. See e.g. John S. Murray et al., Processes of Dispute Resolution: The Role of Lawyers 218 (2d
ed., Found. Press 1996) (describing use of decision analysis to mathematically predict expected values
of cases); Robert H. Mnookin et al., Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and
Disputes 106-18 (Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press 2000).
11. See Thompson, Nadler & Kim, supra n. 7, at 139.
12. Rangaswamy & Shell, supra n. 9 at 1150. In a similar way, the most recent major book by the
head of the Harvard Project on Negotiation includes a heading "irrationality and emotion." See e.g.
Mnookin et al., supra n. 10, at 156. In a similar way, another book by three persons affiliated with the
Harvard Project on Negotiation also sees emotion as a barrier to negotiation. See Douglas Stone, Bruce
Patton & Shelia Heen, Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most 13 (Viking 1999)
("Getting too deep into feelings is messy [and] clouds good judgment," but some less deep discussion
of feeling may be helpful in "difficult conversations.").
13. See supra n. 8.
14. See infra text accompanying n. 230 (Non-lawyers may often perform the same activities as
lawyers, such as advocating in a grievance arbitration.).
2002]
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whole. " And much of the existing scientific research on negotiation and mood is
strongest in showing that certain moods are indeed associated with suchjoint gains. 6
For all these reasons, it is incredibly important to critically examine the evidence that
the mood of negotiators has a significant impact on how well lawyers achieve their
own goals and how well they facilitate truly win-win agreements that may benefit
other parties and society.
In exploring the way mood affects negotiation, we draw lessons from a
constellation of social psychology studies that seem to show that even mild changes
in mood"7 can affect the way even sophisticated and educated professionals, like elite
academic doctors and Stanford business school students, think and act." These
studies discussed at length in section one below, show that mood really can affect the
bottom line of negotiation success. But these studies alone tell us very little about
how lawyers can harness these findings into making themselves more successful
negotiators.
Our emphasis on the importance of mood and negotiation, rooted in these
studies, diverges from two different views about mood and negotiation that many
negotiation scholars, teachers, and popular books hold. One extreme view makes
personality everything: people have a certain durable way of approaching conflict,
and they apply this approach in all of their negotiations. In this extreme view, some
people always tend to compete, other people always tend to just give in to others,
some always avoid conflict, and so on. This view is most recently embodied in the
otherwise very valuable and lucid book by the head of the negotiation program at the
prestigious Wharton school.'9 In one popular variant of this theme, individuals may
15. One may distinguish among several views. On the least sophisticated view, lawyers are better
negotiators because they are somehow more cool and rational than their hot and emotional clients. A
more sophisticated set of views, most prominently associated with the ideas of Gilson and Mnookin,
suggest that lawyers have the potential to lead more efficient negotiations in a variety of ways. See e.g.
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between
Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509, 522-34 (1994) (suggesting that clients may use lawyers
with ethical reputations as a means to overcome the distrust of any given party that the information from
some other party is not accurate); Mnookin et al., supra n. 10, at 4 ("Lawyers have special opportunities
to create value that would not otherwise be available to their clients.").
16. See infra text accompanying nn. 51-53.
17. In our emphasis on mild mood, we differ from the emphases in recent excellent work on more
serious kinds of mood associated with "difficult conversations." See Stone, Patton & Heen, supra n. 12,
at xv ("Anytime we feel vulnerable or our self-esteem is implicated, when we care deeply about what
is being discussed or about the people with whom we are discussing it, there is potential for us to
experience the conversation as difficult."). In the kinds of studies of mood and negotiation this article
considers - such as simulated simple negotiations by students over financing movies, buying and selling
appliances, picking curriculum - it is unlikely students "care deeply" about either the topic of
negotiation or the other students with whom they negotiate.
18. See infra section one.
19. Richard Shell, Bargaining For Advantage: Negotiation Strategies For Reasonable People 3
(Viking 2000). In the first page of the first chapter, Shell quotes a Danish proverb to support the idea
that people should accept that people have certain negotiation personalities. Id. at 3. In contrast to this
fixed view, Mnookin recognizes that people may have different approaches to conflict in different
situations. Mnookin et al., supra n. 10, at 57-58 ("Most people are complicated amalgams of these three
styles [to approaching conflict] .... [and] shift from one to the other depending on the situation .... ").
[V/ol. 2002, No. I
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not negotiate in a particular way because of idiosyncracies of their individual
personality, but possibly because of "cultural" features.20 The implication for
change, however, is the same: different individuals always negotiate in different
ways because of some feature ingrained early on, be it from idiosyncratic personal
circumstances or particular cultural patterns. In a sense, a variation is the emphasis
on the way that women may negotiate differently from men.2'
At the opposite end, another extreme view suggests that personality and
individual differences very rarely matter.22 Instead, what really matters is the way
all of us respond to changing social situations and often display common - even
"normal" - cognitive mistakes, be they reliance on racial stereotypes or defects in
decisionmaking that affect negotiation.23 Such errors include the way we all tend to
get stuck at the first price mentioned in a negotiation, which psychologists identify
as the anchoring effect. 4 Such social settings include the way we tend to discount
20. See e.g. Williams, supra n. 8 (different cultures may engage in different negotiation rituals); Allan
Edward Barsky, Conflict Resolution for the Helping Professions 54 (2000); Rajesh Kumar, Affect,
Cognition, and Decision Making in Negotiation: A Conceptual Integration, in Managing Conflict: An
InterdisciplinaryApproach 185,193 (M. Afzalur Rahim, ed., Praeger 1989) (theorizing that, in response
to the stress of negotiations, Japanese negotiators may withdraw from negotiation, but Americans may
get more aggressive). From a definitional viewpoint, one may be skeptical that any given individual
neatly falls within a particular culture. See e.g. Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution 106
(U.S. Inst. of Peace Press 1998); Michele J. Gelfand & Naomi Dyer, A Cultural Perspective on
Negotiation: Progress, Pi(falls, and Prospects, 49 Applied Psychol.: An Intl. Rev 62, 75 (2000) ("With
some notable exceptions, researchers often utilized post-hoc explanations to interpret unexpected
patterns of results, and generally used geographical location as a surrogate for culture."); Clark
Freshman, Re-visioning theDependency Crisis and the Negotiator's Dilemma: Reflections on the Sexual
Family and the Mother-Child Dyad, 22 L. & Soc. Inquiry 97, 117-21 (1997); Clark Freshman,
Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative Dispute Resolution: Community-Enhancing
Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1687 (1997). Our criticism here, however,
is different: a distinct problem with culture is that it makes the way people behave seem far deeply
ingrained and far less susceptible to change. Where many would say someone negotiates a certain way
because of a certain culture, we would say they may negotiate a certain way in large part because of
their mood on a particular day.
21. See e.g. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal
Ethics, Va. J. Soc. Pol. & L. 75, 87-88 (1994) (showing recent research raises questions about claims that
men and women negotiate differently); Deborah M. Kolb & Judith Williams, The Shadow Negotiation:
How Women Can Master The Hidden Agendas That Determine Bargaining Success 9-10 (Simon &
Schuster 2000) (suggesting that women tend to negotiate differently from men in some ways, such as
not asking for better terms as often as men do).
22. On this view, to the extent individual differences matter, they are only a few individual
differences, commonly understood by social psychologists as the Big Five personality factors. See
generally Lee Ross & Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social
Psychology 90-118 (Temple U. Press 1991).
23. See e.g. Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, andDiscrimination, in 2 The Handbook ofSocial
Psychology 357, 361 (Daniel Gilbert et al., eds., 4th ed., McGraw-Hill 1998) (describing the "core
insight" that "still sustains most current theories of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination" as "[J]ust
as people categorize furniture into tables and chairs, putting their drinks on one and sitting on the other,
so, too, people categorize each other into ingroups and outgroups, loving one and (therefore, he argued)
hating the other").
24. See e.g. Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, Negotiating Rationally 23-30 (Free Press 1992);
Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflicts,
8 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 235 (1993).
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suggestions by those we see as opponents (what social psychologists call reactive
devaluation), and the way we treat the same suggestions better if they come from a
seemingly neutral person, like a mediator.2 This social psychology perspective on
the dysfunction of the "normal" behavior of all of us is a grand theory, and a theory
that may well reflect in part the professional incentives of psychologists to describe
the normal behavior of all of us rather than potential differences of some of us.
2 6
Ironically, both the extreme view that personality is everything and the extreme
view that personality is nothing actually betray a certain pessimism about the ability
of individuals to alter the way they negotiate. The personality view suggests people
will keep approaching conflict in the same ways, even when they are dysfunctional;
likewise, the social psychology emphasis on cognitive errors suggests that we all will
tend to repeat the same errors again and again.27 Of course, there are more and less
pessimistic versions of the way individuals may modify their behavior on their
own.28  And neither view is especially negative about the abstract potential of
resolving conflict - both simply imply conflict sometimes must be better resolved
by calling in additional experts, such as those with some special immunity to
cognitive errors through experience or intensive training, 29 those who can function
as mediators,3 ° or those with reputations for different approaches to conflict.3' In
marked contrast, our view suggests that individuals themselves may be trained in
ways to negotiate better by learning how very mild changes in their mood may affect
their success at negotiation. Although the exact ways to manage mood depend on
further research on exactly how mood affects legal negotiation, we are optimistic in
25. See e.g. Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation, in Barriers to Conflict Resolution 26 (Kenneth Arrow
et al., eds., W.W. Norton 1995) (hereinafter Barriers).
26. Cf Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science' Theories
Identify Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between "Different"Minorities, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 313,
397 (2000) ("Academic psychologists may feel tempted to link discriminatory attitudes and behavior
to normal behavior because academic psychology rewards those studying mainstream topics more than
those studying peripheral phenomena that affect the relatively powerless."). Nevertheless, negotiation
scholarship has been overwhelmingly dominated by social psychology research, which often minimizes
differences between individuals. Max H. Bazerman et al., Negotiation, 51 Annual Rev. of Psych. 279,
303 (2000) ("The psychological study of negotiation was once a subfield of social psychology.").
27. See e.g. Max H. Bazerman, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making 165 (5th ed., John Wiley
& Sons 1994) (relatively pessimistic about change because, among other things, "[i]t is far easier to
identify a bias while reading a book about decision making than it is to identify a bias when you are in
the middle of an organizational crisis"); Leigh Thompson, A Method for Examining Learning in
Negotiation, I Group Dec. & Negot. 71 (1992) (People may cling to notion that negotiation involves a
zero-sum battle over a fixed pie even after other potentials have been pointed out to them.).
28. Compare e.g. supra sources in n. 27 with Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in
Bargaining, 85 Am. Econ. Rev.! 337 (1995) (mere awareness of bias may sometimes eliminate bias).
29. See Bazerman, supra n.27, at 196-97 (expressing doubt that any training may reduce some biases,
but suggesting intensive training may work with some); cf Leigh Thompson, Negotiation Behavior and
Outcomes: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Issues, 108 Psychol. Bull. 515, 528 (1990) (reporting
results of one study that real estate executives with ten years average experience did better at reaching
win-win agreements in a bargaining simulation than college students).
30. See e.g. Ross, supra n. 25, at 41 (calling on mediators to combat the way that parties discount
offers presented by opponents by having a mediator present offers as if they were the mediator's own).
31. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra n. 15.
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principle that such mood management may be integrated into law school and other
negotiation classes.
3 2
Section one first examines studies that show psychology and business school
students put in even mildly better moods by a few minutes of music or funny videos
do significantly better at negotiation. Section two then suggests ways in which mood
might play a different role with lawyers and with legal negotiations. In so doing,
we part company with many distinguished scholars who often assume that studies
based on non-lawyers and non-legal contexts may translate directly to lawyers and
legal contexts, such as settlement negotiations.33 In part, from the perspective of
clinical psychology that emphasizes differences among individuals and the ability
of individuals to change their own behavior, we are answering the call from leading
scholars and teachers of negotiation to supplement the important contributions of
social psychology, which assumes individual differences matter little, with insights
from other branches ofpsychology. 4 Although section two suggests that mood may
have somewhat different effects on at least some lawyers and at least some legal
negotiations, we expect further research will still show that certain moods also are
associated with negotiation success by lawyers in legal negotiations. Section
threesix concludes with a far more preliminary outline of the needs for further
research and some promising potential ways that lawyers and others might manage
their moods to succeed better at negotiation.
32. In particular, we are encouraged by the success of various cognitive-behavioral techniques taught
in classroom settings, which we think may be incorporated into existing negotiation trainings in law
schools and elsewhere. See infra text accompanying n. 351.
33. The earliest reports of psychological insights into negotiation typically offered advice to lawyers
and others based largely on findings of experiments involving negotiations and other activities involving
psychology students. See Robert Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction, in Barriers supra n. 25, at 17
(assuming implicitly that overconfidence bias established in studies of psychology students would
translate directly to "[l]itigants deciding whether to go to trial"). Even these early reports, however,
sometimes acknowledged that psychological insights might vary with settings. Id. at 15 (the discounting
of offers presented by opponents compared to the exact proposal offered by neutrals might "operate to
different degrees in different negotiation contexts").
Often, however, studies implicitly assumed psychological insights gathered by experiments involving
psychology students would apply directly to law students and lawyers. The most recent book by
Mnookin, now head of the prestigious Project on Negotiation at Harvard, discusses psychological
barriers to negotiations involving lawyers by citing almost exclusively to studies based on experiments
involving those neither lawyers nor law students. Mnookin et al., supra n. 10, at 336-38.
Two notable and exemplary exceptions: a careful study by Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, and
Andrew Wistrich shows that judges share many of the same cognitive biases as others, including
lawyers, but that judges actually show less bias in some areas. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, &
Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside The Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777, 817 (2001). An earlier study
by Chris Guthrie noted the general tendency of individuals to reach agreements that might avoid future
regret but noted "some individual litigants are likely to be more susceptible to regret aversion than
oihers." Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior,
1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 43, 83 (1999).
34. Bazerman et al., supra n. 26.
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I. WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR: MILD CHANGES IN MOOD MEAN
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN NEGOTIATION SUCCESS
A. Normal and Mild Moods Matter
The most important aspect of research on how mood affects the way we think
and act is that normal and mild moods matter. By normal moods, we mean that
much current psychology often avoids the sharp dichotomy between "normal" and
"abnormal" or "mentally ill" and "mentally well."'3 Instead, modem psychology
often sees many aspects of mental health as resting on a broad kind of continuum.'
This notion departs sharply from many popular images of the "sane" and "insane.9 37
In part, the emphasis on normal moods is also enhanced by the related emphasis on
the presence of positive moods rather than merely the absence of extreme negative
moods: emphasis on extreme negative moods like clinical depression focuses by
definition3" on a narrow subset of the population, but an emphasis on the potential
for more positive moods can affect all of us. By mild moods, we mean that all of
us tend to have ups and downs and all sorts of variations in our mood: just as we
know we can have a cold without having a brain tumor, we should know we can be
feeling somewhat sad without being clinically depressed.39 That mild and normal
35. See e.g. Jaihyun Park & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Mood and Heuristics: The Influence of Happy and
Sad States on Sensitivity and Bias in Stereotyping, 78 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 1005, 1020 (2000)
("ordinary feeling states (transient happy and sad moods) can increase or decrease existing tendencies
to rely on stereotypes"). As one study emphasized, "[wie stress the ordinary nature of the processes
under investigation to emphasize that the implications of such results cannot be set aside as reflecting
the peculiar actions of a unique group of individuals making unusual decisions. The feeling states we
provoked were ordinary, the individuals we studied held beliefs that were ordinary, and the judgments
they performed were ordinary." Id. at 1020. We acknowledge that some psychologists differ on how
much they emphasize continuum versus divisions such as labeling pathologies; many still refer to the
diagnoses codified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. To some extent, many may use such
diagnoses to justify treatment to insurerers, but may have various degrees of doubt about the diagnoses.
36. See e.g. Theodore Millon & Roger D. Davis, Disorders ofPersonality: DSM-IVandBeyond 7 (2d
ed., John Wiley & Sons 1996) ("Personality exists on a continuum. No sharp division exists between
normality and pathology.").
37. See generally Susan Stefan, Unequal Rights: Discrimination Against People with Mental
Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act (Ist ed., Am. Psychol. Assoc. 2001); Michael L.
Perlin, On "Sanism ", 46 S.M.U. L. Rev. 373,374 (1992) (defining sanism as "an irrational prejudice,
an 'ism,' of the same quality and character of other prevailing prejudices such as racism, sexism,
heterosexism, and ethnic bigotry").
38. For example, depression is often distinguished from the sadness associated with particular events
such as death of a loved one; the standard definition for depression excludes those who are very sad if
they are only having the sadness typical of one who has lost a loved one. American Psychiatric Assn.,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-IV-TR, Text Revision 356 (4th ed., The
Assoc. 2000).
39. Some important qualifications apply. First, although mood may be part of a continuum, there may
be significant points that correspond to key differences: much as temperature may be continuous but
water boils at one temperature and freezes at another, a certain level and duration of sadness may
correspond to a distinguishable phenomenon ofdepression. Second, therefore, some researchers believe
that studies of mood in undergraduate psychology students do not map neatly onto generalizations about
the nature of serious mental illness. See e.g. James C. Coyne, Seyf-reported Distress: Analog or Ersatz
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moods matter means that addressing mood is both important and realistic: important
because it has significant effects on results and realistic because it is more plausible
for lawyers and teachers of legal negotiation to teach identification and management
of mild moods than the wholesale personality re-organization associated with years
of therapy.
The notion that mild and normal moods matter is reflected in an entire
constellation of psychological studies that show mild mood significantly affects the
way people of different professions think and act in a variety of tasks: o
1. Physicians in a prestigious medical center reach correct diagnoses
significantly faster when they are given a small git, which presumably
puts them in a slightly better mood.4'
2. Students induced to be in positive moods by reading cards with simple
positive statements like "I'm sitting on top of the world" identified
significantly more differences and similarities between pairs of
television shows than those who read neutral cards or those who read
negative cards like "no matter how hard I try things always go
wrong. 42
3. Children induced to be in a more positive mood came up with more
ways to manipulate a stuck candle, a standard test used to measure
creativity.
43
4. Stanford business school students got significantly better negotiation
results when they saw a short video - even though the video only
increased their self-report mood from a 4 to a 5 on a scale of 1 to 7."
5. Watching a few minutes of funny commercials enhanced the ability of
people to remember brand names.45
Depression?, 116 Psychol. Bull. 29 (1994); Darcy A. Santor & James C. Coyne, Evaluating the
Continuity of Symptomatology Between Depressed and Nondepressed Individuals, 110 J. of Abnormal
Psychol. 216 (2001).
40. See e.g. Alice M. Isen, On The Relationship Between Affect and Creative Problem Solving, in
Affect, Creative Experience, and PsychologicalAdjustment 3,3 (Brunner/Mazel 1999) ("A growing body
of research indicates that positive affect is associated with greater cognitive flexibility and improved
creative problem solving across a broad range of settings."); Thompson, Nadler & Kim, supra n. 7, at
141 (mood "influences the way people make judgments, solve problems, remember, and process social
information" and "[t]hese processes are all implicated during the course of a typical negotiation");
Joseph P. Forgas, On Feeling Good and Getting Your Way: Mood Effects on Negotiator Cognition and
Bargaining Strategies, 74 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 565,565 (1998) ("Despite strong recent evidence for
mood effects on many cognitive processes, little is known about how mood affects negotiator cognition
and bargaining strategies.").
41. Alice M. Isen, Andrew S. Rosenzweig & Mark J. Young, The Influence of Positive Affect on
Clinical Problem Solving, II Med. Dec. Making 221 (1991).
42. Noel Murray et al., The Influence of Mood on Categorization: A Cognitive Flexibility
Interpretation, 59.J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 411 (1990).
43. Terry R. Greene & Helga Noice, Influence of Positive Affect Upon Creative Thinking and Problem
Solving in Children, 63 Psychol. Rpts. 895 (1988).
44. Kramer et al., supra n. 3.
45. Angela Y. Lee & Brian Sternthal, The Effects of Positive Mood on Memory, 26 J. Consumer Res.
115(1999).
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Although there are relatively few studies that look at the role of mood and
negotiation exercises specifically, the constellation of studies of the way mood
affects a variety of ways of thinking and acting is much larger.' These studies
illustrate that normal and mild mood matters. They show normal mood matters
because the studies involve normal populations such as students and professionals.47
They also show that mild mood matters because the changes in mood are self-
reported as very small and/or involve very mild behaviors designed to have very
mild effects on mood. The notion that mild moods matter, particularly mild
increases in positive mood, is also consistent with a range of studies of physical and
mental health that show how mild improvements in mood may increase a range of
physical and mental outcomes." We next turn to the bottom line results that show
even mild moods lead to very different success and then turn to the more complex
- and largely incomplete - findings on how mood leads to different degrees of
success.
B. The Clear Bottom Line Lesson For Mood and Negotiation:
More For "Us" and Sometimes More For Me
Researchers have examined at least two different kinds of bottom line results.
Most lawyers and lay people who think of negotiation success would want to know
about how mood affects individual gains: Do I get more if I'm in a good mood or a
bad mood? Most studies instead have focused on a less intuitive notion of
negotiation success: joint gains. Studies typically measure joint gains by looking at
the results one negotiator got with the results the person with whom she negotiated
got.49 In more popular language, scholars look at whether the negotiators created a
bigger pie rather than just who got the larger share of the pie."e
46. For useful surveys, see Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect, in Handbook of Cognition and Emotion,
supra n. 7, at 52 1. See generally Joseph P. Forgas, Feeling and Thinking: The Role ofAffect in Social
Cognition 131 (Cambridge U. Press. 2000) (describing latest research and theories of the way that mood
influences cognition).
47. Thus, in the context of thinking about how to translate research about mood and negotiation into
teaching lawyers and law students about negotiation, the use of ordinary students and professionals in
the studies is a strength for our purposes for precisely the same reason that others see it as a weakness
in thinking about how to treat persons with severe mental illness. See supra n. 39.
48. See infra text accompanying n. 298.
49. See Leigh Thompson, Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical
Issues, 108 Psychol. Bull. 515, 517-18 (1990) (describing typical use of sum of individual scores as
measure of joint gain).
50. Although there are some controversies about exactly how to measure this joint gain, the basic
idea is that scholars look whether negotiators made the best deal possible. See e-g. Keith G. Allred et
al., The Influence ofAnger and Compassion on Negotiation Performance, 70 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec.
Proc. 175, 181 n. 2 (1997).
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1. Consistent Evidence That More Positive Moods Mean More Joint Gains
In terms of such joint gains, the results here are consistently dramatic: Groups
of negotiators in a positive mood got significantly larger joint gains than negotiators
either in a neutral mood or in a negative mood. Moreover, it required very little to
put students in a sufficiently better mood that led to better results: one group of
business school students at Stanford saw a funny video,5 and another group of
students got to read funny comics and received a small gift.52
2. Less Consistent Evidence That Positive Mood Sometimes Means More
Individual Gains
The findings on individual gains are far less consistent. Most studies show that
positive moods generally are associated with higherjoint gains53 and negative moods
with lower joint gains;' the same studies often simply show that the moods do not
have any significant effect on individual gains.55
3. Who Cares About Joint Gains Anyway? Will Mood Help Me?!
The lack of evidence for how mood affects individual gains may have less to do
with the lack of any genuine effect and more to do with certain features of the
ideologies of negotiation scholars. As an ideological matter, many of those who
study negotiation seem less interested in advising any given individual to get more
of what that individual wants than in some kind of more transcendent goal.' Some
psychologists who study negotiation seem more interested in studying the basic
phenomenon of decisonmaking or how mood affects decisionmaking. Others seem
more interested in promoting rational decisionmaking. Among leading scholars in
the legal academy, too, there are various ideological tendencies that obscure a focus
on the bottom-line for any given individual. It is as if negotiation scholars aspire to
51. Kramer etal., supra n. 3.
52. Peter J.D. Carnevale & Alice M. Isen, The Influence of Positive Affect and VisualAccess on the
Discovery of Integrative Solutions in Bilateral Negotiation, 37 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. 2 (1986)
53. Id.; Kramer et al., supra n. 3, at 116-17.
54. See e.g. Allred et al., supra n. 50.
55. The only studies to show greater individual gains we identified were Robert A. Baron,
Environmentally Induced Positive Affect: Its Impact on Self-Efficacy, Task Performance, Negotiation
and Conflict, 20 J. App. Soc. Psychol. 368 (1990); Forgas, supra n. 40. We therefore are more cautious
than some in concluding that positive mood is associated with better individual gains. Compare
Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, supra n. 7, at 141 (citing only an earlier unpublished version of Forgas study
to support the proposition that "negotiators in a positive mood who negotiate with negative-mood
negotiators achieve a larger share of the resources"). The Alired and Kramer studies simply showed that
mood had no effect on individual gain. Allred et al., supra n. 50; Kramer et al., supra n. 3.
56. For a notable exception, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A
Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 Geo. L.J. 2663 (1995).
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be Brandeisian counselors to the situation,57 with benefits to any given individual
secondary. Fisher and Ury describe a good agreement as "wise" and "efficient";58
economically trained scholars like Mnookin, now head of the influential Harvard
Project on Negotiation, concentrate on the efficiency of solutions. 9 In short, insofar
as we look at how others have studied the potential effects of mood and negotiation
to extend them to how lawyers and law students may use such research, we are
mindful that any research partially reflects the professional incentives and ideologies
of those conducting the research itself.'
Still, the findings on joint gain may matter even to self-concerned individuals
far more than skeptics may intimate. There has long been a controversy in
negotiation teaching circles about how much to concentrate on joint gains: some
think nearly every negotiation involves some aspect ofjoint gains,6' but others take
the tougher line that most negotiations really reduce to a fight over a single item,
such as money, that both parties want.62 For the most part, these debates take the
form of swapping assertions and anecdotes. Recently, however, a systematic meta-
analysis by Leigh Thomspon showed that negotiators in studies often do not succeed
in identifying the potential forjoint gains: in half of all instances, in fact, negotiators
fail to harness joint gains.63 Indeed, very often negotiators do not even realize when
their "opponents" want exactly the same thing on a particular issue!' This rigorous
finding supports the idea that people often fail to identify potential to increase joint
gains when they exist, but it still leaves open the much larger and more difficult
.57. Cf Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727 (1988) (criticizing lawyers for being enchanted with
the ideal of being counselors to the situation by recommending joint custody).
58. Roger Fisher, William Ury & Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes (2d ed., Penguin Books 1991).
59. See e.g. Gilson & Mnookin, supra n. 15. Some might also read Carrie Menkel-Meadow's
emphasis on fulfilling the "needs" of clients in early scholarship in a similar way, but her later
scholarship makes clear how highly she values the choice by individual clients about their own values.
Compare Carrie Menkel-Meadow, TowardAnother View ofLegal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754 (1984) with Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra n. 56.
One might also hypothesize that the emphasis on joint gains makes sense if researchers emphasize
mediation by neutrals rather than individual negotiation; the mediator is less concerned with what
benefits any particular party. This, however, is the least plausible hypothesis since the overwhelming
majority of quantitative and experimental research, such as that on mood and negotiation, is based on
studies of individual negotiators, not mediators. See Leigh Thompson & Peter H. Kim, The Quality of
Third Parties " Settlement Solutions, 6 J. Exper. Psychol.: Applied 3, 11 (2000) ("Negotiation research
is empirically based and descriptively rich, but often suffers from lack of formal prescriptive methods;
in contrast mediation research tends to be more qualitative, lacking in empirical rigor.").
60. See supra n. 26.
61. See e.g. Menkel-Meadow, supra n. 59.
62. See e.g. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 Geo. L.J. 369, 369-72
(1996) (arguing that many negotiations end with one party winning at the expense of another).
63. Leigh Thompson & D. Hrebec, Lose-lose Agreements in Interdependent Decision Making, 120
Psychol. Bull. 396 (1996).
64. See Leigh Thompson & Reid Hastie, Social Perception in Negotiation, 47 Org. Behav. & Hum.
Dec. Proc. 98, 114 (1990).
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question ofjust how often and how much such potential joint gains exist outside of
academic negotiation studies.65
Joint gains may also matter to selfish negotiators for another reason: a party may
be more likely to get what she bargained for if the other party also thinks a deal is
fair.' Again, this is a far more significant issue than might appear at first glance.
In many instances, parties may reach an agreement at one point, but the agreement
may fall apart later. This is true of both personal and business negotiations. In the
more personal context, scores of studies show that divorcing and divorced persons
seem to reach an agreement at one point but then return to court when one party
thinks the other has not honored the agreement.' For the most part, the existing
studies on mood and negotiation do not test this because the studies simply look at
the way individuals negotiate in a single negotiation session - they do not examine
whether individuals actually honor the agreements.
C. What We Don't Know As Well:
How Do Different Moods Lead to Different Negotiation Results?
Although the studies on the bottom line effects of mood consistently show that
positive moods are associated with better negotiation results, it's less clear exactly
how mood is associated with better results.6" This "how" question - identifying the
pathway - is crucial to translating the laboratory findings into practical advice for
actual negotiators. For example, if one found that positive mood led to better results
because people in positive moods set higher targets69 - a plausible hypothesis in light
of existing research that higher targets are often associated with greater success" -
one might explore whether one could get others to harness this effect by setting
higher targets if they do not feel in as good a mood. On the other hand, if positive
mood instead led to better results because people in positive moods showed more
interest in the needs of the other side, thus allowing them better to identify potential
tradeoffs, one might advise persons not in a good mood to make an extra effort to
65. The evolving state of the art in negotiation scholarship essentially recognizes that many
negotiations involve some potential to create value by making a pie bigger and some possibility for
individuals to get larger shares of that pie by claiming more value; the consensus is that some
negotiations involve more of one potential than the other. See e.g. Mnookin et al.,supran. 10, at 42-43.
66. Carnevale & Isen, supra n. 52, at 2 ("integrative solutions to conflicts contribute to the long-term
stability of relationships).
67. See e.g. Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, and Other Processes 154-55 (Stephen B.
Goldberg, Frank E.A. Sander& Nancy H. Rogers eds., 2d ed., 1992) (one study found that parties only
paid the full amount that courts ordered them to pay in 33.8% of cases, but parties to mediations paid
the full amount to which they agreed in 70.6% of mediations); Fisher, Ury & Patton, supra n. 58
(discussing durable agreements); Kenneth Kressel, Frances Butler, in When Talk Works: Profiles of
Mediators 17, 56-57 (Deborah M. Kolb ed., 1994) (example of mediated agreement in child custody and
visitation dispute requiring further meetings).
68. As one of the leading researchers on the entire field of how mood affects negotiation wrote as late
as 1998, "the processes mediating mood effects on negotiation also remain incompletely understood."
Forgas, supra n. 40, at 566.
69. Id.; Baron, supra n. 55.
70. Shell, supra n. 19.
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ask more questions. Or, if instead positive mood led to better results because other
negotiators make greater concessions to people they like, and they like happier
people more, one might need to give more complex advice about how to otherwise
develop liking behaviors, such as chit-chat designed to personalize a negotiation.7'
So, too, with the somewhat surprising evidence that too much eye contact - long
valorized as a sign (albeit not clearly correct) of truth-telling - also decreases joint
gain, and positive mood may reduce joint gain.7" If we accept such findings, then
even if we cannot be in a better mood, we can make an attempt to monitor and
correct our eye contact.
1. Any Given Mood May Have Functional and Dysfunctional Consequences
It is especially important to tease out the effects of mood because given moods
may have some functional and some dysfunctional consequences. Of course, one
simple strategy to tap the potential of mood effects is to put people in situations and
moods associated with bottom line success, such as putting people in a happy
mood." However, a more ideal strategy would be to have such awareness of the
pathways of mood that one might harness potential functional consequences while
minimizing less functional consequences. 4 For example, if people in happier moods
do better partially by setting higher targets, but they also make more concessions,
then one might caution happy people to try to correct the tendency to give in too
much, too quickly, and/or too often. Another hybrid approach might be to have
people be in one mood for one part of a negotiation and another mood for another
part of a negotiation. Suppose, as research below suggests, positive mood makes
people more likely to make concessions but also leads them to set higher goals. In
such an event, then to the extent one is competing with another for limited resources
- a feature of many negotiations - one might want to have the persons initially in a
neutral mood so they set low targets for themselves; later one might try to put
another in a better mood in order to induce them to make more concessions.
Unfortunately, it is much harder to make empirically-supported generalizations
about this area because different studies on mood and negotiation use some very
different questions. As one recent article noted, such research has "over-emphasized
outcomes and under-emphasized process... [and] relied on methods that facilitate
71. This is also plausible in light of existing research. One study of electronic negotiation showed
parties did significantly worse in electronic negotiations. Don A. Moore, Long and Short Routes to
Success in Electronically Mediated Negotiations: Group Affiliations and Good Vibrations, 77 Org.
Behav. & Hum. Dec. Proc. 22 (1999). However, when parties in electronic negotiations took the time
to find more information out about other negotiators, this negative effect was reduced. Id.
72. Carnevale & Isen, supra n. 52.
73. See e.g. Baron, supra n. 55.
74. We acknowledge that such an ideal strategy may be difficult to accomplish. As discussed in the
final section, it is generally very hard to get people to correct for potential defects in perception and
reasoning because people may readily over-correct or under-correct. See infra text accompanying n.
326.
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laboratory study but do not adequately simulate real-world negotiations."" Thus,
as we identify pathways below, we often must rely on results from single studies
with the obvious qualification that these findings are significantly less reliable than
the bottom-line findings described above. Likewise, as we discuss in the next
section on questions about the mood and negotiation studies, it is possible that the
same moods may have different pathways in different types of negotiations.
Overall, however, the existing studies point to three ways mood may affect
negotiation: (1) the setting of goals in negotiation; (2) the nature of the relationship
between the negotiators; and (3) the strategies the negotiators use. To summarize
briefly: First, parties in more positive moods tend to set higher goals, and high (but
"realistic") goals tend to be associated with better results. Second, parties in worse
moods tend to have worse relationships. In general, at least when there is a potential
for joint gain, better relationships lead to better deals. Third, negotiators in more
positive moods tend to use more cooperative and problem-solving tactics, such as
making deals and keeping the deals they make; parties in more negative moods tend
to use more threats, make fewer deals, and break the deals they do make. Finally,
we consider some other explanations that have less direct support.
Individual studies tend to isolate only one of these particular pathways at a time,
but the pathways may very well be understood as interrelated; for example the more
one sees a negotiation as having more integrative potential, one may see the
relationship differently; or if one sees a relationship as stronger, one may hope there
are more tradeoff possibilities to satisfy everyone, and therefore one may try harder
to identify them. In addition, as one finds more tradeoffs, this may reinforce the
relationship, which in turn may lead to additional searches for tradeoffs. 6
2. Controlled ("Conscious") Versus Automatic ("Unconscious" or "Preconscious")
Pathways
Before we turn to more specific pathways, it is useful to distinguish another
level of different pathways: controlled versus automatic processes (roughly similar
to "conscious" and "unconscious" processes.) We use the term automatic or
preconscious because both terms have become more popular in recent psychological
research and because they better capture the relative ease with which we become
aware of such processes. As popular understandings of Freud suggest, it may take
months or years to unearth an unconscious motivation." In contrast, automatic or
75. Leonard Greenhalgh & Deborah I. Chapman, Negotiator Relationships: Construct Measurement
an Demonstration of Their Impact on the Process and Outcomes ofNegotiation, 7 Group Dec. & Negot.
465,482 (1998).
76. For one theoretical account that attempts to link a number of pathways, see Bruce Barry &
Richard L. Oliver, Affect in Dyadic Negotiation: A Model and Propositions, 67 Org. Behav. & Hum.
Dec. Proc. 127, 139(1996).
77. See generally Fiske & Taylor, supra n. 7, at 282-83. In one framework, one may distinguish
between material that is not within our consciousness for two distinct reasons: (1) we may not being
paying attention ("failures of attention"), perhaps because we are preoccupied with other tasks or
thoughts versus (2) failure of memory. The earlier Freudian accounts emphasized more the failures of
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preconscious information is not at the forefront of our minds, but may become
available to most of us by a simple resolution to focus more mindfully.78  As
discussed further below, mood may affect the degree to which one perceives a
particular negotiation - often automatically and without any consciousness of this
perceptions - as relatively zero-sum or with a relatively wide range of potential
trade-offs.79 Mood may also affect one's more conscious and deliberate choices,
such as the degree to which one makes a decision to make a particular opening offer.
Both these deliberate and automatic decisions may be related."' The more one
perceives a negotiation as having the potential for joint gain consciously, the more
likely one may automatically choose cooperative and problem-solving tactics to
explore joint gain.
This distinction between deliberate and automatic effects is of crucial
significance in trying to extend the theoretical research to training lawyers and law
students in negotiation. To the extent that mood has certain conscious and
predictable effects, one might try either, or both, inducing a functional mood or
advising people to try to correct for the absence of the functional mood (and/or
presence of a dysfunctional mood). On the other hand, if mood actually triggers less
conscious automatic responses, and particularly if it enables certain capacities, then
one must try other strategies. One might instead try to induce or maintain certain
moods themselves or try to develop various techniques to become more aware of
these automatic processes.
With this overview in mind, we can see the evidence of pathways and potential
pathways future research could explore.
3. Evidence Shows Positive Mood Increases Confidence and Goals
One key finding from Kramer's study of Stanford business school students is
that even the very mild mood increase from seeing a short funny video makes
students more confident of achieving their goals. Those who saw the funny video
memory and the more recent work emphasizes failures of attention. Arne Ohman, Distinguishing
Unconscious From Conscious Emotional Processes: Methodological Considerations and Theoretical
Implications, in Handbook of Cognition and Emotion supra n. 7, at 326 (automatic versus controlled)
and 333-34 (failures of attention versus memory).
78. The term mindfulness is used by two related but distinct bodies of research: the psychological
mindfulness research associated with Ellen Langer, see Ellen J. Langer, Mindfulness (1989), and the
perspective of Buddhist mindfulness meditation, also sometimes known as "stress reduction
mindfulness" and "attentional control." In this paper, we draw on the tradition of mindfulness
meditation. See also infra text accompanying n. 355.
79. Joseph P. Forgas, Robert Johnson & Joseph Ciarrochi, Mood Management: The Role of
Processing Strategies in Affect Control and Affect Infusion, in Personal Control in Action: Cognitive
and Motivational Mechanisms 155,156 (Miroslaw Kofta, Gifford Weary & Grzegorz Sedek eds. 1998)
("managing our affective states is a continuous, subtle and frequently subconscious process in which
people selectively search for and use information in ways that help them to calibrate their moods, and
typically do so without any conscious awareness of these strategies").
80. Forgas makes a similar distinction between informational effects, such as when mood "colors"
the way people perceive information, and processing effects, such as "when mood influences how people
think." Forgas, supra n. 40, at 566.
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generally reported they were much more likely to achieve their goals."' Exactly
why the students expected to achieve their goals was less clear. Positive mood alone
did not predict higher goals. Those in a positive mood who also had higher self-
esteem, however, expected the other side to have significantly lower goals. 2 This
also explains why such high self-esteem students who saw the video would have
higher expectations: they expected the other side not to try to get as much. Because
the study did not record actual negotiations, or attempt to code them as they
occurred, we cannot be sure what other effects positive mood may have had. One
might hypothesize that one way the greater expectations to increased persistence;3
as both parties stuck to their high goals, they may then have looked harder for the
tradeoffs that would let them both get closer to their goals.
4. Mood, Relationships, and Information: Negative Moods Hinder Relationships
and Ability to Identify the Interests of Others
Negotiation scholars have long emphasized that the relationship among
negotiators may affect results, and research suggests one pathway for mood may be
its effect on relationships. One study suggests that anger hurts joint gains without
making any individual better off. Allreds tested anger by comparing two groups of
organizational psychologists who performed a simulatedjob negotiation. To test for
the effects of anger, one group was given instructions that led them to be angry with
one another: the prospective employee was told that having a computer was an
important status symbol, and the employer gave out better computers to new
employees it valued most."3 The employers in this condition received very different
instructions that the firm generally did not like giving out such "ostentatious fringe
benefits" and, more significantly, the failure to give such a computer did not indicate
lack of regard for the employee but rather "respect" that the individual was willing
to "sacrifice for the good of the firm as a whole. ' s As predicted, those in the pair
that received these conflicting instructions indeed said they were more angry with
the other person."7 In addition, they said they were less compassionate, consistent
with Allred's hypothesis that the combination of more anger and less compassion
81. Kramer et al., supra n. 3. Research in other areas also suggests that persons in better moods set
higher goals on other tasks as well. See e.g. Baron, supra n. 55 (persons who did filing and sorting tasks
in rooms with pleasant scents expected to complete more sorting than those in rooms with no such added
scents).
82. Kramer et al., supra n. 3.
83. Charles S. Carver & Michael F. Scheier, On the Self-Regulation of Behavior 180-81 (Cambridge
U. Press 1998) ("If expectations of success are sufficiently positive, the person returns to efforts toward
the goal. If expectations are sufficiently negative, the result is an impetus to disengage from further
effort, and, potentially to disengage from the goal itself.").
84. Allred et al., supra n. 50.
85. Id. at 179.
86. Id. at 179.
87. Id. at 182.
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explained more than anger alone." In terms of bottom lines, the joint gains were less
in groups that were angrier and less compassionate. 9
Moreover, Allred was able to identify how this high anger/low compassion led
to worse results: angrier negotiators did not understand what the other side wanted.9
Allred tested for this by asking each negotiator to try to guess the priorities and
incentives of the other side.9 ' This was a simple mechanical matter in the study
because each side received a chart of how many points they got for each possible
item, such as how many points for each salary level, each type of computer, and so
on.' Like many negotiation studies, and at least some negotiations, parties both
wanted to win equally on some items (such as salary), agreed completely on others,
and differed but with different priorities on other items.93 The key to joint gains was
the ability to realize when each side wanted the same thing and to make tradeoffs
between getting more on items that mattered more to one side and less to the other.'
Thus, the bottom line that the angry negotiators got fewer joint gains was consistent
with the less accurate identification of the interests of the other side.9 Allred also
found the angrier negotiators did not do any better for themselves either.'
5. Mood And Tactics: Research Shows Positive Moods Promote Collaboration and
Cooperation; Negative Moods Promote Competition and Lying
Research also shows that mood not only affects how people choose their mix of
relatively cooperative tactics (such as making deals), but also relatively competitive
tactics (such as lying).' Just as the studies that show how mood specifically affects
negotiation results are consistent with a larger constellation of studies that show how
mood affects a variety of other activities, a large number of studies show that people
in more positive moods tend to be more cooperative, and people in negative moods
88. Id.
89. Id. at 183-84.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 179 (showing exact payoff schedule with points each side would earn for each outcome on
each item, such as salary, type of computer, etc.). See generally Thompson, supra n. 49.
94. Allred et al., supra n. 50, at 183 ("more accurate judgments of the other party's interests by both
employers and employees led to greater joint gains"). See generally Leigh Thompson, Information
Exchange in Negotiation, 27 J. Exper. Soc. Psychol. 61 (1991) (when parties knew more about the goals
of the other side, then they were more likely to identify tradeoffs and increase joint gain).
95. A related pathway suggested by other research is that those in a positive mood are more likely to
exchange more information. Thompson, Nadler & Kim, supra n. 7, at 143 (citing Carnevale & Isen,
supra n. 52).
96. Allred et al., supra n. 50, at 184.
97. Most negotiation theorists and teachers reject the single contrast between cooperation and
competition. Instead, most recognize and endorse strategies that involve problem-solving that tries to
identify agreements that meet the needs of all parties. See e.g. Fisher, Ury & Patton, supra n. 58
(rejecting contrast between "soft" and "hard" tactics). Many also adopt some version of the Thomas-
Kilman measure of conflict resolution, which includes styles not just of cooperative, competitive, and
problem-solving (collaborative) but also avoidant and accommodating (giving in to the demands of
others). See e.g. Barsky, supra n. 20, at 42; Shell, supra n. 19.
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tend to be more competitive.9" One early study showed that persons placed in a
slightly higher mood because of the pleasant scent from an air freshener were less
likely to resolve future conflicts through either competition or avoidance."
Forgas extended these general findings to the specific context of negotiation in
a series of experiments. In each experiment, Forgas manipulated the mood of some
students by providing them with false feedback on tests supposedly unrelated to the
negotiation experiments."' To put one group in a better mood, he gave them a
relatively hard test, but said they were not expected to finish.'' To put another
group in a bad mood, he gave the same test, but said the test was easy, and they
should finish many problems.0 2 As expected, when asked about their moods, those
in the negative group reported they were in a worse mood than a control group, and
those in the positive group indicated they were in a better mood.' 3 The groups of
psychology students then engaged in a series of negotiations in small groups and
larger groups to pick the classes to be required for their department; each student was
told to try to get a certain course selected."° To some extent, the negotiation had
features of a competitive scenario since one could test how often an individual
succeeded in persuading others to pick her course as part of the required courses.
At the same time, the negotiation also had potential for win-win solutions since
several (though not all) courses could be picked.
The first key conclusion was that better moods predicted better individual
success. Those in the better mood group more frequently persuaded others to pick
their courses than those in the control or the negative mood group."5 In short, those
put in a good mood did better than those in their natural mood state; those put in a
more negative mood did worse than others.
The second conclusion focused on how tactics were associated with success.
Those in a better mood were generally more likely to say that they would (and did)"°
make deals with others, such as one promising to vote for the course of another if the
other would reciprocate.0 7 In addition, those in the better mood were more likely
98. See Forgas, supra n. 40.
99. Baron, supra n. 55, at 377.
100. Forgas, supra n. 40.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Unfortunately, the study relied simply on asking people to report in advance of negotiations what
tactics they intended to use, and then asking them afterwards about the tactics that they in fact did use.
There was no independent confirmation that individuals indeed used the tactics they said they used.
Forgas acknowledges that his proposed model in terms of "mood induced influences on cognitive
strategies as predicted... would benefit from further confirmation that more directly assesses actual
processing strategies." Forgas, supra n. 40, at 576. One may be skeptical of such reports since there
is some evidence that there is a gap between how individuals describe the way they negotiate with the
way that independent observers say they negotiate. See e.g. Leigh Thompson, They SawA Negotiation:
Partisanship and Involvement, 68 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 839 (1995).
107. Id.
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to report that they honored the deals they made.' s In contrast, those in the negative
mood were more likely to say they planned to threaten others (and did), and they
planned not to honor whatever deals they said they would make."°
6. Mood and Compliance: Research Shows People in Positive Moods Say They
Will Honor Their Agreements
This research on honoring deals is especially significant because many deals
outside the laboratory fall apart when one party does not comply. Therefore, one
pathway that deserves study is whether positive mood itself increases the likelihood
that parties will comply with an agreement reached in negotiation."' Supporters of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) often claim that ADR is more efficient than
other ways to resolve disputes because parties participate more directly in resolving
their own conflicts. A cottage industry of empirical literature has provided mixed
support for this notion by examining a variety of mediation programs. In one study,
when courts ordered someone to pay money, people paid the full amount in only
33.8% of cases, but 70.6% of people paid the full amount when they agreed to do so
in mediations."' At the other end of the legal spectrum, one study showed one-third
of complex mergers and acquisitions fall apart after agreement." 2
Finally, Forgas found the mood of one set of negotiators mattered even if those
with whom they negotiated were in a different mood. Thus, even when those in a
more positive mood negotiated with those who were in a more negative mood, the
ones in the more positive mood were still likely to do better.' Again, this is an
especially significant finding since prior studies had simply compared how all those
negotiating with others in the same mood, such as angrier people with other angrier
people.'"' These earlier studies may have implications for the way that neutrals, like
mediators, may try to foster certain moods, but they had more limited applications
108. Id.
109. This finding is supported by another study of business school students that also showed a
relationship between negative mood, as reported by students, and their reported use of various
contentious tactics. Leonard Greenhalgh & Deborah I. Chapman, Negotiator Relationships: Construct
Measurement an Demonstration of Their Impact on the Process and Outcomes of Negotiation, 7 Group
Dec. & Negot. 465,481 (1998).
110. Bruce Barry & Richard L. Oliver, Affect in Dyadic Negotiation; A Model and Propositions, 67
Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. Proc. 127, 138 (1996). ("We know of no empirical research in the social
psychology of negotiation that has explicitly addressed post-settlement compliance."). We note that
Barry and Oliver propose a slight variation on this them: they theorize that the fairness of an agreement
will lead to positive emotion that will in turn lead to compliance. Id. at 138-39. As expressed, however,
this seems to be more a statement about the effect of fairness than about the effect of mood itself.
111. Stephen B. Goldberg, Frank E.A. Sander & Nancy H. Rogers, Dispute Resolution: Negotiation,
Mediation, and Other Processes 154-55 (2d ed., Little Brown 1992).
112. See Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 1566
n.14 (Found. Press 1995).
113. Forgas, supra n. 40.
114. See Forgas, supra n. 40 (explaining prior studies paired people in a similar mood).
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for how any individual might enhance his" 5 own success simply by working on his
own mood.'
16
7. Disadvantages of Positive Moods: Some Research Shows Positive Moods
Predict More Concessions, and Some Theories Predict Sloppier Reasoning and
Less Persistence
Despite substantial evidence that positive moods predict negotiation success -
and despite evidence of several ways it enhances the negotiation process - other
research and theories suggest positive mood may also lead to less functional tactics.
First, those in positive moods may make more concessions. The most direct
evidence comes from Baron's study of psychology students he induced into a
slightly positive mood (an average of 5.38 rather than 5.02 on a scale of one to 7) by
exposing them to room fresheners in their negotiating rooms." 7 In a series of
negotiations over how to allocate cuts in personnel, and how to allocate budget cuts,
those in the pleasant scented rooms made significantly more concessions." 8 Second,
those in positive moods may think they did significantly better than they actually did.
The most direct evidence comes from Kramer's finding that those induced to a
slightly elevated mood by watching a five minute funny video of Apple's founder
Steve Jobs thought they did significantly better than they actually did."9
In addition to such direct evidence in negotiation studies, there is a lingering
theoretical dispute among leading scholars of mood and cognition generally about
how positive mood may be dysfunctional in some instances. At one end of the
debate, Forgas maintains that positive mood not only makes persons more
cooperative, but also leads them to use relatively simplistic strategies rather than
more complex strategies.' 20 Under Forgas's model, when we are happier, we
automatically resort to such strategies without necessarily any awareness or
115. We use the male pronoun advisedly here to deliberately counter the stereotype that only women
are emotional. See generally Clark Freshman, Were Patricia Williams and Ronald Dworkin Separated
at Birth?, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1568, 1590-91 (criticizing Richard Posner for explaining women's writing
by their psychology, but not so pathologizing male authors).
116. In principle, individuals, like mediators, might try to modify the moods of others. See Thompson
& Kim, supra n. 59. However, we remain skeptical of the ability of individuals, particularly in more
adversarial settings like settlement of pending lawsuits, to modify the mood of those they may readily
see as their opponents. In particular, since much research shows the value of positive moods, we wonder
how well negotiators may make those who view them as opponents feel in a more positive mood.
117. Baron, supran. 55, at 377.
118. Id. at 379.
119. Kramer et al., supra n. 3. Baron also found that males exposed to a pleasant scent - but not
females so exposed - thought they did better at a coding task. Baron, supra n. 55, at 375.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to compare as neatly how well this perception matched reality. First, the
measure of success was ambiguous. Id. at 376 ("exposure to pleasant scents increased subjects' use of
what can be viewed as a relatively efficient strategy of task performance'-) (emphasis supplied). Where
Kramer's study allowed direct comparison of how many points students got and how many they thought
they got, Baron offered only a self rating on a scale of how well students thought they did and no
corresponding quantifiable measure of success. Id.
120. Forgas, supra n. 40 (discussing his affect infusion model).
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consciousness. '' There is some empirical support for this often dysfunctional aspect
of positive mood in a variety of areas, including a very troubling tendency for even
very mild increases in positive mood to lead to greater reliance on racial
stereotyping. " Such evidence is especially important for negotiators from various
outgroups to consider since research suggests that stereotyping - such as the
stereotype that women do not like to negotiate - may be associated with the
relatively poor results women and other outgroups obtain in various studies." In
a related way, those in positive moods may have less motivation and therefore
slack." At the opposite end of the debate, Isen insists there is little empirical
evidence that positive mood is associated with any such dysfunctional effects."
These theoretical concerns, however, have potentially serious consequences for
many negotiations. Take first the notion that those in positive moods engage in
relatively simple strategies. Research shows that simple strategies do not work well:
often people will suggest the simple strategy of "splitting the difference" between
what they want and what they think another person wants. This is dysfunctional and
inefficient when others may want exactly the same thing or may have preferences
that are complimentary (they care more about some issues than others)." In
addition, it may be dysfunctional if people split a difference between their first offer
and another's arbitrarily high/low offer; a car buyer who splits the difference
between his offer and what sticker the used car dealer first puts on the car may pay
too much. 2 ' There is some indirect evidence of this from astudy that looked at
exactly this scenario: pairs negotiated over prices of three different commodities
121. Id.
122. Park & Banaji, supra n. 35, at 1020.
123. Kolb & Williams, supra n. 21.
124. In a related, but somewhat distinct way, Carver and Scheier theorize that people may "coast"
in one activity once they meet their goals so that they can devote resources to another distinct domain
of activity:
People who exceed the desired rate of progress should slow subsequent efforts in this domain of
behavior. They'll "coast" for a while. The result in the person's subjective experience would be that
the positive affect from the overshoot isn't sustained for very long.. Why should there be a built-in
tendency to cause positive feelings to be short-lived? A plausible basis can be found in the idea that
behavior is hierarchically organized, with multiple current concerns. People typically are working
towards several goals more or less simultaneously. To the extent that movement toward goal
attainment is more rapid than expected in one domain, it lets the person shift effort toward strivings
in another domain, at no cost. To continue an unnecessarily rapid pace in the first domain may
increase positive affect, but by diverting efforts from other goals it may create the potential for
negative affect in other domains.
Carver & Sheier, supra n. 83, at 130-3 1.
125. Isen, supra n. 46, at 522 (positive mood "is not usually found to be disruptive or impairing of
thought processes, as many people may assume would be true of any emotion's effect on organized
cognitive functioning or complex cognitive processing.").
126. See supra text accompanying n. 63.
127. See Shell, supra n. 19.
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when each cared about one more than the other two. 2 1 The best strategy was to
figure out these preferences and then get the most of the preferred commodity and
compromise the most on the commodity that mattered the least.'29 Instead, those
pairs that were romantically involved simply split the difference. 30 One
interpretation is that romantic couples were in a positive mood that led them to the
simpler strategy of splitting the difference.' 3'
So, too, less motivation may also be dysfunctional. Those who try less may not
get better results. This is particularly significant because some research suggests that
parties in some disputes may obtain important results simply by asking: in one
famous study of tort disputes, most of those who made any demand at all got that
demand met.'32 We may assume a car salesperson does not want to sell us a stick
shift because it is the last one on the lot, but the car salesperson may instead be quite
anxious to unload the car because only a tiny minority of current drivers even know
how to drive stick, let alone want to!
Finally, even the innocuous finding that individuals in positive moods think they
did better than they did may have negative implications. This is particularly true for
negotiations that involve multiple rounds and negotiators who engage in the future
negotiations. On the one hand, the sense of past accomplishment may serve as
incredibly powerful support for future positive moods,' thereby lending to those
future negotiations the bottom line beneficial effects associated with positive mood.
However, the inaccurate sense of one's level of accomplishment may also reduce
performance in future negotiations for at least two reasons.
First persons who think they have done better than they did with the same
negotiator may make more future concessions to the negotiator out of a sense of
fairness. This may reflect the well-known reciprocity effect where persons, in
negotiation and otherwise, tend to feel that if one person has done something, such
128. William R. Fry, Ira J. Firestone & David L. Williams, Negotiation Process and Outcome of
Stranger Dyads and Dating Couples: Do Lovers Lose?, 4 Basic & Applied Soc. Psychol. 1 (1983).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. We acknowledge a number of other interpretations. Perhaps the couples adopted the simpler
strategy because the payoff of getting a better strategy in an experiment was less than the alternative of
spending more time together in some more enjoyable activity. Max H. Bazerman, Smart Money
Decisions 61-62 (John Wiley & Sons 1999); cf. John Hammond, Ralph L. Kenney & Howard Raiffa,
Smart Choices:A Practical Guide to MakingBetterDecisions 221 (Harv. Bus. School 1999) (sometimes
it is efficient to make a decision quickly on available information). Or perhaps the couple understood
the abstract inefficiency but thought the norm of pure equality on all terms best. Cf. Brian Bix,
Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think
About Marriage, 40 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 145 (1998) (people may not negotiate for premarital
agreements because it seems unromantic).
132. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 L. & Society Rev. 525, 537 (1980-8 1).
133. Both theory and psychological research suggests that one of the best ways to put people in a
good mood is to have them recall a similar experience in which they felt good and/or did well. See e.g.
Aaron Beck et al., Cognitive Therapy of Depression 99 (Guilford Press 1979).
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as having made a concession or shared certain information, then they should
reciprocate by a similar move."
Second, from a motivational perspective, persons who think they have done well
in a certain negotiation may have already satisfied their own sense of their bottom-
line expectations and therefore try less hard later. For example, the music lawyer
who thinks he got a great deal on the term of a recording agreement may press less
hard later on the issue of residuals for other kinds of media; the district attorney who
thinks he got a great deal with the local public defender on one set of defendants
may be less motivated to press hard on the next set of defendants. In our classes, we
have often directly observed such effects. In one instance, we asked a student why
she pressed only for delivery of a small percentage of some goods by a target date
rather than all, and she replied that she was so glad that she had gotten such a good
price shd did not want to push too hard.
It is especially important to remember that the absence of direct evidence about
how positive mood hinders negotiation may reflect features of the prior studies
themselves rather than some failure of proof. First, many studies simply look at
bottom-line effects rather than looking at what actually happens in a negotiation.
This is understandable because the cost of recording negotiations and the cost of
coding those negotiatons may be high in time and money. However, it masks the
possibility that some functional consequences, such as high goals and likeability,
may be offset by quicker concessions. Second, the dysfunctional effects of positive
mood may not kick in until high levels of positive mood, but the increases in positive
mood studied are relatively limited.'35 Again, this is understandable since the ability
to produce large enough pools of people in a very high mood by legally permissible
means is also limited. 36 Third, many of the studies simply look at a single
negotiation rather than a series of negotiations over an extended period of time, such
as the series of small negotiations that may characterize many lawsuits.
To put the skepticism about positive moods in some perspective, one might
adopt at least two possible frameworks in lieu of the simple "be happy" emphasis on
positive mood. The simpler approach would be to hypothesize (and test) that
positive mood promotes some functional activity up to a point, but then may be
counterproductive. Another possibility, suggested by emotion research in other
areas, is to emphasize the balance of negative and positive emotion. Therefore, the
best negotiators may have a certain balance of positive and negative emotion. In
134. See e.g. Michael D. Large, The Effectiveness of Gifts as Unilateral Incentives in Bargaining, 42
Sociol. Persp. 525, 538 (1999) (those given gifts tended to make more concessions in other areas based
on the perception of the cost of the gift).
135. See Baron, supra n. 55, at 380 (positive mood induced by scents may not have had the predicted
effect, based on prior studies, of increasing collaboration and compromise, because the increase in
positive mood was not very large).
136. We exclude the notion of giving large portions of psychotropic drugs like ecstacy.
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other areas, researchers have developed this idea to such an extent they hypothesize
exact rations, such as five times as many positive thoughts as negative thoughts.
37
8. Potential Role: Mood, Persistence, and Bargaining Intensity
One theoretically fruitful area for future research is how mood affects
persistence and bargaining intensity. Existing research points to two potential kinds
of persistence and bargaining intensity. First, there is the question of how people
translate their initial goals into what they actually do in a negotiation. Surprisingly,
people tend to ask for significantly less in a negotiation than what they reported as
a goal. In one study, participants asked for only between 59% and 68% of their
goal. "' We hypothesize that various kinds of mood and personality may well affect
how closely people match what they ask for with their reported goals. Like others,
however, we expect the relationship may be complex. 9 We agree that positive
mood may well be associated with asking for something closer to one's goal.
However, we also think it is worth investigating whether certain types of negative
mood also predict higher goals as well. Some research shows depressed persons
may indeed set high goals because only high success seems to offer hope of lifting
them out of depression."4
A second related variable also involves the question of persistence, the
movement of offers within a negotiation. We like the notion of persistence one of
our law school negotiation students shared with us from her years as a real estate
137. See e.g. Robert M. Schwartz, The Idea of Balance and Integrative Psychotherapy, J.
Psychotherapy Integ. 159, 164 (1993) ("normal individuals strive to maintain an optimal balance of
positive and negative cognitive/affective information, and deviations from this balance are associated
with psychopathology").
138. See Barry & Oliver, supra n. 76, at 134.
139. We agree that one factor may be whether the source of the positive affect comes from the
relationship, which may lead parties to pick reasonable demands, or from outside the relationship, which
may lead them to pick high targets. See Barry & Oliver, supra n. 76, at 134. However, as discussed in
the text, we suspect other complexities as well.
140. See Julie L. Tillema, Daniel Cervone & Walter D. Scott, Negative Mood, Perceived Self-
Efficacy, and Personal Standards in Dysphoria: The Effects of Contextual Cues on Self-Defeating
Patterns of Cognition, 25 Cog. Therapy & Res. 535 (2001); Daniel Cervone, Deborah A. Kopp, Linda
Schaumann, & Walter D. Scott, Mood, Self-Efficacy, andPerformance Standards: Lower Moods Induce
Higher Standardsfor Performance, 67 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 499 (1994). Ironically, although persons
in negative moods may set higher goals, such persons did not think they did better:
The present results indicate that negative mood can induce higher personal standards for
performance and thereby create negative discrepancies between the performance standards people
adopt and the level of performance they judge they actually can achieve. Across a variety of
measures in three studies, subjects exposed to negative mood inductions felt they would have to
achieve relatively higher levels of performance to be personally satisfied with their attainments. The
mood inductions consistently had no effect on perceived self-efficacy. Thus, subjects in a negative
mood held minimal standards for performance that significantly exceeded the level of performance
they judged they could attain.
Id. at 507.
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agent: "If you haven't asked five times, then you haven't asked."'' Negotiation
researchers have translated this into the idea of bargaining intensity, typically how
many times individuals ask for better terms. 4 2 In many instances of actual
negotiation, for example, bargaining intensity may be zero, such as the way
relatively few persons translate their sense of discrimination into a claim for
damages. 43 In many other instances, bargaining intensity may be one because initial
offers are accepted, such as the case with many simple auto injury cases.'" In law
school negotiations and other actual negotiations we have observed, the intensity
varies considerably.
It is unclear exactly how mood translates into such intensity. In the simplest
case, one might associate certain kinds of depressive tendencies with low bargaining
intensity since a sense of hopelessness and helplessness is typical of many instances
of depression; 45 many people who, although they may not meet the strict and
extreme criteria for clinical depression, may have greater degrees'" of depressive
personalities. 4 One early negotiation and mood study showed those induced to be
in a better mood by reading cartoons asked for more responses to their offers and
proposed more alternatives. 4 ' Some research in other areas shows that positive
mood also leads to greater persistence in other non-negotiation tasks.'49 Another
possibility builds on evidence that people in better moods think good things are more
likely to occur."5 Various negotiation theories suggest people should'.' and do 2
base decisions on what they believe their alternatives are. Therefore, because
positive moods make people think positive events are more likely, they may think
their alternatives are better and they will set and pursue higher targets - or walk
away to take advantage of a better alternative.
141. We are grateful to our student, Leigh McDonald, for this quotation from her years of real estate
sales.
142. See e.g. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Form of Negotiation in Ordinary Litigation 18 (U. of
Wisconsin-Madison Disputes Processing Research Program Working Paper Series 7, No. 2, 1985).
143. Seesupran. 132.
144. Compare supra n. 142, at 18 (more tort cases involved high bargaining intensity than other
cases) with supra n. 132 (many tort cases involved a defendant simply accepting the first demand).
145. See e.g. Lauren B. Alloy et al., The Temple-Wisconsin Cognitive Vulnerability to Depression
Project: Lifetime History of Axis I Psychopathology in Individuals at High and Low Cognitive Risk for
Depression, 109 J. Abnormal Psychol. 403 (2000).
146. See supra text accompanying n. 36 (personality exists on a continuum).
147. See Millon & Davis, supra n. 36, at 287 (describing the depressive personality as "[t]he giving-
up pattern"). Id. at 306 (some depressive personalities may feel especially "incapable of coping" but
other depressives may have "sufficient feelings of competence and self-worth to enable them ... to
believe that they may ultimately cope with the difficulties they experience").
148. See Carnevale & Isen, supra n. 52.
149. Alice M. Isen, On the Relationship Between Affect and Creative Problem Solving, Affect,
Creative Experience and Psychological Adjustment 3,4 (S. Russ ed., 1999).
150. See William F. Wright& Gordon H. Bower, Mood Effects on Subjective Probability Assessment,
52 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. Proc. 276, 281 (1992).
151. See Fisher, Ury & Patton, supra n. 58 (discussing idea that negotiators should make decisions
based on their best alternative to a negotiated agreement).
152. See Shell, supra n. 19, at 99-105 (discussing the importance of shaping what others believe their
alternatives to be).
[Vol. 2002, No. I
HeinOnline  -- 2002 J. Disp. Resol. 30 2002
The Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist
9. Potential Role: Positive Mood May Increase Creativity In Negotiation
In principle, mood might automatically affect goals and tactics by increasing
creativity. In particular, mood might make it more likely that individuals identify
more complex kinds of relationships, such as tradeoffs, rather than pursuing
relatively simple strategies, such as taking the middle position on a variety of topics.
In a number of studies, for example, researchers found those in positive moods better
able to identify relationships between words; from such studies research developed
the often-cited broader generalization that positive mood increases "cognitive
flexibility" and "creativity."' 53 In principle, this same kind of automatic effect might
make individuals more likely to identify the possibility of tradeoffs or other creative
solutions.
Existing studies of negotiation, however, do not let us test this pathway directly.
Instead, as we will see, studies compare how often individuals reached tradeoffs not
how often they identified the possibility of such tradeoffs. Thompson developed a
sophisticated methodology to ask students after a negotiation to identify what they
thought the exact goals of the other side were, and at least one other study used a
similar method."5 Such a method lets us see whether people in different moods
understand the different needs of other sides; knowing this is a step toward
identifying gains to be made by trading on such differences. However, such research
does not test whether individuals recognized that such tradeoffs were a desirable
possibility. One way future research might test more directly for how mood affects
such perceptions would be to ask individuals to identify potential solutions to a
negotiation at various stages in a negotiation process, such as the beginning of a
negotiation, the middle, and the end. Such research should also consider the
possibility that mood enhances the speed at which individuals identify the potential
for such tradeoffs since other mood research suggests mood may affect the speed of
diagnosing problems. 5'
10. Potential Role: "Mood" May Trigger Thoughts and Schemas
The last potential pathway for mood is the most complicated, but potentially the
most significant for helping us translate laboratory research into practical advice for
negotiators: existing studies may, at least in part, prove not that mood affects
negotiation but rather that certain "mood inductions" really trigger certain patterns
of thought. If this is true, then the studies do not suggest that negotiators, mediators,
and others should seek to promote certain moods, or to deploy negotiators who
153. See Isen supra n. 46 at 530-32. One interesting explanation for the biological basis to positive
mood and creativity concerns dopamine, a neurotransmitter. Isen and others theorize that dopamine,
associated with positive mood, may facilitate creativity. There is some support for this theory in the way
that persons with Parkinson's, caused by a decrease in dopamine, do less well on some tests of creativity.
Id. at 531.
154. See Thompson, supra n. 94; Allred et al., supra n. 50.
155. See Isen, Rosenzweig & Young, supra n. 41 (physicians given a small gift, and presumably
placed in a better mood, reached a correct diagnosis faster than other physicians).
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exhibit those moods; at one extreme, the "moods" are just a sideshow, and the real
work is in the way particular mood inductions trigger particular thought patterns.
To see exactly how "mood" might be a sideshow to cognitions, we need to
carefully examine the existing studies. First, take the claim by Allred that "anger"
reduces accuracy in identifying the incentives of others, thereby reducing the ability
to make tradeoffs and negotiate better. Recall that Allred induced anger and lack of
compassion by giving inconsistent instructions to pairs of students playing
employers and employees. " Researchers told employees they should expect a good
computer, but researchers told employers that potential qmployees would not want
such a computer." 7 Of course, one effect of this is no doubt that students report
greater anger and less compassion. However, a more important effect left
unexplored is that these inconsistent instructions led individuals to mistrust each
other quite rationally: each side believed the other was acting inconsistent.
Therefore, each side reasonably discounted everything the other side said.
This alternative explanation suggests "anger" might not have similar effects in
other negotiations. First, research in cognitive clinical psychology suggests some
individuals are likely to develop mistrust more quickly. According to the schema""8
theory of Jeffrey Young, some individuals develop a schema of mistrust early in life
through crucial experiences, and they are more likely to develop mistrust than other
individuals." 9 We have not identified any existing research that tests whether law
students and lawyers have higher incidences of such mistrust schemas, but we think
it is plausible they do. In particular, we suspect the critical thinking associated with
law school, and the skepticism engendered by the adversarial way advocates
selectively disclose information may make law students and lawyers be more
mistrustful generally. Our current research measures both the relative scores on
schema scales for law students and the change in these measurements during law
school. Second, the more that mistrust rather than pure anger explains the results,
156. See supra text accompanying nn. 85-87.
157. Id.
158. Various other definitions.of schemas exist as well:
The term schema has been used by different researchers and theorists in different contexts with
different degrees of precision. This has led to considerable confusion and lack of specificity in the
use of the term. However, some common specific criteria are emerging. These are that a schema:
(I) is a stored body of knowledge with which incoming information interacts; (2) has a consistent
internal structure that organizes incoming information in a particular fashion; (3) embodies generic
prototypical information such that specific instances are processed using the appropriate schematic
prototype to impose structure; (4) and finally that it is modular in nature such that the activation of
any part will tend to produce activation of the whole.
Laura Rice, Robert Elliot & Leslie S. Greenberg, Facilitating Emotional Change: The Moment-To-
Moment Process 46 (Guilford Press 1993). Although various distinctions are of interest to other
research, they are not especially important to our main point here: different experiments that purport to
test an emotion, such as anger, may activate a schema, such as mistrust. Therefore, the emotion from
other sources, which do not activate this schema, may have different consequences.
159. Jeffrey E. Young, Cognitive Therapy For Personality Disorders: A Schema -FocusedApproach
72 (Prof. Resource Press 1990).
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the less likely that negotiators who are angry for other reasons may show similar
results. For example, the lawyer who runs a red light on the way to a negotiation,
or gets a call from a difficult client on the way, may experience anger, but may have
none of the mistrust associated with Allred's study.
A close examination of Forgas's study also suggests that certain cognitions
about competence play more of a role than happiness or sadness. Again, recall the
exact way Forgas manipulated mood: he made one group happier by giving them an
easy test and saying they did well on a hard test, and he made one group sadder by
telling them they took an easy test but did very badly."w Imagine how this
experience affected the thoughts of such individuals: the happy mood group may
have considered themselves much more competent, and the sad group may have
considered themselves much less competent. Therefore, the happy group may have
tried harder because they expected, based on what they thought was their success on
the test, that such hard work would pay off; the sad group, on the other hand, may
have given up because, based on what they thought was their test experience, hard
work did not pay off.'6' Again, in Young's schema vocabulary, the experience with
the test may have activated a "failure to achieve" schema in which people "feel
stupid, inept, untalented, or ignorant." 62 When this schema is activated, people
"often do not try to achieve because they believe that they will fail."' 63
In short, we face several reasons why existing studies that rely on inducing
mood may not show how happiness and sadness will generally affect negotiators.
First, schema research suggests some individuals are more or less likely to recall
patterns of incompetence or lack of ability to meet their own needs. We have
hypotheses about how this pattern may affect lawyers: perhaps the rigors of law
school immunize some so that feedback does not trigger such competency schemas;
or perhaps the rigorous hierarchical and competitive nature of law school further
engenders and/or strengthens such patterns.
Second, it is possible other sources of happiness and sadness will not have the
same effect.'" For example, if a negotiator receives flowers from a loved one on the
160. Forgas, supra n. 40, at 567-70.
161. We acknowledge that one strategy to avoid the critique that studies depend upon triggering a
particular cognition is instead to engage in a series of different types of inductions, all presumed to
induce positive emotion. Isen, supra n. 46, at 523. Thus, for example, if exposing people to funny
videos, giving them false positive feedback on tests, etc. all are associated with increased creativity, one
may interpret this as empirical support for the idea that positive affect is associated with creativity. On
the other hand, one might also construe such studies to say that they simply show these particular
inductions induce creativity; or one might interpret them as all triggering some other cognition, such as
the schema that they are entitled to special treatment, a schema often associated in extreme measures
with narcissism. See Young, supra n. 159, at 14.
162. Young, supra n. 159, at 73.
163. Id.
164. Our basic point is that mood inductions that purport to be about "anger" may not generalize to
sources of anger different from the experimental context. We acknowledge that one might make the
same point without referring to different cognitions. Instead, one might distinguish between different
sources of anger, such as anger directed at the person with whom one is negotiating from simple free-
floating anger, or anger directed at some other person. See generally Fiske & Taylor, supra n. 7, at 411
(there may be a variety of distinct emotions).
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way to a negotiation, this may lead to happiness, but it may not activate cognitions
about competence.
Third, the exact mood manipulations may exert effects in ways other than
mood. As Barry and Oliver noted, it is problematic to rely on the giving of gifts to
induce positive mood because this may trigger cooperation not via a happy mood but
through the well-known reciprocity effect: if one receives something, one has a
tendency to want to give something in return. 65 Overall, as one leading overview
of research on emotion and cognition concluded, "[E]ven if one grants the internal
validity of a laboratory method, a researcher may wish to adopt more naturalistic
methods to ensure the ecological validity and the generalizability of the findings.'"
D. Alternative Methods to Identifying Pathways:
The Importance of Naturally-Occurring Mood Versus Mood Inductions
In light of these limitations of existing studies, we have turned in our own
ongoing research to a different method of testing the way mood affects negotiation.
We have declined to try to induce certain moods. Instead, we have surveyed
students about their moods before and after negotiations; we then compare the way
these moods predict negotiation outcomes and behaviors. 67 In mood research
circles, this is known as studying naturally occurring mood.'" This research is more
likely to produce results that show a variety of different sources of the same mood,
such as happiness, really will have similar effects. When we find that a group of
students is in a happier mood, it is more likely that this happy mood has come from
a variety of sources than if we simply induce a happy mood. Therefore, findings
based on such naturally occurring mood suggest that one may give empirically
supported advice about how the moods, whatever their source, affect negotiation.
In addition, such research also allows us to draw on a variety of existing methods in
This alternative explanation of why particular mood inductions may not generalize outside the
experimental context avoids potential entanglement with complex debates about the exact relationship
between mood and cognition, such as whether any kind of mood or emotion invariably involves some
implicit, even if not conscious cognition. See generally id. at 450-57 (discussing various rival accounts
of the relationship between emotions and cognitions); John D. Teasdale, Multi-level Theories of
Cognition-Emotion Relations, in Handbook of Cognition And Emotion 665 (Tim Dalgleish & Mick
Power, eds., John Wiley & Sons 1999); Robert B. Zajonc, Closing the Debate Over the Independence
of Affect, in Feeling and Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition 31, 48 (Joseph Forgas ed.,
Cambridge U. Press 2000) (arguing that one should pay greater attention to general and nonconscious
mood because it may easily "spill onto almost any stimuli that are currently present - stimuli totally
unrelated to the individual's condition at the moment").
165. Barry & Oliver, supra n. 76, at 139. Among negotiation studies, the first major study of mood
and negotiation relied on both the use of funny cartoons and a small gift to induce pleasant mood. Id.
at 134.
166. Parrott & Hertel, supra n. 7, at 67. See Barry & Oliver, supra n. 76, at 139 ("In general, external
validity concerns argue for observation over manipulation .... ").
167. We acknowledge the limitation that different people may have different understandings of words
like "angry" or "happy." To minimize these differences, we now are developing definitions to
accompany the words.
168. See Parrott & Hertel, supra n. 7, at 67.
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clinical psychology that have been empirically-supported to affect such moods, such
as short term management of anxiety through breathing or longer term cognitive-
behavioral skills that may be taught in classes.'69 In contrast, findings based on
particular mood inductions may only lead to the very limited advice that individuals
should replicate a particular induction: this is easier with some inductions, such as
using pleasant scents, but harder with others. How does one give oneself false
feedback on a test?
On the other hand, the existing studies may also be useful for other purposes as
well. Even if Allred's study of "anger" has more to do with "mistrust," then it may
suggest predictable ways that perceptions of dishonesty may affect a negotiation.
This may be an important topic because misunderstandings and individual
differences, such as assumptions about what nonverbal behavior indicates lying, may
be very common in negotiation. In a similar way, even if one cannot directly
replicate false feedback on a test, one may analogize this to situations in which a
lawyer may attempt a negotiation after winning/losing an argument in court or in
another negotiation.
Other alternatives for measuring mood also exist. One may look for stress
hormones in blood, activation of areas of the brain associated with different
emotions, or code for nonverbal communication, such as facial movements,
associated with different emotions."' Such methods may be expensive, and, in some
instances, more invasive than many people would like. (How many would like to
negotiate while in a brain imaging machine - even the new partially open ones?).
Ultimately, however, the best understanding of how mood affects negotiation (as
well as other cognitions and tasks) may come from the cumulative findings of a
number of studies using a combination of mood inductions, naturally-occurring
mood, and these other more time-consuming and costly methods. As in other areas
of psychological research, the best approach often involves an examination of
multiple traits by multiple methods."'
169. We acknowledge that there are some potential risks to studying naturally-occurring mood as
well. As even Barry and Oliver note, there may be the danger that it is harder to detect emotion without
a manipulation. Barry & Oliver, supra n. 76, at 139. In seeking funding for our own experimental
research, for example, some anonymous reviewers doubted whether law students would actually exhibit
any emotion during a mere classroom negotiation; others doubted whether law students would accurately
report whatever emotions they did feel. See Isen, supra n. 46, at 523. Our initial pilot research has
addressed these concerns in several ways: First, on the measures we used, students did report a range of
emotion; second, many of the students reported symptoms associated with depression, which one might
have feared students would conceal because the legal profession, like society, stigmatizes those who
describe mental health concerns. More generally, self-reports of emotional states are the usual method
used to measure naturally occurring mood, and some research suggests a priori concerns about potential
biases do not explain the results. Parrott & Hertel, supra n. 7.
Others fear that asking persons to report their emotions may itselfdisrupt negotiations. See sen, supra
n. 46, at 523.
170. See Parrott & Hertel, supra n. 7, at 73-74 (for an overview of these other methods).
171. Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Bert R. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation 298
(Acad. Press 1975) (citing D.T. Campbell & D.W. Fiske, Convergent and Discriminant Validation by
the Multitrait-multimethod Matrix, 56 Psychol. Bull. 81 (1959)).
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II. WHAT WE DON'T KNOW:
How DOES MOOD AFFECT LAWYERS AND LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS?
A. What We Know: Mood Affects Many People,
But Affects Some People And Some Negotiations In Different Ways
We have seen that studies of business and psychology students suggest even
mild changes in mood may have dramatic effects on the strategies and successes of
negotiators, but there remains the question of how studies relate to legal
negotiations."7 Negotiation scholarship often borrows conclusions about the way
psychology and business students negotiate and assumes this reveals some general
truth about negotiation that law students and lawyers can apply directly." This
partially reflects the much bemoaned - and slowly changing - habit of legal
academics not conducting empirical research. 74 This habit may reflect not so much
laziness or lack of skill but rather the lack of incentives and lack of resources that
law schools provide for empirical research. In larger part, however, it is consistent
with a deeply held belief of social psychologists that different individuals negotiate
the same way if they are in the same social settings; this belief in turn reflects a
broader belief- and large body of experimental literature - that different individuals
behave the same if they are in the same social conditions. To put the ideas in a
slogan, it is the situation and not the personality that determines how people act, be
it in negotiation or some other activity.'7
172. We recognize that there is no simple definition of legal negotiations, and the term is most often
used without any definition. Mnookin defines legal negotiations as one in which a "client's negotiation
involves legal issues - when it occur in the shadow of the law." Mnookin et al., supra n. 10, at 93-94.
Some might question the precision of such a definition since any negotiation often silently involves
assumptions about how law defines things like property, but we think this definition works well enough
for research into how mood may affect different kinds of negotiations.
173. See supra text accompanying n. 33.
174. On the much bemoaned habit, see eg. Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law (Harv. U. Press
1995). Ironically, it is far more common to find legal academics who bemoan the lack of empirical
research than those willing to follow up with empirical research of their own. See Clark Freshman, Were
Patricia Williams and Ronald Dworkin Separated at Birth?, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1568 (1995) (reviewing
Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law (Hare. U. Press 1995)).
175. For a leading general statement of this view, see Lee Ross & Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and
the Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology (Temple U. Press 1991). In negotiation circles, the
possibility that differences matter has received mixed attention in research and teaching publications.
For an early review, see Rubin & Brown, supra n. 171, at 195 (noting "a surprisingly large number of
experiments that find no systematic relationship between individual differences parameters and
bargaining behavior."). Even this early review argued that negotiation research needs better tools "for
the measurement of individual difference variables." Id. at 298. On the research side, one of the leading
researchers, Leigh Thompson, suggested in 1990 that research might focus more on individual
differences, but in 2000 contributed to ajoint article that concluded individual differences did not matter
much - despite citing the very Forgas article that demonstrated individual differences did show mood
affected some people far more than others! Compare Thompson, supra n. 49, at 527 (suggesting that
study of individual differences may be valuable approach to study of negotiation) with Max H.
Bazerman et al., supra n. 26, at 285 (citing Forgas's article, which shows machiavellianism differences
among individuals make difference in how mood affects behavior, but also asserting that individual
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More recent studies, however, suggest mood may indeed have different effects
on different kinds of negotiations. 76 The data are still only suggestive and our own
empirical study of how mood affects law students when they negotiate is only in its
preliminary stages. Still, two possibilities deserve consideration: First, mood affects
negotiation by lawyers differently because of some characteristics lawyers, be they
formed before law school, during law school, or in legal practice. Second, mood
may not affect negotiations involving legal issues because the nature of those issues
leads lawyers and non-lawyers to negotiate in ways that are less susceptible to the
vagaries of mood. We distinguish lawyers and legal negotiations because: (1)
nonlawyers may engage in a variety of legal negotiations, such as settlement of
arbitrations in jurisdictions which permit nonlawyer advocates in arbitrations, and
(2) lawyers may engage in relatively nonlegal negotiations, such as renting hotel
rooms for their own vacation. Section A sets outs general reasons why mood may
apply differently to different types of negotiations and/or groups of people with
different personality profiles. Such different psychological profiles might
characterize different professionals, like lawyers, people in different countries,
people of different genders, and so on. We acknowledge the problematic nature of
any particular system of psychological classification; dominant psychological
paradigms in the helping professions historically stigmatized lesbians and gay men"
and may continue to stigmatize women.' Everyday informal psychologizing may
be infected by similar biases. 79  SectioA B directly applies this framework to
lawyers, and Section C applies it to legal negotiation.
Although the potential differences we survey are many, we believe the bottom-
line is clear: we need empirical research of the way mood affects various lawyers
and legal negotiations. For a number of plausible reasons, mood may affect lawyers
less than it affects other individuals. For example, lawyers may have personalities
associated with deliberate strategies Forgas has shown lead to fewer mood effects on
cognition and behavior. On the other hand, it is also plausible that mood may have
greater effects on lawyers and/or legal negotiation. For example, many legal
negotiations, such as settlements of pending legal disputes or negotiation of
collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers, take months or
years - far longer than the brief negotiation studies conducted so far on mood. As
shown below, this might lead to fewer effects as lawyers have time to plan and
execute deliberate strategies; or it might lead to greater mood effects because the
initial mood may escalate over time.
differences do not matter in negotiation.).
176. See e.g. Forgas, supra n. 40, at 576 ("It is also possible, indeed likely, that additional features
of the person, the task, and the opposition not considered here may play a critical role in cueing
alternative processing strategies and thus different mood effects. Future research needs to consider the
role of such contextual variables in recruiting different processing strategies and, thus, in mediating
mood effects on negotiation performance.").
177. See Freshman, supra n. 20.
178. See Stefan, supra n. 37.
179. See Clark Freshman, Re-visioning The Dependency Crisis and the Negotiator's Dilemma, 22 L.
& Soc. Inquiry 97, 101 (1997).
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1. Mood Affects Deliberate Decisionmaking and Deliberate Decisionmakers Less
The most direct evidence comes from Forgas's experiments on bargaining. In
general, those in worse moods behaved more competitively, but mood had no
significant effects on some individuals.' Specifically, individuals who scored high
in Machiavellianism"' and social desirability s2 did not behave differently when
exposed to different mood manipulations.s In a similar way, Kramer's study of
business school students showed that mood lowered students' expectations of the
other side at a greater rate for students who had high self-esteem.'" Both these
findings are consistent with a small but growing body of research that demonstrates
180. It's worth noting that there is an unresolved ambiguity in Forgas's research between two
possibilities: (1) As implied, certain individuals had the same changes in mood in response to the false
feedback as other individuals, but their behavior did not change, or (2) certain individuals behaved
differently because the false feedback did not change their moods. It is impossible to resolve this
ambiguity from the published research because the study simply reports in general that the false feedback
succeeded in changing individual's mood, but it does not report separately on whether there was any
relationship between the degree of various individuals traits and the amount of mood change.
Conceivably, one explanation applies more to one group than the other. The machiavelians may have
been immune to what others told them, and thereby had no mood change; those high in the need for
social desirability, on the other hand, may have been especially unnerved by the notion that others rated
their abilities as less desirable. In e-mail correspondence, Forgas agreed that the data were unclear, and
a number of interpretations were possible:
[W]e did not collect data on precisely how the social desirability and machiavellianism effects
occurred, but simply assumed that high scores on such dimensions tend to reduce mood valence
effects because those people have motivated reasons to respond to social situations in particular
ways. The possibility that effects were reduced because of the reduced effectiveness of the false
feedback mood induction is also a reasonable possibility that could be tested in the future; however,
this could only apply to high scorers on some individual difference measures (such as
machiavelliansim) but not to other (such as social desirability), so on balance the former explanation
seems more plausible and parsimonious than the second one.
E-mail from Joseph P. Forgas, Professor of Psychology, University of New South Wales, to Clark
Freshman, Professor of Law, University of Miami (July 26, 2001) (on file with author).
181. As described by Forgas, the twenty item Machiavellianism scale is to "measuref] a person's view
of others and their preferred strategies of dealing with people, assessing the extent to which a person is
likely to have a motivated, detached, and even cynical view of human nature, and is likely to see others
as manipulable in social situations." Forgas, supra n. 40, at 570. See also Rubin & Brown, supra n. 171,
at 189 (defining Machiavellianism as "the willingness and ability to use guile, deceit and other
opportunistic strategies in interpersonal relations in order to manipulate people") (internal quotations
and citations omitted). A number of other studies have long shown that persons who score high on the
scale tend to behave more competitively. Id.
182. As Forgas summarized it, the thirty-three item scale of true false questions "measures the extent
to which individuals are motivated to seek approval, by acting and describing themselves in erms of
favorable, socially desirable characteristics." Forgas, supra n. 40, at 570.
183. Forgas, supra n. 40, at 570-74.
184. Kramer etal., supra n. 3.
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mood does not have the same effects on all individuals, but that individuals with
certain identifiable characteristics may react differently to mood.' 5'
It is important to understand how Forgas relates his finding to a broader theory
of how mood affects particular decisions for what people; this will later give us one
way to think about how mood may affect law students and lawyers. Forgas's
explanation for this data largely focuses on the degree to which people engage in
relatively deliberate and consistent strategies. The reason why people who are
Machiavellian are less affected by mood, according to this theory, is not that they are
"evil," or willing to "use" people, but rather because they engage in deliberate and
planned strategies.'" In principle, then, one might think those who consistently
engage in strategies of "goodness" would also be less affected by mood. For
example, a Tibetan lama, who consistently tries to help others and always take on
their pain, would seem to be less affected by mood 87 because the lama follows a
consistent, deliberate strategy. In short, people who act consistently for whatever
reason may be less affected by mood. As we shall see, such a variable might include
the tendency to be obsessive and/or compulsive.'
185. For an overview, see Forgas, Johnson & Ciarrochi, supra n. 79, at 183 ("Unfortunately, evidence
for the role of individual difference variables in affect infusion or affect control processes is still
relatively scarce.").
186. Id. (noting that there is less effect of emotion on people with Type A personality: "As we know
that Type A persons are characterized by a high level of concern with control, as well as feelings of time
pressure, urgency and tension, it seems likely that these individuals processed information in a more
targeted, motivated manner that eliminated affect infusion effects"). It is worth noting that emotion may
still have a significant effect on Type A persons. Among other examples, the Stanford Business School
students who negotiated differently in different mood conditions likely include many Type A
personalities. See Kramer et al., supra n. 3.
187. It is worth noting that the ambiguity latent in Forgas's work - are deliberate individuals less
susceptible to mood or do they experience less mood variation - is confronted directly in Tibetan
practices: the Tibetan tradition emphasizes the rooting out of most emotions. "As soon as disturbing
emotions arise," one classic Tibetan text advises "jump on them, round them up, isolate and crush them."
Jamgon Kongtrul, The Great Path ofAwakening 45 (Ken McLeod trans., 2000). See also id. at 37 ("be
decisive in your attitude that such [disturbing emotions]... will never arise again"). To the extent that
the Tibetan tradition, like other Buddhist traditions, emphasizes the development of feelings of
compassion, see e.g. id. at xiv, then the explanation seems to be more that emotion is felt but balanced
by a quite deliberate cultivation of equanimity, the ability to feel for another but without giving in to the
needs of another:
The example might be given of a friend who is engaged in extremely self-destructive behavior. We
wish wholeheartedly with great intensity, that they be free of suffering .... But, in the end we have
to recognize where the boundaries actually are what our responsibility really is .... [W]e continue
to offer them.., compassion but we do this with the wisdom and acceptance that they are
ultimately responsible for their own actions.
Sharon Salzberg, Lovingkindness: The Revolutionary Art of Happiness 147 (Shambhala 1995). This
attitude is cultivated through quite explicit meditations. Id. at 152.
188. Obsessive and compulsive are strongly evocative words - it's tempting to think that only "crazy"
other people are "obsessive" but that we focus on detail. See e.g. John M. Oldham & Lois B. Morris,
The Personality Self-Portrait: Why You Think Work Love, and Act the Way You Do 56 (Bantam Books
199) Instead, it's worth noting that the qualities of focusing tightly and persistently are better
understood as part of a continuum, with many people exhibiting similar qualities to a lesser degree.
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2. "Mood" May Interact Differently With Persons With Different "Personalities"
and Mood "Disorders"
To the extent we want to apply this research to improve negotiation, a very
important question is precisely how ingrained these different responses to emotion
are. In general, those who study how to change individual behavior, although seeing
a continuum of stability, make three relevant distinctions about mood: (1) some
mood is simply transient and quite easy to change; (2) some mood differences stem
from relatively stable mood disorders, such as depression and anxiety, and are more
difficult to change; and (3) other differences are more deeply rooted in aspects of
personality and are far more resistant to change. For example, many mood
disorders like depression are successfully treated in sixteen to twenty weeks of
cognitive therapy,"5 9 and there is some evidence such treatment may work
successfully in group settings such as classes in mindfulness or problem-solving.'"
There is considerably more variation with different types of personality disorders.
In contrast to the substantial studies that support cognitive-behavioral therapy for
depression and anxiety, only preliminary studies exist for other personality disorders,
and even these require longer treatments of approximately one year. 9 ' At the
opposite end of the spectrum, there is more recently developed evidence that some
persons may have propensities to be in positive moods. Some persons generally tend
Nevertheless, clinicians frequently distinguish at the more obsessive end of the spectrum between those
who have obsessive-compulsive personality disorder ("OCPD") and those who have the more serious
and entrenched obsessive-compulsive disorder ("OCD"):
Simply stated, when your obsessions and compulsions are enough to cause significant functional
impairment, you have OCD. In OCPD, these "obsessions" and "compulsions" are more like
personality quirks or idiosyncracies, however unpleasant. For example, a man with OCPD may
hang on to some object because he believes he may need it someday. But a man with an OCD
hoarding compulsion may fill every square foot of his house with worthless trash he knows he'll
never need.
Jeffrey M. Schwartz & Beverly Beyette, Brain Lock xxiii (Diane Publ. Co. 1996). Others see OCPD and
OCD as more distinct. See Millon & Davis, supra n. 36, at 506 (criticizing use of "obsessive-
compulsive" when "the great majority of these patients exhibit neither compulsions nor obsessions").
In addition, many of those with OCPD often have no desire to change their habits but blame others for
not sharing them! Schwartz & Beyette, supra at xxii; Millon & Davis, supra n. 36, at 523 (some
compulsives are less satisfied). See infra n. 350.
189. Beck, supra n. 133, at 104-16 (describing typical course of cognitive-behavioral therapy for
depression).
190. See infra text accompanying n. 354.
191. See e.g. Kelly Koerner & Linda Dimeff, Further Evidence on Dialectical Behavior Therapy, 7
Clinical Psychol.: Science & Prac. 104, 105 (2000).
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to be more optimistic."9 Somewhere else on the spectrum, other researchers have
also identified relatively stable propensities to be angry. 93
Thus, in terms of negotiation, it is important to know just how broadly the
effects of mood change occur on a given set of negotiators. The more a population
consists of persons with relatively stable negative moods due to depression, for
example, the more comprehensive responses may need to be developed. Differences
in propensity to mood also raise a very different possibility: perhaps much of the
effect of mood on negotiation applies disproportionately to only a few individuals.
For example, although depressed persons tend to be in a generally bad mood much
of the time, they may also respond to negative events more quickly by entering an
even worse mood than others."9 Some existing research in other areas shows
depression (or dysphoria)'95 has an effect on the way mood affects individual
decisionmaking. "9 We know of no studies, however, that have examined the effect
of either depression or anxiety on negotiation results.
192. See Ed Diener & Richard E. Lucas, Personality and Subjective Well-being, in Well-Being: The
Foundations ofHedonicPsychology 213 (Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz eds., Russell
Sage Found. 1999); Sonja Lyubomirsky, Why Are Some People Happier Than Others? The Role of
Cognitive and Motivational Processes in Well-Being, 56 Am. Psychologist 239 (2001) (individuals who
identify themselves as happy are more likely than individuals who identify themselves as unhappy to
engage in a variety of cognitive and motivational processes which are hypothesized to moderate the
impact of the objective environment on well-being); Carol D. Ryff& Corey Lee M. Keyes, The Structure
of Psychological Well-Being Revisited, 69 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 719 (1995).
193. See e.g. Mario Mikulincer, Adult Attachment Style and Individual Differences in Functional
Versus Dysfunctional Experiences of Anger, 74 J. Pets. & Soc. Psychol. 513 (1998).
194. Consider recent evidence that women law students have less confidence about how they did
compared to men - even though they did just as well. Sandra R. Farber & Monica Rickenberg, Under-
Confident Women and Over-Confident Men: Gender and Sense of Competence in a Simulated
Negotiation, 11 Yale J. L. & Feminism271 (1999). One might consider the degree to which this finding
reflects a difference in gender per se versus the degree to which it may reflect the higher proportions of
diagnoses of depression among women.
195. Some reserve the term "depression" to refer to those diagnosed with depression only according
to certain methods, such as the use of an individualized clinical interview by a psychologist trained in
such methods; such persons prefer to describe research that uses pencil and paper tests of depression,
such as the Beck Depression Inventory, as research instead on "dysphoria" or "depressed mood." See
e.g. Parrott & Hertel, supra n. 7, at 68-70.
196. Galen Bodenhausen et al., Sadness And Susceptibility To Judgmental Bias: The Case of
Anchoring, 11 Psychol. Sci. 320 (2000) (sad persons were more subject to the anchoring bias).
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3. Mood May Affect Experts and Other Intuitive Decisionmakers Less (But
Produce Suboptimal Decisions)
Ironically, even as some research suggests deliberate decisionmakers are
affected less by mood, another set of research suggests those who act automatically
or intuitively may also be less affected by mood. In principle, those who have made
many similar decisions in a field previously, typically labeled "experts,"'" often
make decisions by recalling a similar situation and the responses that worked best
in such scenarios. 9" This research suggests experts make decisions in stressful
situations that are much like the decisions they' make when not in stressful
situations.'" If one assumes that stressful situations provoke mood changes even in
experts, then this evidence suggests mood affects experts decisionmaking less.
Despite its obvious differences from Forgas's notion that mood affects
deliberate decisionmakers less, the expert model shares some features. Of course,
the notion that experts are less affected by stressful situations because they think less
deliberately, not more, seems the exact opposite of Forgas's research. On the other
hand, the stress research shares a similar structure: just as Forgas found high-
Machiavelians are unaffected by mood because they always act competitively, the
stress research finds that stressful situations do not affect certain individuals because
they always recall the same prior patterns and always act consistently with them. In
other words, mood does not affect certain decisionmakers because they always act
in certain predictable ways: Machiavellian deliberate decisionmakers in Forgas's
study always act competitively, and expert decisionmakers always simply recall the
expert pattern of response to a situation. The stress studies also share the ambiguity
between the idea that: (1) mood may affect some individual decisionmaking less, or
(2) certain situations do not affect some individuals' decisionmaking because
situations that generally put most people in certain moods do not change the moods
of some individuals. This ambiguity is even more pronounced in the stress and
decisionmaking studies than in Forgas's research because the stress studies we
examined do not measure the mood of any individuals but simply compare how
experts versus novices responded to stress.'
In addition, like Forgas's model, the expertise studies leave open the possibility
that some decisionmakers are less affected by mood but still make suboptimal
decisions. Both merely show that some decisionmakers make the same decisions in
circumstances where the decisionmaking of others would be affected by mood. As
Emerson noted, however, a foolish consistency can be the hobgoblin of little
197. Perhaps a more neutral way to describe such persons would be to say that they are "repeat
players;" this shows they have experience doing something, but not necessarily that they have mastered
a particular area - nor that whatever area they have mastered is relevant to a particular current task.
198. Gary Klein, The Effect of Acute Stressors on Decision Making, in Stress and Human
Performance 49, 64 (James E. Driskell & Eduardo Salas eds., Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 1996).
199. Id.
200. On the other hand, other scholars of mood and cognition routinely do not measure mood in
individual studies once they have established in other studies that some given activity, such as giving
a small gift, has a consistent effect on mood. See Isen, supra n. 46.
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minds. 2°1 In the case of Forgas, the consistent use of a competitive strategy may
neglect the potential to perform well by the development of relationships and
tradeoff skills associated with success in at least some negotiations. In the case of
expert decisionmaking, the reliance on pattern recall sacrifices the possibility of
developing new solutions, which may include better solutions to older problems or
appropriate solutions to new problems.2"c Likewise, even fans of expert
decisionmaking note that such decisionmaking under stress may not be optimal,
particularly if the situation at hand differs from patterns recalled." 3 Thus, although
expert decisionmakers may seem to be less affected by stressful conditions, it is
possible they could perform even better over a wider range of circumstances if they
were better trained to manage mood and negotiation. 4
The nature of the existing study of experts obscures this possibility. Research
suggests experts use of (often automatic) recall works well for a number of reasons.
Such research on expert decisionmaking limits itself to decisions where speed is
especially important, where routine solutions work acceptably well, and where the
possibility of more optimal decisions is not considered.2 5 Partly this stems from the
selection of activities, like firefighting, where speed is important. This also stems
from considering scenarios, such as games of chess, in which there are strict rules
that by definition limit novel solutions. 206 In other instances, there is simply an
unstated assumption that novel solutions do not exist, such as in decisions by
firefighters about how to fight fires.20"
201. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self Reliance, in Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson 147, 153
(Stephen E. Whicher ed., Riverside Press 1957).
202. Maurice Allais, Nobel Lecture." An Outline of My Main Contributions to Economic Science, 87
The Am Econ. Rev. 3, 8 (Dec. 1997) ("[I]t is only through the constant questioning of 'established
truths' and the blossoming of new ideas suggested both by empirical evidence and by creative intuition,
that science can truly progress .... Dominant ideas, however erroneous they may be, end up, simply
through continual repetition .... ).
203. Klein, supra n. 198, at 64 ("My point is that, given the inherent difficulties of performing a task
with reduced time and attention and working memory, decision quality is usually satisfactory, although
not necessarily optimal.").
204. This hypothesis remains speculative, however. It is possible that training in the awareness of
the reality that mood affects performance might diminish performance in some cases. In the narrowest
sense, the resources devoted to monitoring mood might tax limited cognitive resources. In a broader
sense, the attention to the possibility of mood effects might itself cause the very anxiety that may have
a negative effect on performance.
205. Klein, supra n. 198, at 49.
206. One may also put the expertise in another research context. Isen, one of the leading advocates
of the idea that mood affects many decisions, and co-author of the first published paper to show such
effects on negotiation, notes that mood does not seem to affect routine activities. One reason mood may
not affect some expert decisionmaking is that, from the perspectives of such experts, decisions that might
seem quite novel to us are really quite routine to them. Where we might be overwhelmed by the idea
of how to fight a fire, and engage in elaborate types of research and cost-benefit analysis, a veteran fire
chief may just experience the situation (often accurately) as indistinguishable from dozens of similar
situations she faced. See Isen, supra n. 46.
207. Klein, supra n. 198, at 64. But cf Michael Wheeler, Presence ofMind, Harvard Business School
Case N9-902-176 12-13 (January 22, 2002) (only firefighter to escape fire came up with "novel
situation").
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Some of these same considerations apply differently to non-experts who
generally rely on more intuitive processes, like automatic recall of prior experiences.
Research reveals that some individuals generally rely more on intuition or automatic
recall of prior circumstances. °' Such intuitive thinking often entails a "'quick and
dirty' approach, arriving at usually reasonable answers... effortlessly [such as]
agree[ing] with an argument because a quick glance reveals that it is presented by
an expert source." As with the other concepts we have explored, research on
intuition has evolved from dichotomizing between rational and intuitive thinking to
a more complex model. In particular, researchers now see rational and intuitive
reasoning as partially autonomous so individuals may draw on both rational and
intuitive processes;2 0 the relative balance, however, will vary with individuals.2" '
Again, we may ask whether mood affects such individuals who use more intuitive
decision-making less than those who engage in more "rational" thinking.
We think it less plausible that mood affects such intuitive individuals differently.
First, to the extent that stressful situations do not affect experts because the experts
never exhibit any mood change, we think those less expert and less familiar with
various stressors will still experience emotional change. To take a popular example,
even the most intuitive decisionmakers may still find buying a car stressful. As a
result, the change in mood may affect even intuitive decisionmaking because
research shows that people in certain moods tend to recall examples associated with
those moods."' Thus, the intuitive car buyer may get anxious and recall similar
examples of decisions made when anxious.
Second, as a consequence, it is even more plausible that mood may make
intuitive decisionmakers reach sub-optimal decisions. The less an individual has
experience in an area, the more likely the examples recalled will be inappropriate
208. For a recent synthesis, see Eliot R. Smith & Jamie DeCoster, Dual Process Models in Social and
Cognitive Psychology: Conceptual Integration and Links To Underlying Memory Systems, 4 Pers. &
Soc. Psychol. Rev. 108 (2000). Particular theorists and researchers vary in the extent to which they see
differences in how much given individuals use one mode or the other; theorists also differ in the extent
to which the differences depend on some capacity of an individual for various kinds of reasoning versus
the motivation to engage in various kinds of reasoning. Id. at 125. In our research, we have relied on
the Normative Message Processing Scale. It has twenty-four items, distinguishing between tendency
to engage in Inessage processing that is selective, effortful, and highly deliberate (analytical factor) and
message processing that is unselective, low effort, and nondeliberate (intuition factor). R. Kelly Aune
& Rodney A. Reynolds, The Empirical Development of the Normative Message Processing Scale, 61
Commun. Monographs 135 (1994).
209. Smith & DeCoster, supra n. 208, at 108. We omit the authors' use of the modifier "efficiently"
because efficiency, as understood by economists, depends both on the costs and the benefits; a decision
is not efficient merely because it cuts costs if, as in specious reliance on an expert, it results in a worse
outcome.
210. Id. at 109 ("numerous theorists have advanced generally similar proposals... that [all] humans
have two separate memory systems.").
211. Cf id. at 115 ("[S]ome people may make decisions based on gut instincts, but [o]ther people are
likely to be more readily convinced of a conclusion if one can offer a step-by-step logical account ofhow
it was derived than if the conclusion is simply based on 'gut feelings' or intuitions.").
212. See e.g. Eric Eich & Dawn Macaulay, Fundamental Factors in Mood-Dependent Memory, in
Feeling and Thinking: The Role OfAffect in Social Cognition 109 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., Cambridge U.
Press 2000).
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examples: the intuitive car buyer may recall situations in which he worried too much
about getting the best price on something; he therefore may concede too quickly on
car pricing or car financing when holding out would get a much better price. Our
ongoing research has attempted to address this question empirically by studying the
way those prone to more intuitive decisionmaking perform on negotiation tasks." 3
B. What We Don't Know: Does Mood Affect Negotiations By Lawyers
Differently?
We next turn to why lawyers present such an important case for the study of
mood and negotiation. As we saw, there is clear evidence, and a number of theories,
that mood does not affect people equally. Forgas's experiments with negotiation
show that mood does not affect people with Machiavellian personalities, and he
thinks, more generally, that those who tend to engage in any kind of deliberate
and/or consistent pattern of behavior will be less affected by mood. It is difficult to
apply existing studies directly to different populations because different researchers
have used very different ways to measure individual differences, rather than
including the same measurers of mood and the same individual difference measures,
such as standard personality measures. Therefore, our hypotheses about how mood
may affect lawyers are not definitive, but a set of empirically-testable propositions.
1. The "Personalities" of Lawyers: Do More Symptoms of Obsession, Anxiety,
and Depression Mean Mood Affects Negotiation Differently?
The largest reason to suspect mood affects lawyers differently from other
negotiators is that lawyers and law students have very different psychological
profiles from other individuals. Lawyers have much higher rates of symptoms of
depression, anxiety, and obsessiveness from the general population.2 14 There is also
213. In particular, our research has looked at law student negotiations and the response of students
to an inventory designed to measure their propensity to think in relatively rational versus relatively
intuitive ways. This approach relies on the notion that: (1) there is some kind of measurable propensity
to rely on such intuitive thinking, and (2) the measures based on student self-reports in fact measure this
propensity. Another way to test the same question would be to instead try to examine more directly how
students said they made decisions in a particular negotiation, such as the process used in "think-aloud"
studies that ask individuals to describe how they are approaching a situation as they plan for it or engage
in their thinking process. For an overview of such think-aloud measurement methods, see e.g. Gerald
Davison, Ralph Vogel & Sandra Coffman, Think-Aloud Approaches to Cognitive Assessment and the
Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations Paradigm, 65 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 950
(1997); Christopher Eckhardt, Krista Barbour & Gerald Davison, Articulated Thoughts of Maritally
Violent and Nonviolent Men During Anger Arousal, 66 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 259 (1998).
One might also get some similar results by asking individuals to plan for a negotiation in writing and
examine their written plans.
214. William Eaton et al., Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive Disorder, 32 J.
Occup. Med. 1079 (1990) ("A recent study found lawyers to have the highest rate of major depressive
disorder among 104 occupational groups."); Susan Diacoff, Lawyer Know Thysef. A Review of
Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1337, 1378
(1997); G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing PsychologicalDistress
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evidence that other professions, such as stockbrokers, have very different
psychological profiles, and one may question in a similar way how mood will affect
negotiations by persons in such professions.21 As we have seen, there are good
theoretical reasons to suspect that people with such characteristics are affected by
mood in very different ways from other individuals. We also saw existing research
already shows mood affects the cognition of depressed individuals differently from
others.216 In a similar way, if we accept Forgas's theory of why mood affects some
cognitions more than others, the large number of obsessive lawyers might also be
less affected by mood because they generally follow the more deliberate strategies
that Forgas has found are less affected by mood.
Although we are not aware of existing studies that test the way the different
characteristics of lawyers relate to how mood affects negotiation or other cognitive
activities, it is plausible that it might. In part, those with certain personalities may
not be affected by mild moods in the same way as others. For example, those with
more obsessive characteristics may cling rigidly to a particular plan, such as a
particular negotiation bottom line, rather than being swayed by emotion at the time
of negotiations. At the opposite end, those who tend to be more avoidant in dealing
with conflict may be more affected by mild moods: the mild moods may be
relatively intolerable, leading the persons to terminate negotiations altogether or to
give in relatively quickly. In other cases of personality, the type of mood interaction
may be important. For example, narcissists may have such low empathy that they
are unaffected by sadness, but an attack on their abilities ("Who do you think you
are to deserve such a good computer?") may trigger irrational rage that makes them
walk out of a negotiation or trigger such entitlement that they make outrageous
demands.
Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 225, 240; Connie J. A. Beck et al.,
Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of
Practicing Lawyers, 10 J. L. & Health 1,2 (1995); Rick B. Allan, Alcoholism, DrugAbuse and Lawyers:
Are We Ready to Address the Denial?, 31 Creighton L. Rev. 265 (1997). (The devastating effects of a
lawyer's alcoholism harm the quality of service their clients receive.); G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al.,
The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13
Intl. J. L. & Psychol. 233, 241 (1990). ("Statistics show that one in five lawyers has a problem with
substance abuse."); Greg K. McCann et al., The Sound of No Students Clapping: What Zen Can Offer
Legal Education, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 313, 314 n. 6 (1995) (summarizing findings in Benjamin Sells, The
Soul of the Law 17 (1994)) ("One of every eight graduating law students exhibits signs of chemical
dependency."). We note that, while these studies show a clear problem, they often use diagnostic terms
loosely; most clinicians would not use terms like "depression" without an in-person clinical interview.
See supra n. 195. In the text, therefore, we prefer to use the term "symptoms" of (for example)
depression.
215. Carin Gorrell, Wall Street Warriors, Psychol. Today, 14 (Feb. 2001) (reporting on study by Nova
researchers John Lewis and Alden M. Cass, that stockbrokers had a twenty-three percent rate of
subclinical depression compared to only seven percent of men).
216. Seesupran. 196.
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2. Personality as Probabilities and Potentials
As much as personality deserves exploration in studies of mood and
negotiation, we caution that personality styles are not a fixed predictor of outcomes.
Instead, one may think of personality styles as a risk factor: given a predisposition
to fear one is incompetent, for example, false feedback on a test may produce more
of an effect than on others. In addition, given a certain predisposition, a given
activity may produce not merely more emotion, but different kinds of emotions,
cognitions, and behaviors. Give false negative feedback to one person prone to fears
of incompetence and another prone to a sense of entitlement; one may become
depressed and withdrawn and the other energized and angry." 7 As a result, the
person prone to fears of incompetence may give up, but the person prone to senses
of entitlement may ask even more insistently! In addition, personality, like mood,
exists on a continuum," and mild differences in personality may matter just as we
saw mild differences in mood do.
Another way to treat personality is to examine whether certain personalities
explain more about negotiation results and tactics than do mild moods. For example,
existing research by Allred confirms that those with low empathy have less success
identifying the actual needs of others and, not surprisingly, less success at identifying
joint gains. Narcissists typically have very poor abilities to empathize with others,
and it might therefore be useful to know how scores on measures of narcissism affect
research like Allred's.219
Moreover, all this may be even more important with lawyers because existing
data on the psychological characteristics of lawyers and law students may
underestimate the differences between them and other populations. First, some
statistics simply identify the number of persons who pass a crucial threshold for
relatively severe cases of depression and obsessiveness. "' Many largely
217. Consider Young's explanation of how feedback may operate:
Schemas are usually activated by events in the environment relevant to the particular schema. For
example, when an adult with an incompetence/failure schema is assigned a difficult task in which
performance will be scrutinized, the schema erupts. Thoughts begin to arise such as: "I can't handle
this. I'll fail. I'll make a fool of myself."... Depending on the circumstances and the particular
schema, the individual might experience other emotions, such as sadness, shame, guilt, or anger.
Young, supra n. 159, at 11.
218. Millon & Davis, supra n. 36, at 7.
219. See supra text accompanying nn. 87-99. How much lack of empathy is characteristic of
narcissists varies to some degree with different sources. The most widely used diagnostic criteria, the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, lists lack of empathy as one of several characteristics, and persons
need only have some to be diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder. On the other hand, a leading
cognitive-behavioral therapy manual for treatment of personality disorders lists lack of empathy as one
of the three major components of narcissism (along with "grandiosity" and "hypersensitivity to
evaluation"). Aaron T. Beck & Arthur Freeman & Associates, Cognitive Therapy for Personality
Disorders 233, 249 (Prof. Resource Press 1990).
220. But see supra n. 195 (some studies use the number reporting some symptoms of a disorder even
though those reporting symptoms may not meet the diagnostic criteria).
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dichotomous characterizations overlook the importance of some symptoms of
depression even among those without enough symptoms to meet the definition of
depression.22 ' Therefore, it is possible that there are large numbers of lawyers and
law students with significantly greater symptoms of depression or obsessiveness who
may not be classified by existing studies; nevertheless, such individuals may
negotiate differently, and they may respond to stress and other events in negotiation
differently. Second, studies of the psychological characteristics of lawyers rely on
standard measures of what lawyers and law students say about themselves, and
lawyers and law students may under-report symptoms of mental illnesses. Of
course, any population may have such a tendency to under-report," 2 but lawyers may
under-report more than others because official organs of the profession, like the bar
and judicial selection committees, stigmatize mental illness.2" In any event, the
existing data on the psychological profiles of lawyers and law students raise crucial
questions about the effect of mood on how lawyers and law students negotiate. Even
at the rates of elevated symptoms of depression, anxiety and obsessiveness shown
in existing studies, lawyers are so different from the general population in these
aspects that mood may affect them quite differently from other negotiators.
In addition, one branch of cognitive-behavioral research suggests as well that
different measures of "mild personality differences" play a role similar to "mild
mood differences." According to cognitive theory developed by Aaron Beck,
schemas are cognitive structures individuals use to make sense of the world; they are
the lenses through which we view experience." At best, the schemas offer efficient
ways of sorting sometimes complex reality to highlight important features and
facilitate rational decision-making; too often, however, schemas may be maladaptive
and highlight information in a distorted way. Such maladaptive schemas distort
reality in the way a defective lens would distort our vision. 6 The mistrust schema,
for example, leads individuals to mistrust individuals too quickly; another schema,
the entitlement schema, leads individuals to have unreasonable expectations of
others. Some pencil and paper tests help identify the degree to which individuals are
prone to such schemas.2"
Such schema measures may be especially useful in testing whether mood may
affect given populations to different degrees and/or in different ways. First, because
221. See supra text accompanying nn. 35-39.
222. For example, the reasons why lawyers and law students may under-report symptoms of
narcissism are common to other populations: narcissists have unrealistic expectations, but by definition,
they will not report such expectations as unrealistic.
223. Stefan, supra n. 37. We note as well that other groups of persons, such as business executives,
may also hide mental illness because of fear of stigna. See e.g. Micheline Maynard, Grim Reminder of
Mental Illness, N. Y. Times (New York, NY) C 1, C 14 (July 21, 2001) (Experts estimate "as many as 10
percent of senior executives have at least some symptoms of manic depression, yet 9 out of 10 of their
cases are going undiagnosed and untreated.").
224. See e.g. Beck, Freeman & Associates, supra n. 219.
225. We acknowledge that other researchers have used schema in somewhat different ways. See
supra n. 158.
226. Young, supra n. 159.
227. Id. at 61-67.
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the measures presume something of a continuum, they may identify mild
"personality" differences better than other measures. In particular, many prominent
schema theories understand schemas as predisposing individuals to certain actions
when the schemas are activated by certain events. Thus, as discussed above, when
someone perceives someone has lied to them in a negotiation this may activate a
schema that leads the individual to mistrust other things the other negotiator says -
or even to begin more broadly mistrusting things others say. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, the measure is associated with specific methods to replace
maladaptive schemas with better behaviors."2 The schema's continuous nature
means it may identify meaningful differences that other measures miss. The
association with a relatively brief therapy means it is more likely to yield possible
classroom interventions than would measures associated with lengthier therapies.
This possibility of intervention and correction also flows from the nature of these
patterns as predispositions that ripen into action only after a particular trigger;
therefore, although people with more developed mistrust schemas may be more
likely to get angry when someone appears to lie to them, there is still the possibility
of training individuals. Such individuals might be trained so the tendency to be
angry is minimized and/or the tendency to act on any such anger is minimized.
However, unlike other types of cognitive behavioral therapy, there are no published
studies that support the therapy, though some such studies are underway.229 Our
suggestions, though optimistic, are not rooted in rigorous empirical support in the
way that group treatment for depression is.
In short, the existing evidence raises a substantial reason to think mood may
affect lawyers and law students differently in some of their negotiating. The most
direct evidence flows from Forgas's finding that individuals who scored differently
on certain measures, like Machiavellianism, responded to mood differently in
negotiation together with evidence that shows many lawyers and law students vary
in a number of personality and mood predispositions. Exactly how differently
lawyers and law students do negotiate, and in exactly what ways they negotiate
differently, remains an empirical question that deserves further study. At a
minimum, these differences alone should give us pause in presuming that studies that
show mood affects psychology and business school students always applying
precisely the same ways to lawyers and law students. On the other hand, because not
all lawyers and law students differ from other persons, it still remains likely that
mood will have some effect - sometimes parallel to the effect on psychology and
business school students in similar negotiations. More specifically, mood may affect
some lawyers less, but may well affect many lawyers in the same way and may
affect other lawyers in the same way to a lesser degree.
228. Id.; Beck, Freeman & Associates, supra n. 219.
229. Cf Young, supra n. 159, at 7 ("The constructs proposed here have not yet been tested
empirically, and so must be viewed as speculative."). Recent research has been reported at conferences,
but not yet published. Karla Moras et al., Modifying Schema-Focused Cognitive Therapy for Drug
Resistant Depression: Preliminary Observations and Findings (Association for the Advancement of
Behavior Therapy Nov. 1999). Contrast infra n. 351 (support for group therapy for depression).
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C. What We Don 't Know:
Does Mood Affect Legal Negotiations Differently?
Apart from the characteristics of lawyers, the nature of legal problems may also
mean a different role for mood. This is distinct from explanations having to do with
the nature of lawyers themselves. In some instances, non-lawyers may negotiate
over what many would consider legal negotiations, such as when individuals
themselves settle a divorce dispute, when union representatives represent workers
in grievance arbitrations, or when former stockbrokers represent brokerage houses
in securities arbitrations.3 ° Indeed, the number of such non-lawyers engaged in
what looks like legal negotiations may increase as states reconsider limits on the
right of non-lawyers to engage in various kinds of activities and as many individuals
and organizations promote the ability of individuals to lawyer for themselves."3
First, we consider the nature of legal problems. In particular, we address in
detail the notion that mood may matter less to legal negotiation because (1) there is
less potential for joint gain/win-win solutions than in the mood and negotiation
studies, and (2) even if there is such potential, it involves relatively routine and
recurring tradeoffs. As we saw, however, theory and experimental data instead
suggest mood matters more for novel tradeoffs or solutions.
Second, we consider some of the nature of legal decisionmaking. In particular,
we consider how legal negotiations may involve deliberate and systematic
predictions about what courts or other legal officials, like regulators or tax auditors,
might do in the absence of a settlement. We also consider the way anyone
negotiating for another may be drawn to explain decisions in such a way even if they
really decide in some other way. In addition, we consider the way legal negotiations,
like prolonged labor-management negotiations or settlement of a long pending case,
may be spread out far more than the negotiations studied so far. Finally, we consider
the way mood may function as information to other negotiators and, in a related way,
why those negotiating for others may show less emotion.
1. Nature of Legal Problems
a. Zero-sum Negotiations: "It's the Money, Stupid"
To consider how much the existing mood and negotiation studies tell us about
legal negotiation, we must examine the potential for joint gains built into the studies.
First, nearly all of the studies include some clear and quantifiable opportunity for
individuals to make themselves better off if they cooperate. Most give different
230. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Legal Advocacy: Lawyers and Nonlawyers at Work 151 (U. of Mich.
Press 1998) (arbitration of labor grievances "regularly pits experienced nonlawyer advocates against
experienced lawyer advocates").
231. Some advance the idea of lay representation as a way to help poor people who otherwise might
not have access to any representation. See Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's
Vision of Progressive Law Practice (Westview Press 1992).
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payoff schedules to, say, employers and workers so one side gets more points for
winning on, say, vacation and another, say health benefits. 232 Next the different
payoff schedules always include a number of items where the points that one side
may get are vastly greater than the points another side might get for a particular
issue. Thus, if individuals realize this, they can increase their points by conceding
on issues that offer relatively few points to them in return for getting concessions on
issues that offer them many points. In addition, most of the studies presume that
individuals actually have identical preferences for some issues, such as the start date
for employment.
233
The bold assumption comes in the degree of tradeoff potential. In many of the
studies, students received a payoff sheet that told them how many points they
achieved for certain outcomes, such as salary, medical benefits, vacation, and start
date.23  Some degree of similar preferences indeed characterizes many legal
negotiations; often parties have some interest in ending litigation earlier so they save
legal costs. Many negotiation teachers and scholars would agree that an employer
might be worried about health care insurance and would rather pay only sixty
percent of expenses than 100 percent. However, the Allred study made this
preference quite extreme by having the employer get an additional 660 points if the
employer paid only sixty percent rather than 100 percent, but only getting an
additional 100 points if the employer paid $40,000 rather than $48,000.3" In short,
the extent of the tradeoff was unrealistic for this kind of scenario, and it therefore
raises questions about how it applies to scenarios in which the tradeoffs are not so
extreme.
The data raise the serious question whether mood that increases success in
negotiations with huge potential for tradeoffs will have similar effects in other
negotiations with less tradeoff potential, including (as many see them) legal
negotiations. As we saw from the Baron and Kramer studies, positive mood leads
individuals to set higher goals; if both sides set higher goals in negotiations with
many potential tradeoffs, the high goals may motivate both sides to search harder to
identify those tradeoffs. 236 Likewise, to the extent that positive mood makes
individuals more likely to seek deals and otherwise behave cooperatively, as Forgas
found,23 this may make them more likely to discover tradeoffs and agree to them as
well. In contrast, both effects may lead to quite different results if there is less
potential for joint gains. If both sides set higher goals, and tradeoffs are less
possible, then it is more likely that the parties may never reach an agreement.
232. This is true of the movie negotiation by Kramer, the job negotiation by AlIred, and the sale of
appliances by Carnevale and Isen. See Kramer et al., supra n. 3 at 128-29; Allred et al., supra n. 50 at
179; Carnevale & Isen, supra n. 52.
233. Allred et al., supra n. 50 at 179 (instructions to those playing employer and employee gave same
preferences for some issues).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Baron, supra n. 55; Kramer et al., supra n. 3.
237. Forgas, supra n. 40.
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Moreover, if both parties set higher goals and reach no agreement,231 then this may
lead to negative mood, which may further reduce the odds of success in future
negotiating.
Furthermore, if the positive mood leads individuals to search for tradeoffs but
such tradeoffs do not exist, there are several potential problems. Arguably,
individuals simply waste time. 9 In addition, individuals will likely experience such
negotiations as frustrating because their expectations for how the negotiation would
proceed - pleasant discussion of needs, identification oftradeoffs, win-win solution!
- have not been met.' ° In principle, such disappointed expectations may themselves
produce negative mood during the negotiation. And, as we saw, negative mood is
often associated with worse outcomes. Again, however, it is important to test
exactly how negative mood plays out in such scenarios. Recall that the bottom line
associations of negative mood with less success involved negotiations in which there
was potential for joint gain. If negative mood does not have this effect in more zero-
sum negotiations, then this negative mood produced by frustration may not hurt
results. Indeed, if the negative mood leads individuals to shift their behavior to
something more appropriate for a zero-sum negotiation, then this may actually
enhance their negotiation success, mitigating the potentially dysfunctional
consequences of an initially positive mood!
All of this suggests that one fruitful area for further empirical research is the
question of how mood affects negotiations with more of a zero-sum nature. The first
and simplest way to study this is to determine how mood affects negotiations that
allow no tradeoffs of any kind, such as the sale of a commodity with no conditions
or the settlement of a lawsuit for a specific amount of money. Some, of course might
suggest that such a strict approach goes too far and neglects the potential for some
tradeoffs in many legal negotiations.24 Fortunately, the existing structure of
negotiation research makes such fine gradations possible. Researchers may simply
reduce the degree of tradeoffs possible by limiting the gap in points one side receives
on a given issue with the number of points another side receives on that issue.
Finally, researchers should consider the not infrequent scenario when there is
not only no potential for joint gains, but no rational incentive for at least one side to
reach an agreement at all. For example, when someone has an offer from one car
dealer to sell them a particular car at $10,000 - perhaps an especially good price
because of special incentives available to that dealer alone - then there is no
bargaining potential with a dealer who cannot afford to sell the car at less than
238. A significant number of persons reached no agreement in the AlIred study despite the presence
of large potential tradeoffs and, therefore, win-win solutions. See AlIred et al., supra n. 50.
239. See generally Bazerman, supra n. 131. This is arguable. First, this looks less efficient the more
one examines the decision ex post after one knows that the search was in vain, but looks considerably
less inefficient if one looks at it ex ante. Second, this looks less efficient the more one generally believes
that the odds of finding tradeoffs and creative solutions are less. See supra n. 62.
240. See Kumar, supra n. 20 (unpleasant emotion may arise when individuals have a "script" - a set
of expectations for the process of negotiation - that is not met).
241. See e.g. Menkel-Meadow, supra n. 59.
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$11,000. Some scholars call this a negative bargaining zone. 2 In such scenarios,
those in positive moods may be particularly less efficient if they take too long to
realize that no potential agreement is feasible. 3
b. Repetitive Tradeoffs: Another Day, Another Structured Settlement
A second more complicated possibility involves probing the exact nature of the
tradeoffs in particular negotiation. As we saw, existing studies apply most when
there are large potentials for tradeoffs. There exists an additional and far subtler
limitation to existing studies. They deal with populations of individuals who will
likely view the potential tradeoffs as quite novel. Therefore, the studies raise the
question of how mood may affect tradeoffs when the relevant tradeoffs are instead
experienced as more routine. Where negotiations involve routine tradeoffs, two
theories we saw above converge to predict mood will play less of a role: Forgas
predicts mood plays less of a role when activities are narrow versus open-ended,'
and the expert decisionmaking literature predicts mood plays less of a role when
experts confront a familiar problem. 5
Consider how the existing studies create situations where negotiators will
experience potential tradeoffs as novel. Many of the. studies seem to include subjects
with relatively little negotiation experience at all.' 6 To such students, the notion of
any tradeoffs at all may be quite unfamiliar. To anyone trained in negotiation, of
course, this mind state may be difficult to recall, but both anecdotal and systematic
study show many individuals assume that negotiations always involve only zero-sum
possibilities.' 7 In addition, it is unclear how familiar individuals were with the
relevant subject matters of the negotiations. In some instances, such as the Forgas
negotiation over curriculum selection, students may have been familiar with the topic
in general, but not with the kinds of negotiations individuals have about curriculum
selection. Likewise, students in the Kramer study may have seen lots of movies, and
maybe even movies about making movies, like The Player, but most of the students
probably had not studied negotiations about making movies, let alone engaged in
them.
The contrast with individuals already familiar with repetitive tradeoffs may be
quite dramatic. While participants in one negotiation may experience the tradeoff
between, salary and health insurance as novel, experienced labor negotiators may
242. Shell, supra n. 19.
243. In a sense, such a test resembles Isen's study of the speed with which doctors reach correct
diagnoses. Isen, Rosenzweig & Young, supra n. 41.
244. See supra text accompanying n. 186.
245. See supra text accompanying nn. 199-202.
246. Exactly what kind of experience and/or training students had in negotiation is not clear from the
published studies. Typically, the studies merely describe the classes in which students were enroled,
which often includes only psychology students. But cf Isen, Rosenzweig & Young, supra n. 41
(suggesting mood affects practicing physicians).
247. See Thompson & Hastie, supra n. 64, at 107 (sixty-eight percent of negotiators in one study
assumed a fixed amount of resources).
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find them familiar- indeed, even routine. 2' Thus, even casual conversations with
dealmakers and lawyers reveals repetitive tradeoffs available in areas like mergers
and acquisitions, 9 divorce settlement provisions for joint custody 'o and trading
concessions on child custody for concessions on alimony and/or child support,25' or
personal injury lawyers characterizing damages so they avoid tax liability. 2
Although some theories predict mood will affect these negotiations less, some
research on the way mood affects recall leaves room for doubt. This is because
mood may affect what it is that we recall." 3 In particular, when we are in a certain
mood, we tend to recall events that we experienced in a similar mood.2' Even in
routine and repetitive negotiations, there may be instances in which individuals recall
cases that had greater or fewer potential for joint gains. Indeed, individuals - and
even mediators - may talk of cases that "can settle" and those that "cannot settle."
And, as we saw, there is also evidence mood not only affects recall but also our
assessment of the probability of different events." 5 Thus, those in a positive mood
may recognize the possibility of a stalemate but may think settlement more likely or
they may recognize they might lose in court, but think they will win. Suppose
individuals were in a positive mood in cases that settled. This might suggest that
when negotiators sit down to settle in a positive mood they are more likely to
automatically recall those cases that settled; conversely, when they sit down in a less
positive or even negative mood, they may be more likely to automatically recall
cases that "could not" settle.
A final complication, too, depends on another individual difference in the way
mood affects recall of events. Although earlier research simply suggested that all
individuals recall events that occurred when they were in similar moods, more recent
research suggests some people moderate this effect by recalling positive events when
they are in a negative mood.' In particular, it appears that those able to recall
248. See e.g. Robert B. McKersie & Richard E. Walton, A Behavioral Theory of LaborNegotiations:
An Analysis of a Social Interaction System (2d ed., ILR Press 1991) (discussing the kinds of similar
tradeoffs that different union and business organizations make).
249. For example, many view a contingent agreement as one that creates value, but a provision
allowing a company entering a merger to rescind its commitment if there is a material change - a classic
contingency agreement - is routine. See e.g. Edward D. Herlihy et al., Financial Institutions Mergers
and Acquisitions 2001: Adapting to the Challenges of a Changing Landscape 8-9 (2002).
250. See generally Fineman, supra n. 57 (criticizing the tendency of mediators to encourage joint
custody).
251. See Scott Altman, Lurking in the Shadow, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 493 (1995) (noting that reports of
husbands who say they will contest custody unless wives ask for less money, while of dubious ethics,
may not occur that frequently).
252. See J. Gillespie & Max H. Bazerman, Parasitic Integration, 13 Negot. J. 271 (July, 1997)
(negotiators often claim deals that limit tax liability create value, or are win-win, but they often do so
at the expense of parties without a formal role in the negotiations, like other taxpayers).
253. See e.g. Fiske & Taylor, supra n. 7.
.254. Id.
255. Wright & Bower, supra n. 150.
256. Cathy McFarland & Roger Buehler, Negative Affective States and the Motivated Retrieval of
Positive Life Events: The Role of Acknowledgment, 1997 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 200 (1997).
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positive events do not suppress their negative mood, but rather first acknowledge it
and then recall positive events in a conscious effort to shift mood.257
The more complicated question, ultimately, becomes not merely how often legal
negotiation involves tradeoffs, but how often novel tradeoffs. The more novel a
solution, the more that the expertise and Forgas theories converge to suggest mood
may play a role. Perhaps the greatest potential for mood effects in law and
elsewhere is simply not studied: the creation not merely of tradeoffs but novel
solutions. In the familiar scenario in Getting To Yes, the creative solution to
Mideast peace is not a tradeoff between Israelis and Egyptians both seeking the
Sinai; it is a creative solution: the Sinai will be under the sovereignty of Egypt, thus
satisfying Egyptian pride, but it shall be demilitarized, thus satisfying Israeli security
interests.25 In a classic example used by Menkel-Meadow, the husband who wants
to vacation in the mountains and the wife who wants to vacation by the sea can both
get exactly what they want by vacationing in Santa Barbara, which has both
mountains and the Pacific Ocean.25 In the terminology of Pruitt, these types of
creative solutions are bridging agreements; the simple tradeoffs studied in the mood
and negotiation studies, however, are simply logrolling.2" It is likely that mood
would affect these novel bridging agreements most.
Unfortunately, this important theoretical problem is difficult to study for two
reasons. First, as a matter of principle, it is difficult to reach agreement on when
legal negotiations may involve genuinely good and genuinely creative solutions.
Some legal scholars view any negotiation that does not duplicate the results in court
as a sham.26 Others, in principle, suggest that the law (in at least some instances)
may allow individuals to arrive at creative solutions that nonetheless may be
consistent with the law.262 Thus, in a negotiation between a tax auditor who first
257. Id.
258. Fisher, Ury & Patton, supra n. 58.
259. Menkel-Meadow, supra n. 59.
260. Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior 155 (Acad. Press 1981) ("[L]ogrolling involves a simple
additive combination of demands previously endorsed by each party, whereas a solution by bridging
entails some novel substantive element not previously under consideration").
261. Compare Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984) (settlements should reflect
underlying legal principles) with Menkel-Meadow, supra n. 56 (legal values themselves may not be just,
but product of imperfect legal system, and values of settlement may reflect autonomy value of litigants
to choose the values that best reflect their own principles). As Menkel-Meadow notes, the law in a
particular case may not have developed in a particularly just manner, be it because a process was
infected with the inequalities, exposed by various left critical scholars of various hues, or the piggish
interest politics bemoaned by public choice scholars of the right. So, too, as various perspective scholars
have suggested, the general law in any particular case may represent and even reify the perspectives of
some individuals or "cultures" at the expense of others. See e.g, Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 145 (1995) (coining the
term perspective scholar to capture the insights of feminists, women of color and others); Freshman,
Privatizing, supra n. 20. See generally James R. Averill, Creativity in the Domain of Emotion, in
Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, supra n. 7, at 765, 773 (different cultures may have different
awareness of emotion).
262. See e.g. Meadow, supra n. 56. Cf Steven Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules:
Privatizing Substantive Law Through Arbitration, 83 Minn. L. Rev.703(1999) (arbitrators should often
be able to impose decisions on parties that a court would not impose because the competition between
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stakes out one legal position, and a taxpayer's lawyer who stakes out another, the
two might agree to a solution that is both workable and reflects an acceptable
interpretation of the law, albeit one neither adopted at the outset. Or consider the
compromise pardon in the infamous Leo Frank case: with the help of informal
mediation, the board of pardons moved from its initial insistence on granting only
a routine pardon (which implied guilt) and the insistence of Jewish organizations that
the board issue a rare pardon that exonerated Frank.263 Instead, all agreed to a
compromise pardon that stated guilt or innocence could not be determined, but that
the state regretted the way the case stood for anti-Semitism and mob rule.2'
Second, even apart from the difficulty of arriving at agreement on good novel
solutions, it is difficult to generate quantifiable data on such solutions. The great
elegance of negotiation that imposes only certain solutions as possible, and certain
points for each solution, is that they yield very neat results that, in principle, 5 value
the same results by the same quantitative criteria. In legal negotiation classes, one
popular negotiation exercise involves the "angry neighbor" who chopped down a
tree he mistakenly thought was on his property.2' The true owner of the tree seeks
to be made whole, but students can identify a number of ways of satisfying the
owner's need for vindication, privacy, shade and convenience: some students have
one party care for a replacement tree, others pick different vegetation, like a hedge,
that provides privacy, and so on.267 Although teachers of negotiation can lead
interesting discussions of such solutions, it would be far more difficult to agree on
a number that represents the value of the novel solutions. In principle, however, one
could imagine negotiation research in which a panel of raters evaluated the results
that participants received. Even if researchers could design such studies and
convince other researchers of their importance it might be far more difficult to
produce such examples in the neat and dramatic ways that one may (in principle)
demonstrate dramatic effects in zero-sum negotiations or the way that existing
studies demonstrate such effects with joint gains by simple tradeoffs. Some readers
would simply not share the assumptions of the raters in principle, and others might
simply not agree on the precise calibration of different solutions.
arbitrators and courts will lead to the production of better law in a way analogous to the expansion of
overnight delivery after Federal Express began competing with the post office).
263. See Clark J. Freshman, By the Neck Until Dead, Am. Politics 99 (Jan. 1988).
264. Id.
265. We qualify this by noting that students who report a certain deal may also include side
agreements that are not captured by their simple reports. Most studies do not include transcripts and
therefore may overlook this.
266. Leonard L. Riskin & James E. Westbrook, Dispute Resolution and Lawyers, Instructor "s Manual
With Simulation and Problem Material 221-27 (West 1987).
267. Id.
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2. Nature of Legal Negotiation Culture
a. The Culture of Prediction: Decision Analysis and the Similar Case
Another reason why mood might affect legal negotiations differently is legal
negotiations may tend to be more planned, systematic, or rational than other
negotiations. This is related to the idea of zero-sum negotiations because the fewer
the dimensions, all else being equal, the easier one may make a prediction:
predicting how a court will decide innocence or guilt is easier than predicting how
a jury might return 20 questions asked in a special verdict form. Recall, again, that
Forgas's affect infusion model presumes emotion and mood will have less impact
ifdecisionmakers follow a deliberate and consistent strategy, such as the consistently
competitive strategy of high Machiavellians. One example of such a pattern might
be if legal negotiators engaged in the kind of relatively careful and systematic
consideration of alternatives that some scholars and teachers of legal negotiation
suggest: legal negotiators should settle cases based, at least in part, on a prediction
of how a court might rule in a dispute. (Other patterns might be typical of other
social settings or other cultures: for example, in some settings traders might converge
on the midpoint between the opening offer of a buyer and the opening price asked
of a seller.)268 Others might characterize legal argumentation as more about
arguments about the correct analogy, be it the most apt prior case or most similar
prior administrative decision.269 To the extent such predictions focus simply on
pattern recall typical of experts discussed above, then the expert decisionmaking
literature would also predict mood would play less of a role.27
The notion that such arguments about predictions should influence, and even
determine negotiations, has a rich history in theory and philosophy. Most famously,
Mnookin and Komhauser, in one of the most frequently cited law review articles of
all time, said that predictions about what a court would do serve as "endowments"
or "bargaining chips" that serve as one source of influencing a negotiation.271 In
their classic example, custody negotiations between a mother and father would often
be influenced by predictions of how a court would order custody.272 Others have
268. The famous Harvard scholar and teacher of decisionmaking and negotiation found just such a
pattern among his students. Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Belknap Press 1982).
This familiar and tempting pattern, however, may be systematic, butneither functional norrational: there
may be nothing rational about the starting point that either the buyer or seller initially picks, but these
may nonetheless serve as an irrational anchor. See supra text accompanying n. 24; Shell, supra n. 19,
at 189-91 (providing a more popularized how-to critique of letting an initial price be the basis for
"splitting the difference"). To take a familiar example, the sticker price for a car is simply the price that
a dealer stuck on the car, not necessarily a rational basis for "splitting the difference" with a reasonable
offer that a customer makes.
269. See generally Steve Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: How the Study of the Mind Changes Our
Understanding of Life and Law (U. of Chi. Press 2001) (lawyers frequently reason by trying to recall the
appropriate case).
270. See supra text accompanying n. 198.
271. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950,997 (1979).
272. Id.
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made the model seem even more systematic than this relatively modest claim. In one
of the best and most thorough texts on legal negotiation, Murrary, Rau, and Sherman
suggest that predictions about the law are not merely "chips" but a "blueprint" for
an agreement.2" Notice that this metaphor of blueprint extends the original model
even more in the direction of predicting systematic and planned moves; predictions
about the law morph from some chips in the game to the ground rules for the entire
game!
In addition, others have extended this culture of prediction even further. For
example, a defendant may offer to settle a claim of $ 10,000 for $5,000 based on the
argument there is only a fifty percent chance of success. In more complex cases,
involving multiple defenses or a copyright infringement claim, various contingencies
might arise: there might be some chance any of three defenses might work entirely
or there might be various decisions on each element of damages. Even for complex
cases, Murray, Rau, and Sherman reproduce a complex decision analysis tree in their
text. 74 Others suggest mediators use complex math to shape settlement discussions
through systematic predictions.275 As with the emphasis on joint gains and win-win
bargaining above, some of the discussions become confusing because they blend the
utilitarian advice that predictions promote success in negotiation, or that they simply
describe how negotiation naturally occurs, with a rather moralistic notion that cases
should be resolved based on such systematic predictions.
Exactly how well the notion of systematic predictions describes the process of
legal negotiations or their outcomes is unclear. Many cite Condlin's famous study
showing that law students negotiate by quickly shifting from citation of cases to the
facile incantation that there are "cases on both sides" of any dispute.276 However
novel its methodology and however welcome such an early attempt to ground
theories of negotiation in some empirical reality, the study remains limited in several
ways. Most obviously, it may well be that law students, unfamiliar with'the law,
move more quickly away from it than attorneys. Likewise, it may well be that
different attorneys also give different weight to such arguments: perhaps relatively
elite attorneys discuss law more or perhaps attorneys in some specialized areas of
practice, like probate law, discuss predictions of the law in greater detail.
Before dismissing the prediction theory too quickly, it is worth noting that it is
also consistent with non-lawyer arguments in many ways. Consider in particular the
lessons of labor arbitration. In many instances, labor unions and management agree
to submit disputes about firing employees to arbitration. Often non-lawyers argue
such cases, and often such non-lawyers shift at a certain point to settling their dispute
before the arbitrator rules. Such labor arbitrations have evolved into a relatively
273. Murray et al., supra n. 10, at 218.
274. Id.
275. See e.g. David Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Mediator's Tool, I Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 113
(1996).
276. See Robert Condlin, "Cases on Both Sides ".:Patterns ofArgument in Legal Dispute Negotiation,
44 Md. L. Rev. 65 (1985).
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detailed body of work about precisely when there is "good cause" to fire someone.2
The more lawyers try to recall the appropriate case, the more they engage in the kind
of pattern recall in which the expert decisionmaking literature leaves little role for
mood;28 in contrast, the more lawyers analyze each case in open-ended ways, the
more Forgas's theory predicts mood will play a larger role.27 9
Overall, then, the nature of legal arguments - in at least some substantive areas
of law, and with at least some groups of lawyers - may lead to very different effects
for mood. In particular, the systematic nature of some legal argument may reduce
the way that mood affects negotiation. Exactly how mood interacts in each
substantive practice area is an empirical question that deserves further research.
b. Explanations to Clients and Courts: Decision Analysis and the
Right Case Revisited
Another factor that may affect the deliberate nature of legal decisionmaking is
the need to explain decisions to others. Such explanations may flow from legal
duties, as in the case of lawyers, or from the simple need of anyone negotiating for
a client to keep the client happy. In many instances, lawyers in principle must
explain decisions to clients as an ethical matter. In some instances, this need to
explain may force a client to think seriously and systematically about how to
approach a legal problem. In an effort to trim legal expenses, many corporate clients
have added in new loops of decisionmakers who have to approve legal strategies,
expenses, and settlements: both more sophisticated and experienced in-house counsel
and outside consultants purport to get outside law firms to act more efficiently. In
principle, these pressures might condition lawyers to make decisions in a more
systematic and deliberate way. In a similar way, some lawyers must also explain
decisions to courts. Those without a powerful client, such as lawyers who bring suits
on behalf of an abstract class that never meets with the lawyers, must theoretically
explain proposed settlements to courts.2'
Exactly how more deliberate and rational these pressures make lawyers is
debatable for a number of reasons. First, many of the pressures that sound so
confining in theory actually exercise little power in practice. Clients differ in how
much power they have over a particular lawyer. For example, contrast the general
counsel of IBM with the indigent illegal immigrant represented by a legal aid
volunteer. In addition, clients themselves may differ in how much they actually
277. See generally UnitedofAmerica Steelworkers v. Warrior & GulfNav. Co., 363 U.S. 574(1960)
('mhe labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the
common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which
are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment.").
278. See supra text accompanying nn. 199-201.
279. See supra text accompanying n. 185.
280. Just how well courts police such settlements is a separate question. See generally John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding The Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implication of Economic Theory for Private
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 677-679 (1986)
(expressing doubts about how well courts monitor plaintiffs' lawyers).
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demand deliberate rational expectations. Second, even clients and courts with real
power and real incentives may not focus on complex explanations and
decisionmaking. Clients may want to get to the "bottom-line" more than elaborate
decision trees and mathematical models of possible outcomes versus possible risks
and costs. One prominent probate litigator describes the final mediation involving
a claim by someone who might have been entitled to millions in a trust in several
years; another party offered the person a very small sum immediately, and the client
accepted.si Even seemingly "sophisticated" in-house counsel and consultants may
be less interested in balancing complex scenarios than in cutting their legal costs in
a given fiscal year. Although the data remains sharply contested, Janet Alexander
answered the question, "Do the merits matter?" when companies settle large class
actions with a resounding "no." '282 Third, even if clients and courts had the power
and incentive to demand elaborate and rational explanations, it does not follow this
is how lawyers would actually settle cases. Rather, lawyers might give complex
explanations but make their actual decisions in very different ways.
c. Longer Negotiations: More Emotion Because of Escalation of
Conflict or Less Emotion Because of Perspective of Time?
Another key distinction between existing mood and negotiation studies and
many legal negotiations concerns the time frame for negotiations: nearly all studies
focus on negotiators who get information, study it, and negotiate in one brief class
period.' From one perspective, however, many legal negotiations instead stretch
out over long periods of time. In settlements of lawsuits, for example, many suits
do not settle until after years of some kind of litigation, including various
depositions, exchanges of information, motions, and so on."' Though the data are
less easy to obtain and quantify as neatly, many legal transactions like collective
bargaining agreements and mergers and acquisitions also take place over many
months.
Longer negotiations may decrease the role of mood on negotiations. In such
long interactions, people may develop strategies over long periods of time. This
281. Of course, even the most seemingly irrational decisions, such as this decision, could be explained
as rational: Perhaps the person accepted the smaller payment because he discounted future payments in
a dramatic way; perhaps this discount stemmed from his knowledge that he had some terminal disease;
or perhaps the possible regret associated with losing and getting nothing at all seemed great to him. See
Guthrie, supra n. 33, at 83.
282. Compare Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497 (1991) (even large corporations may settle cases without taking into
account the likely outcomes at trial) with Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the
Monitoring: HowInstitutionalInvestors Can ReduceAgency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale
LJ. 2053, 2081 (1995) (suggesting that Alexander's study exaggerated the extent to which likely
outcomes play little role in corporate decisions to settle cases).
283. See e.g. Allired et al., supra n. 50, at 175. We are grateful to Gerry Levy for first suggesting this
critique of the existing psychological studies based on the way they took place in a single period rather
than in the prolonged way typical of litigation.
284. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and
the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 319 (1991).
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means that any given decision will be made while individuals have been in a variety
of moods at various times; the mood at any given time should therefore have less
influence over the decisions. Or, quite the opposite may occur, and time may allow
the escalation of conflict as individuals interpret each other in the worst possible
light, act more aggressively, provoking another to react more aggressively, and so
on in an escalating cycle of aggression and misunderstanding.' 5
Again, there also may be other factors that still let mood play a large role. First,
even if negotiations nominally take place over a long period of time, there may be
a relatively short period of time when actual decisions are made. Some lawyers may
indeed use the luxury of time to engage in careful planning, consultation with clients,
and so on. Others, however, may simply engage in routine, automatic, mindless
litigation mode or due diligence mode until the final moment of decision' 2 For
example, union bargainers may postpone real decisions until the deadline for an
agreement to expire approaches or lawyers may wait until the court ordered
settlement conference, or the eve of trial. Partly this may reflect the individual habits
of particular lawyers. Partly, too, this may reflect differing realities: the lawyer who
handles a case for what looks like five years may actually do little between filing a
case at one point and having the case scheduled for a mediation or hearing until
months or years later. 7
d. Uncertain Negotiations and Mood as Information About Interest
Mood also may play a different role when the amount of interest of various
parties is not clear. In certain negotiations, we hypothesize that individuals may treat
(what they perceive as) the mood of another as information: 8 negotiators may think
a happy buyer is more interested in a purchase. Earlier research, apparently by
unintentional design, did not address this possibility. In all of the negotiations
studied, students knew the person with whom they negotiated already had a large
285. For an analysis of several potential ways such conflict may escalate in terms of economic
rationality analysis, see Bazerman, supra n. 27, at 77-90. For an analysis in terms of the analysis of the
psychological theory of mutual projective identification, see Peter D. Kramer, Should You Leave? 208-09
(Scribnerl997).
286. Steve Schwartz, a prominent legal advocate for persons with mental disabilities, distinguishes
between three approaches to settlement. Early on in cases, he tries to think about what defendants may
ultimately agree to and tries to move toward that point. Another lawyer in his office tends to make
decisions about settlement based on an assessment of how culpable the defendant was, a determination
which shifts over time as more information becomes available. Still another lawyer simply focuses on
what the correct legal solution is that a court should order and tries to move litigation toward such an
official determination. Telephone interview with Susan Stefan (June 5, 2001).
287. Lawyers may continue with such practices despite academic and other advice that lawyers begin
thinking about how cases may be tried and/or settled earlier on. We are very grateful to Lonny Rose, for
raising this point. In-person interview with Lawrence Rose, Professor of Law, University of Miami
School of Law & Educational Director, National Institute of Trial Advocacy, Miami, Florida (May 29,
2001).
288. We do not wish to confuse our view with another view that information as one's own mood may
be treated by oneself as information. See e.g. Forgas, Johnson & Ciarrochi, supra n. 185, at 163.
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interest in reaching an agreement - be it hiring a particular person,2 s9 arranging
financing for a film with a particular person,2' buying and selling appliances with
a particular person,"' and so on. Such given levels of interest characterize many
real-world negotiations. In other instances, however, the amount of interest may be
less clear; one may meet with a potential buyer of some real estate and not know if
the person contemplates other real estate or even deciding to purchase some other
goods - or no goods at all! - instead. In such instances, mood may serve an
additional function as a proxy for one's interest. For example, the person who seems
very happy in viewing a property may be at a disadvantage to some degree: a real
estate sales person may interpret this happy mood as a sign of interest.' Although
we are unaware of any systematic testing of this possibility, many negotiation
advisers suggest that people feign certain emotions as a tactic. 93 In principles, one
might really have one mood, such as the positive mood associated with high targets,
but try to display a different mood.
Such ambiguity about interest is not only common for many transactional
lawyers but for litigators as well. At any given stage of litigation, lawyers do not
know how willing and/or able other parties are to proceed with litigation. Lawyers
not only do not know the inherently subjective aspects of how willing another party
is to risk litigation but also do not know other objective features, such as their
capacity to finance litigation.
Mood may also signal information to lawyers about the legal knowledge of
other lawyers. Simply put, a lawyer who confronts an unexpectedly happier
negotiator may think that the negotiator must have some unknown legal
knowledge.2' Sometimes such unknown knowledge may be factual information that
an adversary may spring at a later date or even, subject to the usual rules of
discovery, at trial itself. Other times, such unknown knowledge may be knowledge
289. See Allred et al., supra note 50.
290. See Kramer et al.,.supra n. 3.
291. Carnevale & Isen, supra n. 52.
292. Cf Shell, supra n. 19 (persons often reach suboptimal deals because they relax when another
side has made an offer that meets their bottom line - even if they might have had a goal that was better
and-even if the other party would have been willing to move closer to that goal).
293. One description of emotion and negotiation canvasses a number of such examples:
Bill collectors ... are required to display urgency (high arousal with a hint of irritation) to debtors
but are not required to internalize the emotion; Mary Kay teaches her beauty consultants to offer
fake enthusiasm to customers when they do not feel genuine enthusiasm. Flight attendants at Delta,
however, are given explicit feeling rules, which require that they imagine being hosts in their own
home and view the passengers as their guests.
Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, supra n. 7, at 152, 157 (arguing that "[e]ffective negotiation outcomes are
best achieved by maintaining positive affect during the negotiation, but we must act tough, and get angry
and upset to show we are serious").
294. Jerome Culp, Professor of Law at Duke Law School, reveals the way one lawyer exploited every
lawyer's fear of the overlooked case. One lawyer, as he tells it, would always tell other lawyers, "I have
a case directly on point, and it says you lose. You can settle for something now, or I'll show the case
later, and you'll get nothing." In-person interview with Jerome Culp, Professor of Law, Duke Law
School (May 2001).
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of a crucial legal argument, such as a reason why a seemingly valid contract may not
be enforceable. Think of the classic first year civil procedure case of MOttley295 : a
couple thought a railroad had no reason not to honor a railroad pass, but the railroad
at some point developed the argument that federal law made the pass unenforceable.
Early on in a negotiation, the railroad might not have disclosed this argument, but
the happiness and confidence of its lawyers may have signaled such an argument.
Thus, in some negotiations, the most functional mood as information for other
parties may be positive.
In short, mood may signal a level of commitment and interest in reaching an
agreement under particular terms. In some instances, then, positive mood may be
dysfunctional because it may lead another party to perceive that the offer that party
made is acceptable; instead a lack of positive mood - or even a negative mood - may
indicate that the offer is less acceptable. The absence of positive mood and/or the
presence of negative mood may also be functional in some negotiations for a
different reason: people may be willing to settle on somewhat less advantageous
terms to avoid having to be in the presence of someone in a less positive or even
negative mood. It is worth noting, however, that this dynamic may vary with
negotiators of different races, genders, and other identities. As Ayres showed in his
study of car bargaining, car salespeople may actually enjoy prolonging a negotiation
with an African-American male in order to act out their dominance over the African-
American male.2'
e. The Cold Agent: Why Get Emotional About Someone Else's
Problem?
Another related hypothesis is that those negotiating for others, be they lawyers
or others negotiating for a client in a legal negotiation, simply do not have any
emotional reactions when they negotiate. One might hypothesize that lawyers and
other agents - Jerry McGuire and Arliss, notwithstanding - are not that emotional.
This may seem especially plausible when lawyers or others negotiate on behalf of
others since often lawyers may have no tangible stake in the outcome - or, in the
case of agency percentages or contingent fees, at least less of a stake. One thinks of
the story of the man just condemned to death who turns to his lawyer and asks,
"What do we do now?" The lawyer replies, "What do we do now? You're off to the
electric chair and I'm due at the golf course at 2." At first blush, this hypothesis
seems implausible given the high rates of mental distress among law students and
lawyers.2' On the other hand, the high rates of distress could be evidence that many
lawyers and law students have emotion, but attempt to suppress their emotional
295. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
296. Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its
Cause, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 109 (1995). The film In The Company ofMen offers a vivid illustration of such
an interaction. In one scene, a white manager asks an African-American male to come into his office
and, eventually, asks him to expose himself. The white manager then acts unimpressed and tells him
to leave.
297. See supra text accompanying n. 214.
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responses and/or their awareness of those responses: much research shows that
attempts to suppress emotion often rebound later and often are associated with worse
health.2'
One might also hypothesize that, even if those negotiating for others do have
emotions, they do not show such emotions during negotiations. After all, as we saw
in the last subsection, the appearance of one's actual emotion, such as the happiness
associated with an imminent settlement one desperately needs, may disadvantage a
negotiator.299
Ultimately, the claim that those negotiating for others have little emotion when
they negotiate deserves empirical testing. Most of the existing studies of mood and
negotiation do not address this at all: instead of looking at how different people have
different emotions, either before a negotiation or in response to the negotiation, the
studies instead compare all those in general induced to have one emotional reaction
with all those induced to have another reaction (or not induced to have a reaction at
all). Another advantage of studying naturally-occurring mood, as we do in our
current program of research, is that it permits us to test directly the question of
whether individuals mood changes during the course of negotiation. We may test
whether people have more or less emotional reactions when negotiating on behalf
of others.
D. The Need For Empirical Testing Involving
Lawyers and Law Students
If the first section made clear that lawyers need to pay attention to mood because
studies show even mild changes in mood affect success at negotiation, this second
section shows that legal academics and academic psychologists also need to consider
the nature of lawyers and the nature of legal negotiation. Given the extensive
evidence of the way mood affects a variety of decisionmakers in a variety of
contexts, including negotiation, it is unlikely that mood plays no role at all in
negotiations by lawyers and other negotiators in legal settings. At the same time,
exactly what role mood plays in which legal negotiations is not free from doubt.
Instead, as we've seen, there are plausible reasons to suppose mood plays less of a
role (e.g., longer negotiations may minimize mood at any one time), more of a role
(e.g., longer negotiations may allow emotions to spiral), or some more complex and
298. Richard M. Wenzlaff& Daniel M. Wegner, Thought Suppression, 2000 Annual Rev. of Psychol.
59, 80 (trauma, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and depression are problems that are "associated with
disturbing, intrusive thoughts and frequent suppression attempts, and for which there exists at least some
experimental evidence that thought suppression may play a role in the production or maintenance of the
disorder"); Keith Petrie, Roger Booth & James Pennebaker, The Immunology Effects of Thought
Suppression, 75 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 264 (1998). See also Thompson, Nadler & Kim, supra n. 7,
at 141. On the emotional labor of lawyering, see Robert Eli Rosen, And Tell Tchaikovsky the News: The
Wedding of Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Lawyering, 5 Psychol., Pub. Pol. & L. 944, 945
(1999).
299. See generally Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, supra n. 7 (suggesting that former Secretary of State
James Baker may have allowed Iraqis to believe their invasion of Kuwait would not provoke a United
States response because Baker did not seem too emotional).
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different role (such as the different meaning that mood may signal to others). We
next turn to how lawyers and other legal negotiators may try to manage mood to
improve their negotiations. In general, we assume that more positive moods will be
associated with greater success and negative moods with less success for many
lawyers for much of the time. Although we speak primarily of lawyers and legal
negotiators, much of the general advice will apply to other negotiators as well.
IIl. WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW: CAN RESEARCH ON How MILD MOOD
AFFECTS NEGOTIATION SUCCESS TRANSLATE INTO TRAINING LAWYERS
To NEGOTIATE BETTER THROUGH MOOD MANAGEMENT?
For those of us who teach negotiation, the logical question that follows from the
basic scientific research that even mild moods affect negotiation is simple: How can
we manage mood better to get better negotiation results?"® For those of us who
worry about the mental and physical health of negotiators, there is a related
questions: Can we teach negotiation in ways that improve the mental and physical
health of lawyers?3°" Again, as with the basic question of how mood affects
negotiation, there has rarely been a shortage of opinions about what negotiators
should do.3"2 However, there has been a large shortage of scientifically-linked
research on precisely how to manage moods to get better negotiation results. Inpart,
as with the basic research on how mood affects negotiation, this is because much
negotiation literature is not statistical and quantitative, but often more qualitative and
contextual. It is also largely because of the nature of even scientific research on how
mood affects negotiation. Many of those who study how mood affects negotiation
are interested in the topic as part of more general research on how mood affects a
range of cognitions and activities; once they have shown that mood affects
negotiation, they seem more interested in moving on to how mood affects other
activities than trying to figure out how to tell negotiators how to manage mood
better. 303
300. Although this is a logical question, it is a question that many teachers of negotiation treat with
some skepticism, sometimes bordering on hopelessness: many act as if their students will simply never
learn. Indeed, some point to evidence that people often continue to make many cognitive errors even
after they are pointed out. One of the most accomplished scholars and teachers of negotiation, Max
Bazerman, has written that he thinks it is difficult to change the ingrained cognitive errors that people
make in negotiation, such as the anchoring error of sticking too much to an initial price, e.g., the sticker
price of a car. See supra text accompanying nn. 27-28.
301. See supra text accompanying n. 297. See generally Dennis P. Stolle, David B. Wexler & Bruce
J. Winick, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Law as a Helping Profession (Carolina Acad. Press
2000) (legal scholarship, policy, and teaching should consider therapeutic consequences as one value).
302. See generally Thompson & Kim, supra n. 59, at 3 ("Prescriptive solutions to avoid or eliminate
bias at the bargaining table are less widely researched than establishing the existence of the biases
themselves.").
303. See supra n. 40 (leading researchers on mood and negotiation generally to study how mood
affects a variety of thoughts and behavior). In part, this reflects the relatively large contribution of social
psychologists to negotiation and the relatively untapped potential of psychologists in other areas,
particularly clinical psychology. See Bazerman et al., supra n. 26, at 303.
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Even those who do have such an interest, however, may be far more familiar
with the social psychological study of how emotion affects thinking and doing than
with the focus of clinical scientists (including clinical psychologists and
psychiatrists) with how to manage moods and our reaction to moods.3° As we saw,
this orientation also affects the way that researchers study how mood affects
negotiation: researchers often do not look at the kinds of measures and variables,
such as measures of depression and anxiety and obsessiveness, that are linked to
research on how to manage mood and personality. In part, then, the reason why it
is difficult to figure out precisely what to do stems from the various questions
identified above, including questions about how different moods affect different
persons in different kinds of negotiations.
Despite the need for more basic research on how mood affects negotiation, this
section draws some tentative lessons and additional questions about what is to be
done. First, we can see that some of the most conventional approaches about how
to deal with mood run counter to scientific evidence. Second, we examine two more
promising strategies: (1) attempts to correct for the potentially dysfunctional effects
of certain moods and (2) attempts to change dysfunctional moods. As we noted
early on, and in the last section, we do not yet know precisely what moods will be
best for what lawyers and what legal negotiations; therefore, we cannot be sure
exactly what moods to induce or exactly what corrections to apply. Nevertheless,
we are reasonably confident that research will show that positive mood often leads
to better negotiation results. Finally, we consider a frequent tension between shorter
term strategies to manage mood in particular instances and longer term strategies to
manage mood.
A. What We Know: Popular Strategies Don't Work
1. Avoiding and Suppressing Emotion Don't Work
The advice to try to ignore or suppress emotion comes in several different
variations. In its crudest form, some negotiators simply think it is best to ignore
emotion as something that is simply irrational and therefore irrelevant.05 In a less
crude form, some people might think emotion in negotiation is important, but not to
the negotiation itself; the emotion can simply be ignored during the negotiation and
dealt with later .31 Sometimes one finds such emotion-avoiding strategies clearly
articulated in maxims like, "Don't get mad; get even." Often, however, these
emotion-avoiding strategies may be so deeply entrenched and rooted in culture (be
304. Thompson, Nadler, & Kim provide a concise introduction to the social psychology of mood and
negotiation, but their discussion of the management of emotions does not draw on much of the literature
in clinical psychology on how moods are managed. See Thompson, Nadler & Kim, supra n. 7.
305. See supra text accompanying n. 12.
306. Cf Rosen, supra n. 298, at 945 (acknowledging that denial of emotion may be linked to
masculine practices but suggesting that "[a]lthough being aware of emotions and psychological
phenomena generally is-always indicated, being disengaged is not always therapeutically contra-
indicated").
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it labeled Anglo or male or otherwise 3 ) that we see this implicit dictate to avoid
emotion in the way that the topic is simply not discussed. In legal texts and
materials, this same view of emotion as merely irrelevant or distorting arises from
the view of the cool-headed lawyer who can simply "cool out" the client and prevent
emotions from getting in the way - a role sometimes also attributed to some kinds
of mediators who try to help opposing parties get "beyond" emotions into a purely
"rational" resolution of issues.)°
This strategy does not work for at least four sets of reasons. First the attempt
to suppress emotions simply may not work at all - the emotions will still exist. A
slew of research on thought-suppression shows it often leads to a paradoxical
rebound effect: the very thoughts one tries to suppress will often come back more
frequently and/or more intensely."° And, as we saw, when an emotion is present, it
may have a powerful effect on the way parties negotiate and the results they
obtain.3
10
Second, apart from the research on how mood affects negotiation, shows other
research that attempting to suppress emotions impairs one's cognitive skills,
particularly memory. In one very recent study, researchers found that people who
were told to conceal their emotions remembered fewer details from slides they
saw. 31' The researchers theorized that trying to conceal emotions drained limited
cognitive resources, thereby leaving less cognitive resources available for storing
information in memory.3 2 This has crucial implications for negotiations: negotiators
must be able to observe and retain details about what others want and need in order
to identify potential tradeoffs and to identify the terms others will accept that will
benefit the negotiator best.
Third, established research shows that attempts to suppress emotion are
associated with worse physical and mental health in the long-run.1 3 These worse
base line mental health conditions, in turn, may make it more likely in future
negotiations that negotiators will be in the kind of negative moods that we saw led
to worse results.31 4
307. See Menkel-Meadow, supra n. 21, at 81-88. See also supra n. 20 (on the difficulties of defining
the exact scope of any culture).
308. See Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 L. & Policy 7, 13
(1986) (some mediators emphasize predictions about what courts might do and others probe underlying
psychological needs more).
309. See Leslie S. Greenberg, Emotion and Change Processes in Psychotherapy, in Handbook of
Emotions (Michael Lewis & Jeannette Haviland eds., 1993) (Trying to stop emotion is like trying to
stop a stream; a flood may be the result."); Richard M. Wenzlaff & Daniel M. WegnerThought
Suppression, 51 Annual Rev. Psychol. 59 (2000); Joseph Forgas, Introduction, in Feeling and Thinking,
supra n. 46, at 8 (providing historical context to idea that suppressing emotion does not work).
310. See supra section four.
311. See Jane Richards & James Gross, Emotion Regulation and Memory: The Cognitive Costs of
Keeping One's Cool, 79 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 410,414 (2000).
312. Id.
313. See Wenzlaff& Wenger, supra n. 298; Petrie, Booth & Pennebaker, supra n. 298.
314. One of the goal's of treatment of depression is to train those prone to depression to prevent sad
moods from spiraling into depression:
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Finally, although there are not empirical data to support this directly,
suppressing emotions may lead to worse negotiation outcomes if suppressed conflict
leads to conflict later and therefore less compliance with agreements. One of the
major claims made by supporters of ADR is that parties comply more with
agreements reached in ADR than with agreements imposed by court. Moreover,
there is at least some evidence that positive mood increases the likelihood that parties
will honor agreements they make."' It is plausible to suppose that parties that
suppress their emotions, particularly if it is suppressed by the pressure from lawyers
or other agents, may find that, when these suppressed emotions surface later on, they
are less satisfied with their agreements and therefore less likely to comply with them.
Veteran probate mediator Clay Craig puts it this way:
When I'm mediating a case, and there's an agreement, I try to get my fee
paid right away. That night, they are very satisfied with the agreement, and
they can't thank the mediator enough. A couple days later, they think they
could have reached the agreement by themselves. After that, they think it's
a lousy deal, and you forced them into it.3" 6
In part, this pattern may stem from the way parties attempt to suppress emotion
during mediations, but the suppression cannot hold long past the mediation.3t7
2. Merely Venting Emotion Doesn't Work Either
At the opposite end of the spectrum from denying, avoiding, and suppressing
emotion, venting emotion is perhaps one of the most frequently listed approaches to
emotion in popular negotiation literature.3  Again, this includes a relatively
unsophisticated claim that mere venting will sometimes be a phase that allows parties
prophylactic effects of psychological treatments depend on patients acquiring the capacity to
respond to initial symptoms of depression by active coping responses, or at minimum, by
"distancing" from symptoms, rather than by ruminations related to hopelessness or personal
inadequacy. In this way, mild depressed states that might otherwise "spiral" into more severe and
prolonged conditions are "nipped in the bud" and relapse is prevented.
John Teasdale & Philip Barnard, Affect. Cognition, and Change: Re-Modeling Depressive Thought 233
(Lawrence Erlbaum & Assoc. Ltd. 1993); Zindel V. Segal, J. Mark G. Williams & John D. Teasdale,
Mindfldness-Based Cognitive Therapyfor Depression: A New Approach to Preventing Relapse (Guilford
Press 2002).
315. See supra text accompanying nn. 108-09 (positive mood enhanced reported compliance with
agreements). See also supra n. Il1 (studies in general show people comply more with agreements
reached in mediation than in verdicts imposed by courts).
316. Interview with Clay Craig, Attorney at Steel, Hector & Davis; Miami, Florida (November 2000).
317. We note that Barry and Oliver propose a slight variation on this them: they theorize that the
fairness of an agreement will lead to positive emotion that will in turn lead to compliance. Barry &
Oliver, supra n. 76, at 139. As expressed, however, this seems to be more a claim that parties comply
with agreements that they see as fair, whether the fairness was associated with a positive mood or some
other factor.
318. See Allred et al., supra n. 50, at 185 (criticizing Getting To Yes for such an emphasis).
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to somehow move on - seemingly as if an emotional analog to the way vomiting up
some difficult to ingest food may be one way to calm one's digestion.319
As with the popular advice to suppress emotions, however, research shows that
venting emotions - at least in the relatively unregulated and spontaneous way
discussed in popular negotiation advice - also is often not effective. Most
importantly, Allred's study of anger, empathy, and negotiation shows that those who
are angry actually have less accurate views of what other parties want.320 Allred's
study documents clearly that higher rates of anger, and lower rates of concern for
other parties, are associated with identifying fewer opportunities for tradeoffs and
with reaching agreements that identify less joint gains. In other words, the
experience of intense anger makes people less accurate at identifying the needs of
others. This, too, may lead to less success at even zero-sum negotiations if anger
clouds a negotiator's awareness of other parties' interests and bottom-lines. 321 All
these negative consequences of venting may be compounded because venting may
simply lead to an escalating cycle of negative emotion.3 "
Finally, we acknowledge that venting in conjunction with processing of emotion
may work.31 Complex processing seems relatively unavailable in most legal settings.
This kind of processing is unlikely to occur in a simple discussion between either
parties to a case or between lawyers. It may be worth exploring whether such
processing might be possible in negotiations that involve persons trained in relatively
advanced therapeutic skills, and such processing may be plausible with the presence
of properly trained professionals, such as some mediators.32
319. Id. ("People obtain psychological release through the simple process of recounting their
grievances.") (quoting, with disapproval, Fisher, Ury & Patton, supra n. 58). We are grateful to the
inspiration of one of our cat's encounters with a hairball for the text accompanying this footnote.
320. See supra text accompanying nn. 84-96.
321. See Shell, supra n. 19 (suggesting that negotiators can do better for themselves when they know
what others want). Nevertheless, it is also possible that the anger might have other effects that might not
lead to fewer individual gains. For example, angry parties might be more motivated, feel justified in
higher goals and - since higher goals often are associated with better individual results - get better
individual results. Again, unfortunately, the design of Allred's study makes this question difficult to
assess as well since, as with nearly all mood and negotiation studies, both parties were induced to be in
the same (here, angry) mood; thus, both parties would perhaps feel justified in setting higher goals. In
other studies, the setting of higher goals might lead parties to search for tradeoffs, but in the angry
condition the parties may actually be so angry that they avoid solutions that would benefit themselves
if they also would benefit an opposing party.
322. See supra text accompanying n. 285.
323. See e.g, James Pennebaker, Writing About Emotional Experiences as a Therapeutic Process 8
Psychol. Sci. 162-66 (1997); Rice, Elliot & Greenberg, supra n. 158, at 70-71 (therapy requires clients
not just become aware of emotions but "construct new emotional meanings that can lead to more
adaptive responding").
324. Exactly what degree of processing and what kind of interventions work best is a relatively
complex topic beyond the scope of this particular article. In particular, the scope of this article does not
give us adequate space to consider how well transformative mediation may accomplish helpful
processing of emotion. See e.g. Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation:
Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition (Jossey-Bass 1994).
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B. More Promising Strategies For Mood Management
1. Basic Choices: Correcting Mood Effects Versus Modifying Mood;
Short-Term Versus Long-Term Strategies
We distinguish between strategies designed to improve negotiation by bringing
about actual moods associated with negotiation success from strategies designed to
correct for biases that different moods may produce. As an example of the first
mood induction strategy, Baron suggests that pleasant scents might be introduced
into workplaces because his research showed pleasant scents improved mood and
negotiation performance."2 A second strategy might tell persons who are feeling sad
to make a self-conscious attempt to consider cooperative kinds of tactics because
research shows persons in sad moods tend to adopt more confrontational tactics. We
distinguish these two in principle initially, although we recognize the complex
feedback between these two strategies: correcting for mood distortions by adopting
certain strategies that may lead to greater success, and this greater success may in
turn bring about different moods.
We recognize the limitations of both the mood induction and mood correction
strategies. Both strategies share a common problem of over- or under-correction.
Existing research more clearly establishes this problem for the mood correction
strategy. Although we are not aware of any studies that look at the way that
individuals may attempt to correct for the way that mood may bias negotiation,
research shows people often overcorrect for the potential effect of their emotions. 26
Although less clearly recognized, the mood induction strategies also involve
problems of overcorrection. For example, if we try to induce a positive mood
because that is associated with success, we may induce a positive mood whose
disadvantages outweigh its advantages. Indeed, what may look more like functional
moods overall may really involve both functional and dysfunctional elements.
Although existing research shows that positive moods may be functional by inducing
cooperative strategies, higher goals, and better identification of the goals of others,
research also suggests it may be associated with some dysfunction, like increased
reliance on simplistic reasoning and stereotyping. The same dangers caution against
attempts to induce negative moods. For example, we saw some research showed
negative moods might lead to higher goals, but very negative moods may lead to a
sense of hopelessness that leads to withdrawal, accommodation, and poor results.
Just as happy negotiators may give up because they thought they did better than they
actually did, unhappy negotiators who do not realize how well they did may also
give up in the longer term. In addition, although we emphasize in this article the
way that mood affects success in relatively narrow terms, we note that many would
325. See Baron, supra n. 55.
326. Leonard Berowitz et al., On the Correction of Feeling-Induced Judgmental Biases, in Feeling
and Thinking: The Role Of Affect in Social Cognition 131 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000).
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find mood strategies that depend on illusions and distortion of reality to be a
disadvantage.
321
Outside the area of negotiation, even many social psychologists who recognize
the virtues of positive moods and attitudes recognize they may distort reality.323 In
a telling phrase, one prominent researcher who has shown optimistic patients do
better but nonetheless misperceive their own conditions speaks of "positive
illusions."329 The disadvantages of positive mood may be even greater in certain
legal negotiations and for certain individuals. For example, longer negotiations may
exaggerate the dangers of overconfidence, as those who think they did well in one
phase of a negotiation either self-consciously make additional concessions to others
or simply slack in their efforts.
2. Short-Term Strategies and Mood Inductions: Replicating Mood Inductions
From Existing Research Has Limitations
If one reads the existing research without looking too closely, one might be
tempted to think anything that will induce a positive mood should work to improve
negotiation success. Even some of the most careful students of negotiation suggest
that one useful strategy may be to put oneself and others in a negotiation in a positive
mood.33 We think instead this mood induction strategy, though promising, faces
several limitations.
The first limitation, is that it is not clear that anything that induces a positive
mood will lead to better results. Instead, the particular ways in which researchers
thought they manipulated mood, such as false feedback on a test, may have instead
operated largely by affecting cognitions, such as one's confidence in one's
abilities.33' Existing research therefore makes it difficult to believe that simply
inducing a mood by other means, such as the pleasant music that researchers in other
areas have shown generally induces a positive mood,332 will work to improve
negotiation.
One might instead try replicating the manipulations associated with mood. Such
a strategy works better for some of the manipulations than others. One might try to
post cartoons around a conference room or spray it with a scent. On the other hand,
327. Moreover, when one turns from the question of how one's own optimism may distort reality to
inducing moods in others that distort their view of reality, additional moral problems arise. See John
Rawls, Theory of Justice (Harv. U. Press 1971) (one principle of justice may be that the principles be
transparent to all).
328. See e.g. Martin F. Seligman, Learned Optimism 291 (1990) (optimism "may sometimes keep us
from seeing reality with the necessary clarity").
329. Shelley E. Taylor et al., Psychological Resources, Positive Illusions, and Health, 55 Am.
Psychol. 99, 106-07 (2000) ("The ability to remain optimistic, even unrealistically optimistic, in the face
of deterioration ... appear[s] to be physiologically protective."); Shelley E. Taylor, Positive Illusions:
Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind (Basic Books 1989).
330. Thompson, Nadler & Kim, supra n. 7.
331. See supra text accompanying n. 164.
332. See supra n.4.
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it's relatively difficult to replicate directly the effects of giving false feedback on a
test in most negotiation scenarios!
A second limitation of such mood inductions is their uncertain effect on
particular individuals and their uncertain effect over time. What induces positive
moods in one individual will not necessarily induce positive moods in another. For
example, we find the commercial air fresheners that induce positive moods in many
puts us in a rather annoyed mood.33
We expect our ongoing research on naturally-occurring mood will remedy some
of these difficulties. Our current research involves asking individuals about their
moods before a negotiation without attempting to change those moods. To the
extent we find that those who report being in certain moods have certain results, we
may generate advice that individuals might do whatever works for them to induce
moods associated with success in negotiation. Likewise, we could advise them to
alter moods associated with impediments to negotiation. For example, if someone
noticed they did better at negotiations that called for creativity and collaboration
when they felt more positive moods, and certain music made them feel better,33 then
we might advise them to listen to such music before such negotiations. Such an
approach is consistent with the success shown by behavioral medicine researchers
in using relaxation and stress management techniques to help persons living with
breast cancer and other disorders: as part of an extensive program of research, they
found a program including relaxation improved physical health, but that different
relaxation techniques (such as visualization, progressive relaxation, and mindfulness
meditation) appealed to different people. 335  We expect that the exact methods
needed to generate certain emotions will vary not just by individuals but perhaps,
too, among those from different cultural backgrounds as well.336
A final limitation of short term mood inductions is that they may not last long
enough for some negotiations. In one doctoral dissertation for example, the
333. At a recent conference on translating theory to practice, veteran negotiation teacher and trainer
Lela Love tried to apply research on conditions conducive to creativity by designing an exercise that
would put individuals in a playful mood: she had the audience of seventy or so divide into groups
according to birth month and then make various animal noises, i.e., those born in the winter month made
cow noises, in spring months, pig noises, and so on. One of us in the audience laughed a lot, but other
prominent negotiation teachers sat stone faced. At a panel discussing that effort, and a version of this
paper, we asked an international audience in Budapest to moo as well and then asked how many felt
better, worse, or no difference. We found a variety of responses. In addition, it is unclear whether
inductions that work on unsuspecting students in one negotiation will work consistently in others: Glade
air freshener that makes people happy may not make people happy if it is always in the background. See
Baron, supra n. 55, at 377.
334. See supra n. 4.
335. Michael Antoni et al., Cognitive-Behavioral Stress Management Intervention Enhances
Optimism And The Sense Of Positive Contributions Among Women Under Treatment For Early-Stage
Breast Cancer, _ Health Psychol. _(forthcoming). See John Kabat Zinn, Full Catastrophe Living435
(Dell 1990) (describing various techniques of stress reduction, including sitting meditation, body scans,
and mindful yoga).
336. Cf Seligman, supra n. 328 (optimism "may work better in some cultures than in others"). We
gratefully acknowledge audience members in our presentation to the 2001 Law and Society meeting for
emphasizing this point.
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researcher failed to replicate prior effects of a mood induction, and she concluded
that this resulted from the failure of the mood induction to last as long as the
negotiation.33
3. Short Term Strategies: Corrections For The Effect of Mood May Work
The exact mood correction depends on further findings about legal negotiations,
but the existing research suggests at least three corrections worth considering. First,
one may try to correct for the way that mood affects strategy. As we saw, most
people negotiate more cooperatively when in a better mood and more competitively
when in a worse mood."' Exactly when to use which strategy is a source of
considerable disagreement depending in part on an assessment of how frequently
negotiators have potential for tradeoffs or other creative solutions and how often
they essentially involve zero-sum arguments over some finite good like a sum of
money. Our purpose here is not to resolve that debate.
Once an individual decides on one kind of strategy, he339 should consider how
his present mood may undermine or bolster that strategy. If, for example, he decides
the settlement of a billing dispute is really about the payment of money (perhaps
because, despite consultation, his client explicitly instructs him only to concentrate
on maximizing the collection of money at this point), then he should be aware of
how his positive mood may undermine that strategy. Such a positive mood might
incline him to lose sight of his client's explicit instructions and be more cooperative,
as Forgas's study suggested; worse, as Baron's study showed, a positive mood might
induce him to make more concessions.3" Exactly how he corrected for this danger
might involve a variety of possibilities. For example, if he fears he is in such a good
mood that he might be tempted to concede in person, he might conduct the
negotiation by email.
Consider a quite different scenario: a somewhat unhappy or even angry person
has been asked to collect on a debt owed by a producer to an actor. The actor may
be somewhat satisfied with receiving the money, but he might well instruct his
attorney that he has other goals as well: he may be concerned about his long-term
reputation in a close industry, or he may even be interested in pursuing some further
acting job with this particular producer. In that case, the lawyer would want to
correct for the way that his negative mood might make him tend to be more
adversarial and tightly focused. Therefore, based on research that direct email
further promotes adversarial negotiations,34' he might choose to meet with the
producer in person. If he negotiated by email, he would make a deliberate effort to
include some personal chit-chat in the beginning of the email exchange. In addition,
337. See Michelle Weitzman, An Examination of the Effect of Affect on the Outcomes and Processes
of Negotiations 85-86 (1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
338. See supra text accompanying nn. 106-09.
339. We use the male pronoun deliberately here to counter the silent assumption that only women and
other outgroups have emotion. See supra n. 115.
340. See supra text accompanying n. 118.
341. Seesupran. 71.
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to correct for the tendency to be competitive and narrow, he might try in advance to
come up with a variety of potential options, such as paying money over time, paying
in other forms of goods, taking a share in some future productions' revenue, and so
on.
Second, individuals may want to correct for the way that mood shapes
perception of information. When angry, individuals often make incorrect
assumptions about what matters to other persons. When happy, persons often think
that they may have done better than they did, and unhappy persons may not realize
quite how well they did." 2 In addition, research outside negotiation shows that
happy persons may actually have positive illusions about how good reality is. 3
Thus, to return to the scenarios above, the somewhat angry negotiator with the
producer will want to make extra efforts to find out what the producer's interests
really are. A variety of corrections may apply: he might ask about such interests in
a letter in advance, or he might put such a discussion in a written agenda he offers
at a meeting in person. The happy negotiator may also want to correct for his
perceptions as well. In collecting on the debt, the negotiator may be too quick to
accept representations about just how much money the person has to pay: perhaps
the person will accept that the debtor only has so many assets, without asking about
other assets his wife may have, or about prospects of future assets from inheritances
or otherwise.
Third, negotiators may attempt to correct for the way that mood may affect
bargaining intensity, both in terms of initial goals and persistence. Here, the
evidence is more mixed: some research suggests those in more positive moods may
set higher goals,3" but others suggests those in persistently worse moods may also
set higher goals." Accordingly, one potential source of correction may be for
negotiators to be aware of whether their mood is either better or worse - either than
their typical mood or of typical negotiators. If they determine it is, then they may
make extra efforts to think exactly about why they have set the goals that they have.
As with the discussion of what tactics are best,3" precisely how individuals should
set goals is a matter of some controversy that we do not seek to resolve here.
Instead, we suggest that individuals aware of mood changes pay close attention to
the approach they believe generally best helps them set goals.
In a similar way, individuals may correct for the way that mood distorts their
bargaining intensity. As with goals, we face two similar complications. First, there
is some controversy over how much time individuals should spend on a particular
342. See Kramer et al., supra n. 3, at 122 (happy negotiators); Tillema, Lebrone & Scott, supra n. 140
(depressed individuals).
343. See supra text accompanying nn. 328-29.
344. See supra text accompanying n. 81.
345. Seesupran. 140.
346. Compare Fisher, Ury & Patton, supra n. 58 (set goals according to objective standards like
market value or expert evaluation) with Shell, supra n. 19 (set high goals generally because high goals
lead to greater success).
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negotiation and how intensely they should bargain." 7 Second, it is not entirely clear
how mood will affect such intensity: happy negotiators may give up in longer term
negotiations because they believe they have done better than they actually did, and
unhappy negotiators may give up because they feel that they have not done as well
as they actually did. 48 As with goals, our best advice, on the evidence now
available, is that, if negotiators notice a significant variation in their mood, they pay
careful attention before they finalize a deal. Again, different negotiators may
implement this in different ways: some may state early on that they need to consult
a client before finalizing a deal; others may make a note to themselves; others may
bring along someone who is instructed to stop him before he reaches a final
agreement.
C. What Science Shows Best:
Strategies For Promoting Longer Term Mood Management
We next turn to two scientifically studied ways of dealing with emotion. The
better established and better studied method involves variations of cognitive-
behavioral techniques. There is already a variety of evidence that suggests that
people in better moods will often negotiate better, though there remain questions
about whether some better moods sometimes become dysfunctional. Cognitive-
behavioral techniques have been well-established to improve the moods of even
severely depressed persons," persons with severe anxiety, and persons with severe
obsessive thoughts. 3" Moreover, there is mounting evidence that these techniques
may be taught in classroom settings rather than in individual one-on-one
treatments. " ' The second technique involves various approaches to training people
347. See e.g, Bazerman, supra n. 131 (some people may spend too much time negotiating over things
that are not worth that much). See also Williams, supra n. 8 (American in foreign store does not bargain
as much as shopkeeper wants, and he refuses to deal with her).
348. See supra n. 140.
349. By "severe," we mean here those with symptoms of depression sufficient to be diagnosed with
depression or other disorders.
350. See e.g. Brian F. Shaw, Comparison of Cognitive Therapy and Behavior Therapy in the
Treatment of Depression, 45 J. of Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 543 (1977); Christine Jamison &
Forrest Scogin, The Outcome of Cognitive Bibliotherapy with Depressed Adults, 63 J. of Consulting &
Clinical Psychol. 644 (1995); Peter D. McLean & Ralph A. Hakstian, ClinicalDepression: Comparative
Efficacy of Outpatient Treatments, 47 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 818 (1979); Dianne L.
Chambless & Martha M.Gillis, Cognitive Therapy of Anxiety Disorders, 61 J. Consulting & Clinical
Psychol. 248 (1993); Thomas D. Borkovec & Ellen Costello, Efficacy of Applied Relaxation and
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in the Treatment of Generalized Anxiety Disorder, 61 J. Consulting &
Clinical Psychol. 619 (1993); David H. Barlow, Ronald M. Rapee & Timothy A. Brown, Behavioral
Treatment of GeneralizedAnxiety Disorder, 23 Behav. Therapy 551 (1992); William Fals-Stewart, Allen
P. Marks & John Schafer,A Comparison offBehavioral Group Therapy and Individual Behavior Therapy
in Treating Obsessive-compulsive Disorder, 181 J. Nervous & Mental Disease 189 (1993); Patricia Van
Oppen et al., Cognitive Therapy and Exposure in Vivo in the Treatment of Obsessive Compulsive
Disorder, 33 Behav. Res. & Therapy 379 (1995).
351. See e.g. Thomas E. Joiner, Zachary R. Voetz & M. David Rudd, For Suicidal Young Adults With
Comorbid Depressive and Anxiety Disorders, Problem-Solving Treatment May Be Better Than
Treatment as Usual, 32 Prof. Psychol.: Res. & Prac. 278 (2001); Thomas J. D'Zurilla & Arthur M.
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in concentration and mindfulness. This second technique is largely based on various
kinds of meditative practices, but researchers sometimes avoid the word
"meditation."" 2 This mindfulness has been scientifically associated with a decrease
in self-reports of moderate depression, anxiety,. and pain.3" There is also some
limited recent evidence that it may increase the empathy,35 which (over some
relevant range) is associated with better negotiation results and creativity.3" In
addition, mindfulness may also be useful in promoting the awareness of emotions
and mood that is frequently a component of cognitive-behavioral techniques. 6
Nezu, Problem-Solving Therapy: A Social Competence Approach to Clinical Intervention (Springer
1999); Arthur M. Nezu, Christine M. Nezu & Michael G. Perri, Problem-Solving Therapy for
Depression: Theory, Research, and Clinical Guidelines (Wiley 1989); Peter M. Lewinsohn, Gregory N.
Clarke & Harry M. Hobernan, The Coping With Depression Course: Review and Future Directions,
21 Canadian J. of Behav. Science 470 (1989); Peter M. Lewinsohn et al., Group TherapyforDepression:
The Coping with Depression Course, 13 Intl. J. Mental Health 8 (1985). We are particularly encouraged
by evidence of success of a group based prevention of depression class for college students who scored
high on pessimism scales, which are associated with risk for depression. Martin E.P. Seligman, Peter
Schulman, Robert J. Derubeis & Steven D. Hollon, The Prevention of Depression and Anxiety, 2
Prevention & Treatment (1999) (available at <http://journals.apa.org/prevention/volume2).>).
This evidence that more efficient group settings may work in teaching mental health skills is also
reflected by some evidence in physical health settings. Researchers in Colorado found that people with
chronic physical health problems who attended group meetings with a doctor not only had better
physical health results but also reported greater satisfaction with their physicians. Gina Kolata, Harried
Doctors Try to Ease Big Delays and Rushed Visits, N.Y. Times (New York, NY) A 1, A16 (Jan. 4,2001).
We acknowledge that Difficult Conversations alluded to the influence ofcognitive-behavioral therapy
and included some very brief examples of techniques related to cognitive-behavioral therapy. See Stone,
Patton & Heen,supra n. 12, at 100 (including advice that "the route to changing your feelings is through
altering your thinking" and "we need to explore our assumptions abut the other person's intentions").
Such advice is consistent with recommendations Beck has given in a variety of contexts and publications
about cognitive-behavioral therapy. See e.g. Aaron T. Beck, M.D., Love Is Never Enough 123 (1988)
(discussing importance of recognizing automatic thoughts in changing feelings) and 11-12 (discussing
dangers of inferring what another person intended).
352. See e.g. Kabat Zinn, supra n. 335, at 2 (acknowledging that program of "stress reduction and
relaxation program" is rooted in Asian practices, but generally avoiding such references explicitly in
book); Jon Kabat Zinn, Wherever You Go There You Are, 263 (Hyperion 1994) ("As much as I can I
avoid using the word 'spiritual' altogether."). In considering the potential role of meditation for lawyers
and law students, we are inspired by Len Riskin. See Leonard Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On
the Potential Contributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and their Clients, 7
Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 601 (2002). We also acknowledge the help of the Center for Contemplative Mind
in Society and Joseph Goldstein who conducted a meditation retreat for lawyers and law professors,
which two of us attended. Although we emphasize mindfulness mediation here, we elsewhere have
discussed how research shows a variety of forms of mediation may improve mood. See Clark Freshman,
Adele M. Hayes & Greg C. Feldman, Adapting Meditation to Promote Negotiation Success: A Guide
to Varieties and Scientific Support, 7 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 701 (2002).
353. Kabat Zinn, supra n. 335; Riskin, supra n. 352.
354. Shauna L. Shapiro, Gary E. Schwartz & Ginny Bonner, Effects of Mindfulness-Based Stress
Reduction on Medical and Premedical Students, 21 J. Behav. Med. 581,592 (1998).
355. Cf. Allred et al., supra n. 50 (concern for other associated with greater joint gain); Freshman,
Hayes & Feldman, supra n. 352 (on mindfulness and creativity). But cf. Mnookin et al., supra n. 10
(describing "tension" between "empathy" and "assertiveness").
356. See generally Teasdale & Bamard, supra n. 314.
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Despite their seemingly dramatic differences," 7 both cognitive-behavioral
therapy and mediation share two virtues: First, both aim not simply to induce a
particular mood but to allow individuals to see reality more clearly.35 Therefore,
both strategies avoid the dangers of simply attempting to induce a mood associated
with success. Neither depends entirely on inducing a certain mood. Second, both
have been shown in general to improve mood in relatively short periods of time (less
than 20 weeks) when taught in group settings.359
Although a full exploration of how to apply either of these two longer-range
strategies to lawyers is beyond the scope of this paper, we have several reasons to
believe that cognitive-behavioral training techniques could be incorporated into legal
curriculum at law schools and in continuing legal education. Most importantly,
many of the techniques associated with cognitive-behavioral therapy fit neatly within
the framework of legal education on negotiation. Like much legal reasoning, they
rely on making decisions based not on first impressions but on careful weighing of
evidence.3" Like much legal teaching on negotiation, they rely on teaching one to
357. Although these two strategies may seem quite distinct, and indeed may be taught distinctly, we
are not alone in recognizing the way the two may contribute to each other or, more generally, the way
more Western psychological techniques may work with more Eastern meditation techniques. Most
prominently, we note that the psychologist Teasdale and others have studied the way that mindfulness
may be combined with cognitive techniques. See Teasdale & Barnard, supra n. 314; Segal, Williams
& Teasdale, supra n. 314. More recently, Tara and Daniel Goleman (the famous author of Emotional
Intelligence) have also pursued this connection. See Tara Benett-Goleman, Emotional Alchemy
(Harmony Books 2001).
358. Aaron Beck made this clear in his influential first major work on using cognitive-behavioral
therapy to treat depression:
The personal paradigm of the patient when he is in a depressed state produces a distorted view of
himself and his world. His negative ideas and beliefs appear to be a veridical representation of
reality to him even though they appear farfetched to other people and also to himself when he is not
depressed .... The gross changes in his cognitive organization lead to incorrect information
processing .... We propose... that when the patient's personal paradigm is reversed and realigned
with reality ... his depression starts to disappear.
Beck, supra n. 133, at 21 (emphasis in original).
In terms of meditation, the goal is also to see reality. See e.g. Daniel Goleman, The Meditative Mind
23-28 (G.P. Putman's Sons); Freshman, Hayes & Feldman, supra n. 352.
359. See Shaprio, Schwartz & Bonner, supra n. 354 (eight week course in meditation techniques
taught to medical school students); Judith S. Beck, Cognitive Therapy: Basics and Beyond 8 (Guilford
Press 1995).
360. One of the most recent books on cognitive-behavioral therapy, emphasizes the careful scrutiny
of evidence - indeed even using the phrase "Socratic" so familiar to lawyers to describe how a cognitive-
behavioral therapist works with clients:
Sally' therapist helps her focus on a specific problem... identify her dysfunctional thinking [and]
... evaluate the validity of her thought .... He does so through gentle Socratic questioning which
helps foster Sally's sense that he is truly interested in collaborative empiricism, that is, helping her
determine the accuracy and utility of her ideas via a careful review of data.
Beck, supra n. 359, at 8.
Consider, too, Young's description of his approach to dealing with schemas, which includes such
schemas as the mistrust schema that may infect experiments with anger like Allred's:
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replace either-or thinking that fixates on a narrow range of solutions with problem-
solving that identifies a range of options that may satisfy one's underlying
interests. 6' Mindfulness training presents a more complicated case, and we and
others have made that case elsewhere.362 Although it may often deliver positive
mood in the same way as cognitive behavioral training, it also offers a distinct
benefit: mindfulness may allow individuals to learn how their moods affect them.363
Such individual awareness may be especially helpful because mood may affect
different individuals in different ways."
D. The Tension Between Short-Term and Longer-Term Strategies
The final complication in translating mood research into training efforts
involves tensions between relatively short-term and relatively long-term strategies.
Short-term mood induction strategies may involve a variety of mild mood
manipulations; longer-term strategies may involve various techniques to change
one's baseline mood or to alter the degree to which mood varies in stressful
circumstances. At one end of such a continuum, one may spray scents or play music
that typically bring about a certain mood in the short term; at the other 6nd, one may
resort to multi-week training programs, individually or in classes.
Some tempting short-term strategies may not work over longer periods of time.
Most notably, as we saw, simply ignoring or suppressing emotion may work in the
short term, but may produce negative consequences in the long term.
Less obviously, techniques that may work over the longer-term may involve
costs in the short-term. Although the research is less clear on this point, we note this
tension in both cognitive-behavioral training and mindfulness meditation, two
longer-term strategies we find promising. In cognitive-behavioral training, we note
there is reason to believe that changing habits of thought may indeed produce better
outcomes in the medium term, but may involve short-term distress. This
phenomenon also fits a more general explanation of change associated with dynamic
systems theory: research suggests that before individuals make changes in the way
they think and act, they sometimes get worse on the very dimensions that later
improve. For example, depressed patients seem to have more ups and downs in their
moods before an improvement in their moods. 65 Although a number of studies
The first step in dealing with schemas cognitively is to examine the evidence for and against the
specific schema which is being examined. This involves looking at the client's life and experiences
and considering all the evidence which appears to support or refute the schema. The evidence is
then examined critically to see if it does, in fact provide support for the schema.
Young, supra n. 159, at 77.
361. See e.g. Beck & Freeman & Associates, supra n. 219.
362. See Freshman, Hayes & Feldman, supra n. 352.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Adele M. Hayes & Jennifer Strauss, Dynamic Systems Theory As a Paradigm For The Study Of
Change in Psychotherapy: An Application To Cognitive Therapy For Depression, 66 J. Consulting &
Clinical Psychol. 939 (1998).
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document that mindfulness training may increase positive mood and a variety of
health outcomes, many meditation teachers note that meditators may go through
periods of feeling worse as well."
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude primarily by noting that our project has barely begun. Our overall
goal here has been to help the scientific study of mood and the legal study of
negotiation inform each other. In particular, we hope that legal scholarship and
teaching may begin to take seriously the importance of mood in both scholarship,
where it may offer scientific methods to test conventional folk wisdom, and in legal
teaching, where it may offer scientific insights into mood that compliment the rigor
of rational analysis of negotiation. So, too, we hope that the already well developed
study of how mood affects cognition may take seriously the possibility that mood
may affect different persons and different contexts in somewhat different ways. In
addition, we hope that both social and clinical psychologists may begin exploring not
just the effects of mood on negotiation, but how negotiators may be better trained so
mood furthers their success in negotiation, both by mood corrections and corrections
for mood effects, both in short-term and longer-term ways. Eventually, we h6pe
such research shows the potential to teach negotiation to promote moods that not just
lead to successful and efficient negotiations but also mentally and physically healthy
negotiators.
366. See e.g. Goleman, supra n. 358, at 28 (at a relatively advanced stage of meditation, the
meditator's mind "is dominated by feelings of discontent and listlessness towards all its own contents");
Freshman, Hayes & Feldman, supra n. 352.
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